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MEMOIRS

OF

SIMON BOLIVAR,

PRESIDENT LIBERATOR

OF

THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA;

AND OF

HIS PRINCIPAL GENERALS;

24344

COMPRISING

A SECRET HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION, AND THE EVENTS WHICH PRECEDED IT, FROM 1807 TO THE PRESENT TIME.

BY

GEN. L. V. DUCOUDRAY HOLSTEIN,

EX-CHIEF OF THE STAFF OF THE PRESIDENT LIBERATOR.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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MEMOIRS OF BOLIVAR.

CHAPTER XIV.

Evacuation of Carupano — Skirmish at Ocumare — Fifth Flight of General Bolivar, and his Retreat to the Island of Hayti — M'Gregor's Retreat towards Barcelona.

We have seen how General Bolivar acted in Carupano, how jealous he was of his authority, and what were my recompenses after so many fatigues and disgustful services. The fear of General Bolivar that the creation of a foreign legion would compromise his authority, shows sufficiently the little confidence he had in his own merit. Then how could 1500 and more, foreigners, give him the law, (as he said distinctly to me) being in his country, surrounded by his countrymen, and having already his authority established. If George Washington should have protested against the landing of so many thousand French troops and foreign officers, during the revolutionary war, would it not have been prejudicial to him and his country? How differently did he treat these auxiliary foreigners; but George Washington was a *man*, a soldier, a sage; and Simon Bolivar a *liliputian* in every respect in comparision with this great man! Should such a man be suffered to be compared with

Bolivar? No, certainly not, as will be sufficiently shown in the course of this work.

General Bolivar is not the only one who is jealous of strangers; this jealousy is very common among the chieftains of Colombia, and is, I must say, characteristic of them. Their prejudices, their education, their talents, their ignorance, is the natural consequence of the Spanish system to suppress, in the Americans, every spark of light and industry. The superficial knowledge acquired by some among them is regarded as a phenomenon, as an extraordinary and remarkable instance, and such a man is a hero among them, when he would be a very common and ordinary man among civilized and enlightened nations, where education, intercourse with strangers, industry and liberal institutions, have a daily influence upon the population. The ceremonies of the catholic religion, the intolerance of the greatest part of the clergymen, the influence which monks, friars, and priests have, down to the present day, upon the people, the miserable condition of public education, the natural apathy of the inhabitants, the total want of industry, agriculture, and commerce, united with military despotism, can never give to Colombia freedom and rational liberty, and are altogether unfavourable to the production of men of talent and liberal ideas. The few existing cannot raise their voices against those of thousands, and must necessarily remain silent. Arbitrary arrests, exiles, and punishments, are the natural consequences of a military government, where bayonets, and those who command them, rule exclusively.

Limited talents make an illiberal government, and

never can a man of character, experience, and knowledge, be suffered by such men, because they must naturally fear the consequences of his powerful influence over those who were under his immediate care; and the great difference between the two, will necessarily, sooner or later, be found out. In time of danger and war they will be consulted, suffered to take the command, to make dispositions and act; then here they stand in danger, and expose their lives; but once this danger passed, once in prosperity, they captiously cavil at those actions of yours which have saved them, and employ every means to weaken the favourable impression made upon their subalterns; they try to ridicule you whenever and wherever they can, and suffer your presence with reluctance. It results that the thousands of strangers who have served in Colombia, could never render effective services in a country where their authority was so limited, that it was impossible to act freely and in accordance with their talents and experience. It is a fact, that the greater part of these chieftains have complained of strangers, have exiled, punished, and ill-treated them, alleging that they had rendered very little or no service. This is the greatest injustice ever heard of, as, in the course of this history I shall prove, that Bolivar, the Republic of Colombia, and its chieftains, are indebted to strangers, and their powerful support, for their existence, if not as a free, at least as an independent people.

Labatut took Santa Martha in 1813, and was obliged to evacuate it in consequence of the intrigues of his subalterns. He was arrested and exiled. Louis Aury prevented the evacuation of Carthagena by the patriots.

We have seen how Bolivar has recompensed him. Ducoudray Holstein was the last commander in Carthagena, and protected in Boca Chica many hundred families. He was threatened to be shot! Louis Brion sacrificed his large fortune for the republic, and was the constant support of Bolivar, who treated him very harshly at Savanilla. He died broken-hearted at Curaçao, and so poor that he did not leave a cent to pay the expenses of his burial! General Piar, who fought bravely in 1814 and 1815, when Bolivar fled from Venezuela, and who conquered, in union with Brion, the beautiful and rich province of Guayana, was arrested, tried, and shot. To whom are the Colombians indebted for their successes in 1819 in conquering New Grenada? Was it not to foreign legions? Who gained the battle of Carabobo? Was it not the Irish legion? Thousands of these brave men perished by misery, and maladies brought on in consequence of hardships; and now the Colombians boast that they have gained their independence alone, and without the aid of foreigners. They forget past services, because they want them no more.

It is an astonishing fact, that among all these chieftains of Colombia, not a single man can be found who deserves the name of a great man, a hero, or an extraordinary man. Can Simon Bolivar possibly pass for such a one? It has been proved already, by *facts*, that he is not, and it will be still more fully proved. In contemplating a time of revolution, when the ordinary distinctions of rank and titles are confounded, and the lowest citizen, if he is brave or has talents, can rival the highest, we search in vain for distinguished characters

on the Main. Among the military chieftains, we find Paez, Amismendy, and Padilla, who have achieved some distinguished actions; all the rest are very ordinary characters, who have gained the undeserved name of heroes and skilful men.

I left General Bolivar ready to embark at Carupano for Ocumare. The defection of Generals Marinno and Piar, the want of order, regulation, and provisions, produced diseases and maladies, and a good many of those who came with General Bolivar from Aux Cayes and the Island of Margarita, fell sick and died, or left him. The enemy, profiting by the faults of Bolivar, his want of firmness, activity, and talents, increased their forces in proportion to the declining state of the patriots. The history of the campaign of 1816 is substantially the same as that of 1813 and 14 in Caracas, and ended with the flight and embarkation of General Bolivar, as in the year 1814.

When General Bolivar saw at last that there was no hope of making recruits, or of any support and junction from Marinno and Piar, he followed the advice of Admiral Brion and evacuated Carupano to seek another landing-place more convenient; and so it was determined to go to Ocumare, where he could find more resources and recruits. They landed accordingly in the bay, protected by a little fort of no consequence, and proceeded to the village of the same name, Ocumare, where Bolivar arrived the 3d July, 1816, with thirteen vessels, of which seven only were armed. He published the following proclamation :—

"Head-quarters, at Ocumare, July 6th, 1816.

Simon Bolivar, Supreme Chief, &c. &c. to the Inhabitants of Venezuela.

"An army provided with arms and munitions of war of every kind is on the march, and under my orders, to liberate you.

"I will drive out and exterminate our tyrants, and I will restore you to your rights, your country, and peace. On our part, the killing of the prisoners of war will cease from this instant. We promise to grant a general pardon for those who submit, even European Spaniards.

"All the troops of the enemy which shall join us, will participate with us in the advantages and recompenses which the country and its inhabitants can afford.

"No Spaniard shall be killed, except when resisting with his arms in hand. No harm will be done to the natives who are found in the army of the enemy.

"Our unfortunate brethren who are suffering as slaves, are from this moment declared free. Nature, rights, and government itself, demand their liberty. In the future there will exist in Venezuela no more than one class of inhabitants—all will be citizens.

"As soon as we have taken possession of the capital, we will convoke the people to name their deputies for Congress. During my march upon Caracas, General Marinno will besiege Cumana; General Piar, supported by Generals Roxas and Monaga, will render himself master of the plains, and march against Barcelona; while General Arismendy, with his victorious army, will maintain himself in the Island of Margarita.

"BOLIVAR."

This proclamation is, like those of the same author, drawn up to deceive the ignorant, and those living at a distance. The *army*, of which he speaks as being under his order, consisted of 650 men, of whom 300 had never seen a battle, and whose officers were, a great part of them, totally unfit to command.

"I shall *exterminate* our tyrants," says General Bolivar, "on the 6th of July;" and the 10th of the same month he was beaten by 300 men, which Morales and Guero had assembled in haste, and he fled full gallop from the field of battle to the Bay of Ocumare, where he embarked for the Dutch island of Buen Ayre, as I shall relate hereafter.

"As soon as we have taken possession of the capital (Caracas), we will convoke the people to name their deputies to Congress," says General Bolivar. His sincerity on this occasion is doubted by those who know him and his intentions. In 1813 he spoke the same language, and did nothing to assemble the Congress, when it was in his power; in 1815 he disobeyed, formally, the orders of Congress in New Granada, in besieging Carthagena instead of St. Martha; in 1817, when recalled, the first condition of his admission was to convoke a Congress; it was not done; on the contrary, he broke up the Congress assembled at Cariaco, and persecuted its members in 1818; and the following events in these memoirs will show clearly that he has been, and is decidedly against the formation of any Congress; and when forced to suffer its existence, he has limited its power by military display and authority, so that the senate and chamber of representatives were no more than *nominal*, and the submissive servants of the President Liberator.

"While I march against Caracas, General Marinno will besiege Cumana: General Piar, supported," &c. &c. This is again deception; for some days previously to his evacuation of Carupano, he said *to me*, that he was very sorry to see Marinno and Piar paying not the least regard to his orders; and it is known that in consequence of the defection of these two chieftains, Bolivar was obliged to evacuate Carupano, &c.

To any experienced military man, the following reflections will afford a convincing proof of Bolivar's weakness and small capacity as a commander-in-chief. Instead of employing every means in his power to compel Marinno and Piar to do their duty, he approved, in an official manner, their defection, which naturally encouraged them to act in an isolated and independent way. Then if Marinno, instead of besieging Cumana, had joined Bolivar at Ocumare, the united forces of both would have been sufficient to take Valencia, which had not 200 armed men to defend it, and to march against Caracas, where there were at the time no more than 500 men. The forces of the Spaniards were much dispersed, and would have fallen an easy prey to the patriots, who could have destroyed them, isolated as they were, one column after another. This success would have reanimated the sunken spirit of the inhabitants, not in regard to patriotism, but in regard to confidence in Bolivar's bravery, military skill, and ability to govern them. The actions of the dictator, and his flight, gave them disgust; and, therefore, Bolivar himself might well be discouraged to see, that after more than a month's stay at Carupano, not seventy of the inhabitants came to volunteer under his orders. On the contrary, about the whole population fled on

the approach of Bolivar, and we found deserted houses. The same thing happened at Ocumare, &c. &c.

General Bolivar collected, in virtue of his proclamation of the 6th of July, some hundred slaves, who were armed, and united them to his troops. He collected about 800 men, armed in haste, but without instruction, uniforms, or discipline. With this band of armed men, called the *liberating army*, he marched from Ocumare to Valencia, where, at the time, less than 200 men were able to resist him. The possession of Valencia was precious to him, being situated between Caracas, the plains, and the fortress of Porto Cabello, by which he could have been supplied easily from the plains, where Paez, Zarasa, Roxas, Sedeno, &c. had always acted bravely, and resisted the powerful forces of Morillo.

Morales, arriving at Valencia, heard that General Bolivar had disembarked at Ocumare. Having with him no more than a small escort of cavalry, he lost no time in waiting for more troops, but collected about 200 armed men, and directed his march towards Ocumare. The major of the militia, Jose Guero, joined him with one hundred more; and with this small force, he determined to attack General Bolivar. He met him on the 10th of July, not far distant from the village of Ocumare, upon a hill which commanded a view of the Lake of Valencia. When Morales discovered the advanced guard, commanded by Soublette, he put some *tirailleurs* among the trees, unperceived by the patriots, in the bushy hills where they had to pass, and took an advantageous position with the remainder of his force, to wait a favourable moment

to attack. A small skirmish began, which lasted not a quarter of an hour, when a deserter from Morales was brought before the supreme chief, and acquainted him that this much feared partisan was the person at the head of the Spanish troops. Soublette, as usual, and as has been stated by eye witnesses, fled immediately on hearing some musket shots. General Bolivar, seeing his advanced guard dispersed, lost all presence of mind, spoke not a word, turned his horse quickly round, and fled in full speed towards Ocumare. Colonel Boe (brother-in-law of Mareschal Lefebre Dugue, of Dantzic, who was in this action), related to me afterwards, that Bolivar was so blinded by fear, that his horse ran against Boe's mule, loaded with baggage, and precipitated mule and baggage down the hill, without stopping a single moment. He passed the village at full gallop, and arrived at last at a place of safety, the Bay of Ocumare, two leagues distant from the village of the same name, jumped from his horse, got into a boat, and embarked on board the Diana, the same armed vessel which I had left about three hours previously to his arrival. I had found there a French captain (Mr. Du Clerk), who was sailing from Ocumare to St. Thomas', and who treated me with the greatest kindness, and offered me a passage, gratis, on board his vessel. I had lost (as related), in Villa del Norte, all my baggage, and had only some few changes of clothes, and my uniform, without a single cent in my pocket, being at the same time sick with an intermittent fever. We were very much surprised to see the whole squadron coming after us, under full sail, and we were soon joined by them, all steering towards Bonaire, and lying

close by the Bay of Ocumare. Here I heard the following particulars:—

Bolivar was so seized by a panic terror, that he arrived with only a single aide-de-camp out of six. This was the Lieutenant-Colonel Perez, on board the Diana. Not far distant from the bay, opposite the little fort, was a kind of farm-house, under the roof of which lay, stretched on a mat, the wounded Major Picard, who lost his arm in a surprise (related in the last chapter) of the advanced cavalry guard not far from Carupano, and who, unable to move, was carried on shore, in order to be more comfortable. When he saw Bolivar and his aid-de-camp, Perez, passing close by him at full speed, he called the general, and requested him, for God's sake, to order him to be again carried on board; but the supreme chief did not, or would not hear him, and embarked. Captain Demarquet, another Frenchman, and aide-de-camp of Bolivar, arrived at the bay some minutes after Bolivar was in the boat, and urged the boatswain to return and take him in; but the general ordered him to proceed, and put him on board the Diana. As soon as he was on deck, he directed Captain Debouille,* (the commander of this fast sailing armed vessel, and in the absence of Admiral Brion, on an excursion to the Island of Curaçao, the commander of the squadron), to make the signal to cut their cables and depart, which was done accordingly. They directed their course towards the small Dutch island of Buen Ayre, where they arrived in the afternoon of the 10th of July.

* I have these particulars from Captain Debouille himself.

Thus General Bolivar again left his army, and his command, to put his person in safety, and this was the *fifth* time that he had done so since 1812.

1st. Lieutenant-Colonel Bolivar left, in June 1812, the strong place of Porto Cabello, of which he was governor, and embarking clandestinely in the night, with some officers, in consequence of the fear he had of the revolted Spanish prisoners of war, retired to San Manteo, leaving his garrison without commander or orders; in consequence of which, these retired, and the place fell into the hands of Monteverde.*

2d. The general-in-chief, dictator, liberator of the western provinces of Venezuela, Simon Bolivar, embarked hastily in the night of the 25th of August, 1814, at Cumana, and fled with his colleague, San Jago Marinno, dictator of the eastern provinces of Venezuela, towards Margarita, &c. He lost all presence of mind, and would not listen to any representation of his cousin, Joseph Felix Ribas, and others, to remain with them on the Main; he sent for Marinno, and as soon as the latter was on board, he ordered Commodore Bianchi to cut the cables, and off he sailed. He left Ribas, Villapol, and thousands of his countrymen behind, who had placed their confidence in his skill and bravery—and sought safety *in flight*.†

3d. The captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, Simon Bolivar, not having succeeded in taking Carthagena by force of arms, and

* See Chapter V.

† See Chapter VII.

having lost, through a miserable position, his troops, and the province of New Grenada, embarked on board an English brig of war, and left his countrymen retiring in safety to Kingston, in the Island of Jamaica.

4th. In the naval action of 2d May 1816, the supreme chief of the Republic of Venezuela retired into the long-boat of commodore Brion's armed vessel, and gave the command to Ducoudray Holstein during the whole time of the action, which lasted about four hours.*

5th. And now, at Ocumare, the supreme chief fled and sheltered himself from all danger in the Island of Buen Ayre.

When Admiral Brion arrived at Buen Ayre, from Curaçao, he was much astonished to find the squadron and General Bolivar there; and he came immediately on board the Diana, where General Bolivar had remained the whole day in bed, and reproached him in very strong terms with his cowardice and desertion; and above all, for having given orders to the squadron to follow him alone, and to leave all his companions without means and assistance. This was a well deserved, but humiliating lesson, for a man of Bolivar's proud and vain character. But here, as every where, when the general was isolated, and in misfortune, he was very docile, and endured every thing. Brion, now a little cooler, admonished Bolivar to return to the Main, and rejoin the commanders on the coast of Cumana and Barcelona, and to unite again the patriotic troops. He spoke so convincingly to Bolivar, that at last he consented to depart in the same vessel for the

* See Chapter XIII.

coast of Cumana; while Brion, with the remainder of his squadron, was going to Margarita, to refit some of his vessels.

As soon as General Bolivar arrived on the coast of Cumana, where he found Marinno and Piar, he was received by these two very harshly, and reproached with his new desertion at Ocumare; Piar threatened to try him before a courtmartial, and to have him shot as a deserter and a coward. This last scene enraged the vain and vindictive mind of Bolivar so much, that he afterwards was the most bitter enemy of Piar, which, as I have been assured, was the cause of his subsequent condemnation. Bolivar found it not prudent to remain, and embarked without delay. This essay, and the fear of being treated by other chieftains in the same manner, discouraged him so much, that he ordered Captain Debouille (who had received positive instructions from the admiral to remain at the disposal of the supreme chief), to make the port of Aux Cayes, in the Island of Hayti, from whence he had departed some months before with the sanguine hopes of the most brilliant success! He remained a couple of days, and re-embarked for Jaquemel, from whence he departed by land to Port au Prince, where I had, as related, my last interview with him.

I forgot to say, that during the conversation with me, he told me he had heard that I was going with the expedition of General Mina, who, in fact, had made me several very honourable propositions to join his expedition, which arrived at the time of my stay at Port au Prince. I answered General Bolivar—"I will never go more with General Bolivar or with General Mina,

as long as there is neither organization nor instruction, and only a shadow of an army." Bolivar said—"I believe, *mon cher ami*, you will never forget your *ancien métier*."

The president of Hayti, Alexander Petion, received him very coolly, having already been acquainted with a part of his actions.

Such was the end of an expedition which sailed in May, 1816, from Aux Cayes some months before, which cost large sums, and promised brilliant results. This pitiful end must entirely be attributed to the wrong measures taken by General Bolivar, of which I have related some striking particulars. We have seen that Bolivar had lost, by his own fault,—1st. The forces of Commodore Aury, which were half of the entire strength in vessels and men, lying at that time at Aux Cayes; 2d. His cowardice in the action of the 2d of May alienated from him the esteem and the confidence of hundreds of his subalterns; 3d. By his weakness in following the perfidious advice of his flatterers, he annulled all the good which I could have done in endeavouring to establish order, instruction, and discipline, in a band of armed men, who called themselves generals, colonels, and officers, and who had not the least notion of the first elements of our art. He was opposed, by the same weakness and his jealous fears, to any consent to the organization of a foreign legion, which might have had the most useful consequences. This same weakness of character induced him to consent to the departure of Marinno and Piar against his own conviction, and against mine and Admiral Brion's well-grounded advice; 4th. To crown all these faults,

he lost all his presence of mind in an attack by 300 men, when he had more than 800, and fled with all the speed of his horse at the first musket shots, galloping twelve miles from the field of battle to the Bay of Ocumare, as if the enemy were at his heels.

What I have related here of General Bolivar would appear impossible or exaggerated; but it is, unfortunately enough, too true and authentic. Hundreds of eye-witnesses like myself, as the inhabitants of Buen Ayre, Aux Cayes, Jaquemel, Port au Prince, &c., to whom these facts are perfectly known, will confirm and testify to the correctness of my statements, if they are not blinded by self-interest, or by fear of a persecution, in case of their being settled on the Main or in the service of Colombia. The Gazettes in the Havanna, from July, August, and September, 1816, give a correct account of what had happened in Ocumare; and General Bolivar is treated with the most contemptuous rigour. There will be found a detailed list of all that the Spaniards found in the Bay of Ocumare, of unshipped arms, ammunitions, the beautiful and new print, &c. All these objects were unshipped in order to follow Bolivar's troops, and awaiting the transportation by mules, were left on shore. Bolivar would not suffer their being reshipped.

I fear and hope nothing from Bolivar or the Colombians; my name is on the title page, and I will, and shall state the naked truth, and nothing else, in order to show General Bolivar as he is, and not by declamations, but by facts. I give him credit when he deserves it, and relate his actions and their consequences, and nothing else.

General Bolivar, who had received powerful support from the Haytian government, has acted very ungratefully to the Haytians. Before he came to Carupano, he had sent back the Haytian captain, Courtois, who came with his vessel from Aux Cayes as a transport, and treated him harshly and in a haughty manner, on his making him some just representations. At Carupano he sent two other Haytian vessels back without paying, or consenting to give them any written promises to pay their fleet, and forced them to quit Carupano without the least compensation for their voyage.

This impolitic treatment of the Haytian vessels, and the officers which served in the land troops, united with the condemnation of General Piar, a man of colour, who was shot some years later at Angostura, made a very bad impression on the inhabitants of this hospitable island.

President Petion, who was fully acquainted with the treatment of the Haytians by Bolivar, did not reproach him in the least, but, of course, received him much more coolly, and made no great exertions for a man who behaved so ungratefully. General Bolivar, in one respect, kept his promise to President Petion. The latter assisted him powerfully in his expedition which sailed from Aux Cayes, on condition that Bolivar would promise him the emancipation of the slaves. This General Bolivar faithfully fulfilled, as I have shown by his proclamations, published in Margarita, Carupano, and Ocumare. Bolivar did the same afterwards with his own slaves, in San Mateo, which did him honour.

In consequence of the flight of the supreme chief from the field of battle at Ocumare, and the sailing of

all the vessels from the said bay, General M'Gregor united the scattered troops of Bolivar's corps, and effected a retreat along the sea shore—of which event much has been spoken that is not worthy to be repeated. The fact is, that M'Gregor had nothing else to do, but either to perish or to advance as well as he could, until he effected a junction of his miserable and harassed troops with General Piar, near Barcelona.

The European Gazetters have described this retreat in which nothing was done that was worth mentioning, as one of the most heroic actions of M'Gregor's; and some of them had the absurdity to compare it with the retreat of Xenophon, or of General Moreau. The public is now too well persuaded of the merit of General M'Gregor to render any further reflection necessary, in regard to a man who is well known and justly appreciated.

CHAPTER XV.

Cause of General Bolivar's Recal to the Main.—His Arrival at Barcelona—Siege and Occupation of Barcelona by the Spaniards—Behaviour of General Bolivar at Barcelona.—Years 1816-17.

GENERAL BOLIVAR, whilst in Port au Prince, was the inseparable friend of the brothers Pinneres, whom I have mentioned before,* and of Celedonio, the ex-corregidor at Mompox. He regularly spent his evenings with the two sisters of Soublette, whose mother died at Port au Prince. Mr. Southerland afterwards said to me, "that he wondered at finding in Bolivar nothing extraordinary, nothing to be admired, and nothing adequate to the idea he had entertained of him. I do not like," said he, "his great familiarity with every stranger who is introduced to him. He takes one by the arm and walks up and down my piazza with him, as if they had been acquainted for many years." I told him that Bolivar, in Port au Prince, and unfortunate, was altogether a different man from the supreme chief on the Main, where his haughty manners formed a complete contrast to those he adopted here. Various other gentlemen made the same remarks as Mr. Southerland.

General Bolivar, meanwhile, passed his time in quiet and amusement at Port au Prince. Admiral Brion

* See Chapter VIII.

was busily engaged in endeavouring to persuade the chieftains who remained in Venezuela to consent to his recal. Brion was the most sincere friend Bolivar ever had. He had expended his large fortune, and employed all his credit in fitting out the expedition from Aux Cayes, and he placed entire confidence in General Bolivar's skill and courage. He was grievously disappointed; but, as he often told me, "he knew no other chieftain among the natives who possessed a greater reputation, or more authority, (whether deserved or not,) than General Bolivar. He was the only military character who was able to exercise authority sufficient to unite them all." When I spoke privately to Brion of the strange, and even cowardly conduct of Bolivar, of his weakness, and his incapacity for command, he often asked me, "to whom else would you confide the command?" We discussed once the native chiefs, one by one, and, I confess, could find none, whom, on the whole, we thought preferable to him.

Under this conviction, Admiral Brion was active and ardent in favour of Bolivar; and, after making great exertions for some months, he succeeded in uniting a majority of the chieftains, viz. Arismendy, Paez, Zarasa, Sedenno, Bermudes, Roxas, Monagas, and others, who consented to recal General Bolivar as their commander-in-chief, upon two express conditions: 1st. That he should assemble a congress; 2d. That he should direct the military operations only, and should not meddle with the administration of the republic. He consented to comply exactly with their wishes, and prepared to sail in the Diana, Captain De-

bouille, for Barcelona, the place appointed to receive him.

Before General Bolivar departed, he communicated to President Petion the despatches and his recal, and received from him new supplies of warlike stores.

Bolivar sailed the 25th December, 1816, from the Haytian port, Jaquemel, on board the privateer Diana, accompanied by three of his aides-de-camp, Perez, Chamberlain, and Palacios; his nephew, two brothers Pinneres, and some private families who wished to return to their country. He arrived the 31st of the same month at Barcelona, where the arms, munitions of war, and provisions given him by Petion were immediately disembarked; of which the patriots were in great want.

General Bolivar published a proclamation, in which he again took the former titles: "Commander-in-chief, Captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, Supreme Chief of the Republic," &c. He confirmed his former proclamations respecting the emancipation of slaves, and offered it to those who would serve in the army. He called a new congress, and ordered the deputies to assemble at his head-quarters at Barcelona. He proclaimed a provisional government, of which he took the presidency, under the title of "Supreme Chief of the Republic of Venezuela," &c.

General Arismendy came the 2d January, 1817, with 300 men, to join General Bolivar. This is the same Arismendy who, after the flight of the two dictators, Bolivar and Marinno, from Cumana, in 1814, had treated them as I have related. He said, more-

over, publicly in Margarita, on hearing of General Bolivar's flight from Ocumare, "that General Bolivar's cowardice was shown too often, and that he ought to be tried for it by a courtmartial, and condemned to be shot." Brion not being on the best terms with the governor of Margarita, employed Villaret, the major-general of the navy, in whom Arismendy had great confidence, and who succeeded, at last, in gaining his assent to Bolivar's recal. The latter, though he knew Arismendy's character, and what he had said against himself, was so delighted at gaining him, that he exerted all his great power of pleasing, and subjected Arismendy to his wishes, insomuch that the supreme chief, on the 4th January, proclaimed martial law, and again united the three powers in himself.

Bolivar was not beloved in Barcelona. He, however, continued to prevail on the inhabitants to take arms, and joining to them as many slaves as he could collect, marched on the 5th against the posts of observation of the Spaniards, which they had established in the neighbourhood of Clarius. On the 9th, at the head of about 900 armed men, with a field-piece, he attacked the Spaniards, under Colonel Ximenes, about 500 men strong, half of whom were placed in ambush. General Arismendy, who is brave, active, and skilful, commanded in the action, whilst General Bolivar was behind. He sustained the combat for four hours, but being attacked on his rear and flanks, he was compelled to retire with the loss of his field-piece, baggage, arms, &c. As soon as General Bolivar discovered that his troops had fallen into an ambush, from which he was at a considerable distance, instead of rallying them

and disengaging Arismendy, he turned his horse, and escaped with some of his officers to Barcelona, where he was in safety. A French captain, a man of colour, Zenon Bouille, who fought bravely at the head of his company, was wounded and taken prisoner. After having surrendered, he was shot. The papers and plans of operations of the patriot chieftains fell into the hands of the Spaniards.

When this victory over Bolivar's troops was known in Caracas, the Spanish inhabitants collected one thousand dollars in money, which they sent to be distributed among the non-commissioned officers and privates of Colonel Ximenes' troops. Government promoted each officer one grade. The patriots have not, in any instance, employed such means for the encouragement of their troops.

The routed troops of the patriots retired to Texas, and were pursued by order of Colonel Ximenes. A considerable part of the 300 soldiers from Margarita and elsewhere, were taken prisoners. The former were pardoned on condition of entering into the Spanish service; all the rest were shot. By this action Ximenes opened a communication with Morales.

The latter having collected more forces, attacked General Zarasa, and routed him and some smaller patriot corps; so that, by the last of January, the whole province of Barcelona, except the capital, came again into possession of the Spaniards.

San Yago Marinno, who acted separately from Bolivar in his native province, Cumana, besieged the capital, where General Pardo, who commanded there, attacked him. He was repulsed, and forced to retire

to his entrenched camp in the savannas of del Cantaro; whence he advanced against Cumana.

General Bolivar immediately gave orders to fortify, at Barcelona, a large building which stands isolated, and formerly served as an hospital. It is called the *Charity*. Various privateers arrived there, bringing him officers, men, arms, ammunition, and provisions, sent by the persevering activity of Admiral Brion. Six heavy guns were transported from the vessel, and put in battery in this house, where he collected some of the routed troops and recruits; so that he was again at the head of 1000 men, among whom were about 450 strangers taken from the crews of the privateers.

When General Pasqual Real, commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, called the Eastern army, heard that General Bolivar had taken shelter in the *Charity*, he united the forces of Colonels Bausa and Ximenes, and General Francisco Thomas Morales, in order to attack the city of Barcelona, which Bolivar endeavoured to defend. But he was compelled to retire into the *Charity*, and from that day (10th February) the city of Barcelona was closely besieged, and by the strange negligence of the Spanish commander, the road to Cumana remained unguarded.

Urged by Bolivar, Marinno came at last, through this unguarded road, surprised Real, and forced him to retire. He entered the city of Barcelona the 11th of February. On the 14th, a part of the patriotic army directed its march towards San Bernardino, where they attacked a part of General Real's troops entrenched in a convent; but they were repulsed, and the next day retired to Barcelona.

The Spaniards attempted to force the entry of the port of Barcelona by sea. They advanced with their squadron of seventeen armed vessels, brigs, schooners, gun-boats, &c. and attacked (18th February) the privateer schooners and the four gun-boats posted to defend this entry. After a sharp action, the Spanish squadron was forced to retire. On the 19th they returned, and were again repulsed, with great loss. The captains and crews of the three privateers were French and North Americans in the service of the republic.

General Real united his scattered troops, and being reinforced, marched again towards Barcelona, and reached Tuacal, about two miles from the city, where he entrenched himself.

On the 22d, the privateer Diana, Captain T. Debouille, carrying five guns, sailed from the port of Barcelona, and attacked a Spanish royal schooner armed with seven guns, and posted near the port to observe what was going on in the patriotic squadron. Debouille burnt the schooner in view of the whole Spanish squadron; not a vessel of which ventured to her support. The Diana lost nothing but half a sail, which was burnt; and she pursued her course, unmolested, to the Island of Margarita.

On the night of the 28th the Spaniards left their entrenched camp without having made an attack upon Barcelona, and retired towards Caracas.

The 4th March, the republican gun-boats, under the command of the post captain, Antonio Dias, with 300 infantry on board, attacked a Spanish battery placed upon a hill called the Moro, near Barcelona. The patriots were greatly annoyed by this battery; and the

approach to it was dangerous, it being defended by eighteen Spanish armed vessels. At day break, the fire of two of the gun-boats commenced against the battery, whilst four others coming out of the river, attacked the Spaniards with such promptitude and vigour, that they thought of nothing but evacuating the battery, and the whole coast. The confusion of the enemy was unexampled. The sloop of war *Baylen*, and the armed brigs and schooners, cut their cables and escaped. The attack of the Indian colonel, Aunario, upon the Spanish battery was conducted with great bravery. His troops rapidly mounted the hill, once a rough and broken road, close by the shore, and exposed on both flanks to the fire of more than a hundred guns. Aunario lost but few of his men. The land troops, under General Real, were dispersed or destroyed.

General Morillo, the Spanish commander-in-chief, had, in March, fixed his head-quarters at Maracay. When he heard of these events, he raved like a madman, and ordered General Real to be arrested and confined in the fort Del Colorado, at Laguaira. Brigadier-General Morales, Colonels Urdestieta and Guero, and Captain Alexo, were also arrested and sent to Porto Cabello, as was supposed for cowardice in the attack on Barcelona; but such was the capricious and tyrannical character of Morillo, that he deigned not to inform these officers for what offence, nor for what length of time they were to be punished.

Bolivar and Marinno, elated with these unexpected successes, lost their time in festivals and indolence. They took no serious measures to unite their forces and march against Cumana, to clear the coast and the

neighbouring valleys, and to drive the Spaniards from the provinces of Barcelona and Cumana. Bolivar, jealous of Marinno's influence over the inhabitants, declined assisting him to besiege Cumana, and insisted on directing his operations against Caracas, where the other had no influence. Marinno was in favour of besieging Cumana. And so it happened that disunion now again broke out between them, as it had in 1813. Marinno regarding himself independent of Bolivar, at last gave orders to his troops to evacuate Barcelona. But hearing that the Spaniards were marching under Colonel Aldama to attack the place, he encamped not far from that city, opposite to General Bolivar's entrenched house.

Marinno, a second time, left his commander-in-chief; who was weak enough to suffer it. Bolivar sent various officers to persuade him to return; representing to him the danger to which both were exposed by acting separately. He always answered equivocally. Thus Bolivar looked for their reunion in vain.

Bolivar was greatly discouraged, feeling himself unable, with about 1100 men, to resist the force that was advancing towards Barcelona. After the arrest of General Real, Morillo appointed Colonel Juan de Almada commander of the first division of the eastern army, destined to act against Barcelona. This column marched on the 2d of April from the environs of Picutu; and on the 5th, took possession of the town, whilst the patriots retired towards the entrenched Charity-house. As soon as General Bolivar saw the enemy approaching, he clandestinely left his post in the night of the 5th and 6th of April, with a few officers and a

good guide, all well mounted. He told Colonel Pedro Maria Freites, that he was going in search of more troops, and would soon return with a strong body of armed men. He confided to this colonel the command of the post during his absence. He departed as secretly as he could, and directed his course to the plains of Cumana, where he was again in safety.

On the 6th, the Spanish commander summoned Colonel Freites to surrender; and offered him honourable conditions, which he refused, under the expectation of being soon relieved by General Bolivar. He sent the messenger back with a negative and spirited answer to the Spanish camp. On the 7th, the Spaniards assaulted the Charity-house; and the garrison, after a brave defence, was obliged to surrender. Colonel Freites, who was wounded in the action, and the intendant, Francisco Esteban Ribas, were put in irons; all the rest, among whom were many foreigners, were butchered. The two prisoners, after receiving the usual barbarous treatment from the Spaniards, were transported in irons to Caracas where they were shot!

Bolivar, here in Barcelona, renewed the scenes of 1812, when he escaped from Porto Cabello. A commander of ordinary skill and talent would not have left 1100 men in a place unfit to shelter them against a serious attack; nor would he have left them with only four days provisions. Nor would a man of integrity have left his people under the pretext of obtaining aid, which he knew to be out of his power. Yet were all these things done by the supreme chief in April, 1817, at Barcelona.

Marinno had broken up his camp and retired, leav-

ing Bolivar and his countrymen to their fate. Any other commander would have joined and marched with them against the common enemy. Both Marinno and Bolivar behaved here as they had done in Cumana. Each being jealous and ambitious of command, they both sought their own security in flight, and basely deserted the interests of their country.

General Bolivar, by his flight, abandoned one of his aides-de-camp, who was initiated in many secret negociations of his commander. I speak of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Chamberlain, a native of the Island of Jamaica, who had been attached to him for several years. On this subject I will copy a page from Colonel Hippisley's narrative, p. 466. "At the taking of Barcelona, Captain Chamberlain was with him (Bolivar) in the rank of lieutenant-colonel, with a regiment. When the general-in-chief fled from the place, he directed his friend to continue in the command, with an assurance that if he held out for three days he would order a strong reinforcement up to his relief. Chamberlain with difficulty retained it for the period. No reinforcement arrived; and knowing the cruelties which the royalists would inflict on him, he retired to his quarters, and the firing of a pistol was to be the signal for opening the barriers. The pistol was fired, and a second; the barrier was opened; the enemy rushed in, and running to his residence, found that the same shots, the sound of which gave the token for opening the gates, had also given the signal of death to the ill-fated Chamberlain and the girl of his heart, whom, to save from miseries of the worst extreme, from violation and public exposure, he had first shot, before he placed

the second pistol to his own head. Deprived of the satisfaction of putting a period to the existence of the Englishman and his wife (for a priest had previously united them), the royalist commander glutted his disappointment and revenge by severing the bodies into quarters, and publicly exposing them on the walls of the fort."

Without noticing the variance of my own relation with that of Colonel Hippisley, as to the taking of the Charity-house, I will only observe, that we coincide respecting the clandestine flight of Bolivar from Barcelona, the promise of a reinforcement at his departure, and the destruction of more than one thousand men!

As soon as the inhabitants of New Grenada heard of the advantages gained by the patriots over the Spaniards, they began to revolt against their oppressors. In the provinces of Antiochia and Choco, various guerillas were formed, who did great damage to the Spaniards and gained advantages. The provinces of Quito and Popayan openly revolted, took arms, and drove the Spaniards out of their territory. The patriot guerillas were so strong and so numerous, that they cut off the communication between Bogota, Carthagena, and Santa Martha. The commerce of these places was nearly destroyed.

CHAPTER XVI.

Conquest of the Provinces of Guayana by General Piar and Admiral Brion—Trial and Execution of General Piar—Bolivar and Marinno—Anecdotes. 1817.

WHEN General Piar heard, in December 1816, that the province of Guayana was confided to Colonel Miguel de la Torre, he resolved to march against him, and take that beautiful province by force of arms. He had heard from several officers, and had himself witnessed so great a want of firmness and courage in Torre, that he was satisfied his attack would not long be resisted. This, together with a plan proposed to General Bolivar when at Aux Cayes, confirmed his opinion that the enterprise would be brilliant and useful to the republic.

The following is the plan which was proposed at Aux Cayes. General Bolivar received a long letter from Colonel Bidot, who was in the service of the republic in the neighbouring plains, stating and explaining a plan for conquering Venezuela, by commencing with Guayana, because that province was rich, affording great resources from not having suffered from the war, and containing numbers of inhabitants who were secretly opposed to the Spaniards, and would declare for independence as soon as General Bolivar should present himself with a thousand men. He added, that the imagined security of Morillo, the Spanish general-in-

chief, was so great, in regard to this country, that he had left but a small number of troops to defend it, and that he was confident Bolivar would succeed, &c. This letter was immediately communicated to a number of us, and we were all in favour of Colonel Bidot's proposal. Piar, with whom I spoke, was one of the warmest approvers of the plan. It would have produced the happiest effects upon our expedition. Bolivar, however, was decidedly in favour of first reconquering his native country, Caracas; and then, said he, "we will march against Guayana." This childish predilection for Caracas was extremely injurious to the cause of independence in Venezuela. Guayana was deprived of Spanish troops, and contained many who were our friends, and were waiting to join us; it had also supplies for us of every kind. A sudden attack upon it could scarcely have failed of succeeding. I proposed to General Bolivar to establish in St. Thomas de la Angostura, its fortified capital, a depot for recruits, because the superior numbers of the horses afforded a fine resource for the formation of a good cavalry; and its navigable rivers, an easy communication abroad; with the anterior particularly. He preferred going to Carupapano, a village destitute of resources. If Bolivar could have got rid of his injudicious predilection for Caracas, an open and exhausted city, and have consented to conquer Cumana, as Marinno had proposed, he would not have lost this general and his troops, which, in Barcelona, in 1817, amounted to 1500 men; nor would he have lost this place, nor (by far the greatest loss) 1100 brave men. All these losses certainly resulted from his predilection for Caracas. We

shall see what fatal consequences resulted from it in 1818.

General Piar, remembering Colonel Bidot's letter, conferred with General Sedenno, and proposed to him to unite their forces, and march against Guayana. Sedenno, active, brave, and enterprising, approved highly of Piar's plan, and joined him with 1000 Llaneros, who all had perfect confidence in Piar's skill and bravery; having for a long time fought under his orders. He collected about 1000 infantry, and 1000 more cavalry, under Sedenno, and, having overcome the greatest labours and hardships, arrived with them in this fine province on the 10th of March, 1817. Many volunteers joined him and supplied his wants.

When General Miguel de la Torre, the governor of the province, heard of this sudden irruption, he sallied from the fortified city of St. Thomas de la Angostura, at the head of 2000 cavalry and infantry, and advanced ninety miles to San Felix. Here he found Piar and Sedenno in order of battle, ready to receive him. La Torre had left St. Thomas unprovided with means of defence or supply, and, subaltern-like, had taken 2000 chosen men ninety miles from their garrison, and exposed himself to be cut off. La Torre, who was in no respect to be compared to the Mulatto general, as he called Piar, had owed his promotion entirely to his adulation of his master and benefactor, General Don Pablo Morillo. This will not be doubted when it is known, that after La Torre had lost Guayana, as is said, by his cowardice and wrong measures, he was promoted by Morillo to the rank of brigadier-general; whilst Real, Morales, and others, were arrested and

punished for not having taken Barcelona. Such partiality surely proves the existence of some extraordinary and secret influence. Morillo appointed this same De la Torre as his successor in the command of the army, and, in consequence of it, lost the royal cause upon the Main.

The attack was commenced at San Felix, by Lieutenant-Colonel Zerutti, during which, as I have been assured by some who were present, Colonel de la Torre, though at a good distance from the fire, trembled so much as to excite the laugh of some of his own officers at his position on horseback. As the action proceeded, Zerutti's example of activity and courage became more and more conspicuous. La Torre, seeing how bravely the battle was fought by the *miserable insurgents*, as he was pleased to call the patriots, instead of animating his soldiers by advancing to the charge, turned his horse in a contrary direction to that from whence the balls were flying, and galloped off with some officers, and about forty men. They directed their course for the fortress of Angostura; and were among the first who brought news of their defeat to the garrison. When La Torre's conduct became known to his officers they despised him; and attributed the loss of the battle to his cowardice. But knowing Morillo's partiality for him, they did not dare to speak out against him.

In spite of La Torre's decamping, Zerutti and his troops fought bravely during more than two hours; when at last, some soldiers learned the flight of their governor. This news was soon communicated to others. Growing discouraged, they then defended themselves less bravely, and were nearly all killed.

Of the 2000 men, about 100 escaped. All the rest were taken or killed. Piar ordered all the prisoners to be shot; and among them the brave Colonel Zuretti. He was commandant of Angostura, and was an officer of the Spanish body guard; a man of talent, and of a liberal mind. He had been an aide-de-camp of Louis Lascy, captain-general in Catalonia, who was arrested by Ferdinand, and butchered, on coming ashore near Palma, the capital of the Island of Majorca. Who knows not the fate of Lascy and Porlier? And who can trust a sovereign capable of thus treating his bravest soldiers?

The battle of San Felix decided the fate of Angostura and the province of Guayana. The road was now open for Piar and Sedenno, who approached the capital to within half musket shot from its walls. The patriots entrenched themselves, so as to be protected against the guns of the fortress, but, having no artillery, they could not bombard it. The ancient commander of the place, Mr. Fitzgerald, had been arrested, sent to Caracas, and tried for treason; but was honourably acquitted, and restored to the command of the fortress. He was a skilful officer, but severe and cruel. He condemned many of his soldiers to be shot upon slight suspicion of treason, which alienated from him the greatest part of the garrison.

General Piar made various attempts to take the place by surprise, but was repulsed by the vigilance and bravery of Fitzgerald; so that he was driven to blockade it. The city of Angostura is small, the streets dirty, and the houses of a common size, neither handsome nor well constructed. The city lies close by the river Ori-

noco, partly upon the flat adjoining the river, and partly upon a hill, which affords a fine prospect over the beautiful river Orinoco and its rich plains. From the mouth of the Orinoco toward the interior, Angostura is the only port for eighty leagues. It was badly fortified; and contained about 500 houses. General Piar blockaded it so closely that nothing could pass either way. Colonel de la Torre having left the fortress unprovided, the garrison and inhabitants were compelled to live upon horses, mules, &c. The governor, Fitzgerald himself, paid three dollars for a cat. (During the siege of Carthagena, by Morillo, in 1815, a cat was sold for eight dollars, and a dog, from sixteen to twenty dollars!)—Many inhabitants and soldiers died for want of food, and more than 1500 women and children embarked to avoid certain death. But no man was allowed to absent himself. Notwithstanding this misery, Fitzgerald maintained his post, while the governor of the province, who should have been the last man to depart, deserted and took shelter in the Island of Grenada. I am assured, that on all occasions where danger awaited him, he betrayed his cowardice; insomuch, that when any one in danger appeared uncommonly disturbed, the Spanish officers would say, "He has a paroxysm of Miguel de La Torre's fever."

Admiral Brion arrived from Margarita at the mouth of the river Orinoco with his squadron, and contributed powerfully to the conquest of Guayana, by forcing the passage of the river, which was defended by a numerous flotilla of Spanish armed vessels. Captain Debouille, (the same who distinguished himself before Barcelona,) with seven gun-boats forced the passage.

and destroyed about twenty Spanish vessels of every description; besides taking many others,

As soon as Governor Fitzgerald received the news of the total destruction of his squadron, he saw that all hope of defending the city any longer must be given up. Considering the sanguinary character of Piar, he did not dare to trust to capitulation. He divided the small remains of his garrison among different boats, and departed with them in the night. He arrived without any loss at the Island of Grenada.

On the 18th of July, 1817, General Piar entered the city of Angostura. He found many dead, and many sick for want of food. Even his troops were struck with horror at the sight of such misery.

The city of *old Guayana* was evacuated the 30th of August, and the whole province united to Venezuela. In both cities, the Spaniards left large stores of merchandize and war, and more than a thousand prisoners, among whom were the bishop, the clergy, and many officers and other persons of rank and distinction, who were respected and well treated.

This brilliant and eventful conquest was effected without the knowledge or the order of General Bolivar. It was owing entirely to the courage and exertions of two foreigners, Brion and Piar. It occasioned vast advantages to the republic. And what was their recompense? The former died poor and broken-hearted in Curaçao; the latter was shot by order of the supreme chief.

This latter had lost much of his influence by his desertion from the battle field at Ocumare. And it had cost all the exertions of Admiral Brion to effect his

recal to the Main. General Piar was strongly opposed to his recal, and spoke publicly against him, when Bolivar resumed his former title of supreme chief, and proclaimed martial law. After his flight from Barcelona, he was so retired in the plains, that nobody knew with certainty what had become of him. The greater number of the patriot chieftains were averse from Bolivar's assuming supreme power, and neglecting to call a congress. His warmest friends, Francisco Antonio Zea, the former members of congress, and Jose Brion, among others, had constantly, but in vain, admonished him to keep his word. They thought his absence, therefore, a convenient time to convene a congress, and that the measure would be best for the republic. Brion spoke to Zea, and he to Marinno and Arismendy, and they thought the moment propitious. Marinno, having at that time, (May 1817) established his head-quarters at Curaçao, the 8th of May was fixed on, to assemble in the cathedral church a junta, composed of the most respectable inhabitants of Venezuela, which followed the troops, among whom were many members of the first congress of Caracas. This assembly was numerously attended. Admiral Louis Brion, the intendant Zea, Jose Cortes Madariaga, better known under the name of the Canonicus of Chili, addressed the assembly, showing the necessity and urgency of establishing a congress. The addresses made to the assembly were received with unaminous approbation. Congress was re-established, and the citizens Francisco Xavier Maiz, Francisco Alcala, Diego Valenilla, Diego Alcala, Manuel R. Raba, Franc de Paula Navas, D.B. Urbaneja, and Man. Maneyro, were proclaimed members of this

congress. This election was provisional, in order to give time to convoke all the members of the first congress. This body was to be legally constituted by the regular elections of the people.

The executive was entrusted to Simon Bolivar, Francisco del Toro, and Franc. Xavier Maiz. The name of the first was admitted for fear he might appear and disapprove the proceedings entirely. (Some, however, doubted the existence of the supreme chief.)—But the rapid changes of the war, and the impossibility of finding a safe place of meeting, prevented their assembling, and after some months' fruitless endeavours to that effect, congress was obliged to dissolve, and leave the three powers in the hands of General Bolivar.

The idea of convoking this congress is generally attributed to Brion and Zea, who, though much attached to Bolivar, saw, with great pain, the powers united in a man so incapable of exercising authority judiciously, and so often abusing it.

Hidden as he was in the plains of Cumana, Bolivar could know nothing of these proceedings towards the having a congress. As soon, however, as he learned what was done, he fell into a violent passion, and not only annulled the proceedings, but persecuted the members appointed, especially the Canonicus of Chili, against whom his hatred seemed more particularly directed. Brion and Zea, who best knew his vindictive character, hastened to appease him by a prompt submission, and by assuring him of their belief that he had been killed, and of the necessity of complying with the general wish of the inhabitants, and the old members of congress, to establish a government. Bolivar ap-

peared satisfied, but from that time he treated them both with less confidence, and Brion with harshness, afterwards, at Savanilla, as I shall relate in the proper place. He could not endure Marinno, who was implicated in the trial of General Piar, and who would certainly have suffered, had he not saved himself by a timely flight.

General Paez, in two brilliant actions, with 2000 Llaneros, routed the Spaniards, once at Guayabal, where General Calzada had united 3000 men, and the second time at Calabozo, where Morillo himself commanded. The latter having lost nearly all his forces, retreated precipitately towards Valencia, where he arrived with about 300 men, the remains of 2500. These two victories of General Paez, in which he destroyed, wounded, took and dispersed, about 6000 of Morillo's best troops, made him the terror of the Spaniards. They were discouraged, and treated for the evacuation of Caracas and Laguara, that they might retire into the strong place of Porto Cabello. But Morillo, very unexpectedly, received news of the arrival of thirty transports, bringing him 3000 men, and a large quantity of arms, ammunition, &c. He came, himself, in the beginning of June, to Cumana, where they had arrived, and after some days rest, united them with the remainder of his troops, and marched against Marinno, who had not moved from Curiaco. He attacked and routed him, and taking possession of Cumanacoa and Carupano, left garrisons in these places and returned to Cumana.

Instead of preparing to march against Paez, Morillo ordered the embarkation on board the transports of

about 4000 men, lately come from Spain, under the escort of various armed vessels of war, in which he, and a great many staff officers, likewise embarked. This new expedition was directed against the Island of Margarita ; and in passing the Island of Coche, took in the troops assembled there under the orders of Colonel Aldama.

Morillo could never forget the loss of 3000 men, on his first coming from Cadiz, in 1815, when he thought it would be an easy task to subject this small rocky island full of bushy hills, where Arismendy fought with bravery and skill. Morales also had been beaten before ; so that both Spanish chieftains were extremely bitter against these islanders. Before embarking, Morillo was heard to declare, " that now he would exterminate them with fire and sword !"

The inhabitants of Margarita have done more for the independence of Venezuela than those of any other province. They now destroyed an army of 4000, and after various incidents, in about a month's continual fighting, succeeded in driving the remainder out of the island.

The further particulars of these three expeditions, will be given when I come to treat, in a separate article, of General Arismendy.

Morillo, having lost nearly the whole of his 4000 men in this bloody campaign of about two months, burnt and destroyed all the houses, farms, trees, and crops, wherever he passed in his retreat, to Juan Griego, where he had left his vessels ; and having murdered every one that came in his way, man, woman and child—his cruelty and rage were not yet satiated.

He ordered all those Margaritans, who had fought steadily under his banners (not excepting those who, in his expedition, in 1815, had presented themselves under his general promise of amnesty,) to be put to death. They were all murdered by his express order. Such are the deeds of Don Pablo Morillo, the *Pacificator* of America, who will be long remembered by the brave inhabitants of Margarito.

At the end of August, Morillo arrived in the city of Caracas, in such ill humour that, for several days, he refused to see any one. The reflection that in two months time, and under such critical circumstances, he had lost so many men, reduced him to the condition of a madman. He could discover nothing to be done for the support of the royal cause upon the Main. During his absence, Paez had beaten the Spanish generals, Calzada and Correo, not far from the city of San Fernando de Apuré. The want of provisions and money had produced sickness and desertion. The patriots invested the province of Barinas and took possession of its capital, and of the city of Guanare, (August 14th,) where they found large stores of English dry goods; and, to fill the cup of sorrow, the news came of the total loss of the rich province of Guayana, which had supplied him with quantities of money, goods, provisions, &c. It was scarcely any alleviation, that Colonel Ximenes had attacked and beaten General San Jago Marinno, the 27th of August, and taken the city of Guiria from him by assault, causing him to fly headlong. Here the Spaniards murdered men, women, and children, after having committed other most shocking cruelties.

In these critical circumstances, Morillo, on the 23d September, 1817, published at Caracas, with great solemnities, a general amnesty for all who had taken an active part in the patriotic army. He was stupid enough to believe that this amnesty, granted under the express condition of "returning under the Spanish domination," would make a deep impression upon the minds of the Americans. But he ought to have been discouraged by the consideration that the Venezuelans had been but too well acquainted with the character of the Spanish chieftains, and particularly with the duplicity, despotism, and cruelty of himself. No one confided in his promises.

While he was occupied with his expedition against Margarita, the patriots were busy in exploring the province of Guayana, where they found large supplies of every thing; this province having never suffered by any invasion during this civil war. As soon as Bolivar heard of this conquest, effected by Piar and Brion, two foreigners, his jealousy rose to a high pitch, but he dissembled it, and hastened to Angostura. He received General Piar most graciously, who naturally of a cold and dry character, received his compliments with an air of pride and disdain which made a very bad impression upon the vain and haughty mind of the supreme chief. Piar, feeling his own superiority in point of military skill and courage, had for several years shown an aversion to General Bolivar. He had been advanced to be a mejor-general, when Marinno was the colleague and rival of Bolivar, during his dictatorship of the eastern provinces of Venezuela in 1813-14.

Marinno, who is of a lively and amiable character,

but has neither firmness nor talent, found in Piar the man he stood in need of, and soon advanced him to the rank of major-general, and was his devoted friend and second. Piar left himself under no obligations to Bolivar, whom he knew to be his inferior; and at Angostura, putting himself on an equal footing, felt little flattered by the compliments paid him. He was well aware too that they were insincere.

Bolivar was busily employed at Angostura upon his favourite plan of delivering the capital and province of Caracas. He therefore formed a campaign against the Spaniards in that province. He sent General Bermudes with 4000 men, who departed the 25th September, with an order to unite with the division of Zarasa, whom he found at Chaguaramas.

Admiral Brion, devoted to the supreme chief, and anxious that he should forget the proceedings relative to a congress, was busily employed in inspecting the construction of a number of gun-boats, to protect the river Orinoco, and facilitate the transportation and free intercourse between the inhabitants of Angostura and foreign places. These gun-boats were well manned and sent in perfect order.

Bermudes, after having joined Zarasa, who, with 2000 horse, (Llaneros,) occupied Cabruta and the advanced posts, and were extended as far as El Raçtro, on one, and St. Sebastian, on the other side—marched towards Cabloboza and San Carlos, where he united with General Paez. General Monagas was ordered to take possession of Barcelona. The supreme chief collected a strong body of recruits in the province of Guayana, intending to act in concert with all these

forces against Caracas, an open and defenceless city, instead of directing them against Cumana, which the Spaniards had fortified, and against Porto Cabello, both sea-ports, and affording the enemy a strong central place, whence he might be supplied, and carry the war from east to west, throughout Venezuela—whereas Caracas is neither a fortress nor a sea-port. But representations against his favourite plan were made in vain. He persisted in his partiality for Caracas. He was so certain of soon being in possession of it, that he said publicly, "the colours of the republic shall be hoisted very soon upon the tower of the cathedral of this capital." In that conviction, he published the following proclamation, directed to the inhabitants of the valley of Tuy:—

"Caraguins! the precious moment decreed by Divine Providence for the total expulsion of the Spanish government from the territory of Venezuela, has at last arrived. The arms of the republic have triumphed everywhere. We have been constantly victorious, from the plains of Casanare to the mouth of the river Orinoco. Twenty glorious actions have consolidated the fate of Venezuela. All the famous chieftains which Spain has sent to subject us, have been beaten by our troops, except Morillo, who avoids the battle which we seek to offer. Five thousand men protect this rich province, (Guayana;) five thousand others, under Gen. Marinno, are ready to march against Cumana, and to deliver it! Thousands of brave inhabitants of Maturin, commanded by General Roxas, are ready to receive the Spaniards, if they should attack that city. The in-

trepid General Monagas harasses them with his brigade near Barcelona. The brave brigade commanded by the worthy General Zarasa, 2000 men strong, has marched through the plains of Caracas, to deliver its inhabitants oppressed by force. The army of General Paez, which reminds us of the defeats of Calzada, Morillo, Gorrin, Lopez, Ramos, Reyes, Gongorra, and a great many more, is 4000 men strong. He has spread the sparks of liberty over a great part of New Grenada, Caraguins! having delivered Guayana, I re-cross the river Orinoco, and will be soon in the midst of your capital with such a formidable army as has never existed in Venezuela. The forces of Morillo were reduced to nothing. The miserable reinforcement which Capini has brought him lately from Spain, the 3000 armed men from Cumana,) is not sufficient to take the fort of Pompatiar, in the immortal Margarita.—Caraguins! despise the power of the Spaniards; as long as we are united, we shall remain invincible!

"Head-quarters of Guayana, July 1st, 1826.

(Signed) "SIMON BOLIVAR."

Here is a new instance of Bolivar's deceitful proclamations: 1st. He says that "twenty glorious actions have consolidated the fate of Venezuela." It is notorious that, from the day of his re-entering upon the territory of Venezuela, (31st December 1816,) there had been fought no other glorious action, besides the two gained by General Paez over Aldama and Morillo, that by General Piar over De La Torre, and that by Colonel Gomez, in Margarita, over Morillo; making

in all, four. Perhaps the supreme chief includes those which occurred at Barcelona under his command, and after his flight, or those of Cariaco, Guiria, &c. under Marinno's command.

2d. He accuses Morillo of avoiding the battles which he says "*we* seek," &c.

3d. These many thousands, to come near the truth, must be reduced, at least, one-third; and the remainder forming his powerful army, were badly clothed recruits, collected in haste, and without orginization or instruction. The reader will recollect what I have said in another place, (chapter xiii.) as to the instruction and formation of these *armies*.

4th. The army of General Paez, which reminds us of the defeats of Calzada, Morillo, Gorrin, Lopez, Ramos, Reyes, Gongorra, and many others. This high sounding collection of names can deceive none but those at a distance from the seat of war, who have no other means of information but these proclamations. The victories gained over Calzada and Morillo would be truly described, by saying that their antagonist, in a regular combat, gained the advantage. All the rest were skirmishes, with small bodies of armed men, known under the appellation of guerillas; and among them, some Indian chiefs, like Reyes, who came over to the patriots, after having three or four times changed his colours between the contending parties. He had some sixty or an hundred naked and half-armed Indians, that committed great devastation wherever they came. The bands of guerillas were a little better. Some might have 150 or 200 men; and these fled ordinarily at the first serious attack. Such was the

character of the Spanish chieftains whose names are here so pompously enumerated.

5th. But the following cunning phrase affords the best example of his duplicity: "Caraguins! having delivered Guayana, *I* re-crossed the river Orinoco." By this he certainly means it to be understood, that he, General Bolivar, had delivered Guayana; when, in fact, he was about a thousand miles distant from the battle-field at Guayana, carefully hid in the plains of Cumana, after his flight from Barcelona.

In his proclamation he names nearly all the chieftains in Venezuela, and gives to them, or their corps, flattering epithets. He speaks of having delivered Guayana, and says not a word of Admiral Brion or General Piar, the actual deliverers. These two were foreigners, and if he had mentioned their names, he could not have avoided the mention of their glorious actions, and their conquest of Guayana. All the rest were natives. If he had not used this mode of expression too, he could not have used the grand phrase, "*re-crossed the Orinoco.*"

This omission of the names of Brion and Piar, in a proclamation of which far the most important topic was the delivery of Guayana, shocked them both; and Piar expressed the bitterness of his feelings in a most sarcastic manner. His expressions were reported to the supreme chief, whose vanity was deeply piqued. But he dissembled, as usual, and received Piar with the same exterior marks of kindness and regard as before.

General Bolivar was now advised to form a government, and to show that he sincerely wished for a

republican form, and a division of the powers." But he had great objections to calling a congress, pretending that there would be much difficulty in convening the members during the war; and he named in its place a "*Supreme Council of the Nation.*"

Bolivar was charged exclusively with the executive, under the name of President Supreme Chief. This council was divided into two sections; in one, the *political section, (section politica,)* Antonio Francisco Zea presided; in the 2d, the *military section,* Louis Brion presided. Bolivar was well aware of the submission of both presidents to his wishes, so that he again effectually united in himself all the powers of government. Nothing could be done without his sanction. In his absence, messengers were continually on the road between Angostura and his head-quarters, with papers to sign relative to one or other department, that of Zea or of Brion. This uncontrolled power and influence of Bolivar, was said to be the principal cause of Piar's condemnation.

I must here relate this famous trial, which excited a great sensation at the time. The secret causes of it are not known as they ought to be, for they are characteristic traits in the life of the Liberator of Colombia.

Manuel Piar was born in 1782, at the Dutch island of Curaçao. He was a man of colour, and his parents were poor and laboured for their subsistence. They, nevertheless, sent him to school, where he learned reading, writing, and the elements of arithmetic, and nothing more. He was averse to close application, and never would consent to be a mechanic, which was too degrading for his vain and proud temper. At the

age of fifteen he passed over to the Spanish Main, and remained there a long time before the revolution of Caracas, being in one place and another without any fixed occupation. He came to Curaçao, where he married a woman of colour, who brought him a small fortune. But his restless and ambitious temper did not suffer him to remain long in Curaçao, where his colour and extraction kept him from aspiring to rank and fortune. He travelled over part of the Antilles islands in search of business and fortune, until the time of the revolution in Caracas. He had left his wife and children at Curaçao in the greatest misery, while he lived with a young and handsome girl, whom he seduced, and whom he supported on the Main, with her parents, in a splendid manner. This family were white and of good extraction. It is a fact, that during our stay at Carupano, he established them in a large store taken from the families who had fled at the approach of Bolivar's expeditionary army in 1816. While he lived in great abundance, he sent not the least support to his wife and children.

At the beginning of the revolution (1810) at Caracas, Piar commenced his military career as a non-commissioned officer. Miranda had, as I have mentioned, a great predilection for foreigners who had served, and preferred them as officers to his own countrymen, saying, that the latter should learn to obey before they could be fit to command. He saw in Piar an ambitious and courageous young man, and advanced him by degrees to the rank of colonel; whilst Piar day and night studied military tactics. He distinguished himself on the field of battle, acquiring by practice what was want-

ing in theory. His coolness in the hottest fire, his quickness in discerning the faults of his enemy, and his personal bravery, gained him the confidence of his subalterns, whom he inspired by his example with energy, and a confidence in success. He owed his rapid advancement to merit, and not to any intrigue, which he always despised. He advanced himself thus to the rank of major-general, under the dictatorship of Marinno, in 1813. Marinno having, in 1812, passed over to the Island of Trinidad, came soon afterwards back to Cumana, where he formed a small corps of young men, and named himself dictator of the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, as I have related. Piar joined him very soon; and being acquainted with the active part Bolivar had taken in the arrest of General Miranda, for whom Piar felt the greatest veneration, he detested Bolivar for this act of cruelty and treachery against a defenceless old man. This was the first cause of Marinno's defection from Bolivar; Piar having gained a complete ascendancy over the weak mind of Marinno, so that Marinno could do nothing without Piar. It was Marinno who persuaded Piar to join Bolivar at Aux Cayes, where the two former lived like brothers, and were called by Bolivar the inseparables. Bolivar at that time spoke to me of Piar as a very dangerous man, who hated all whites, and saw with great anxiety Marinno's intimacy with him. Brion hated Piar, and in speaking to me of him used to say, "That mulatto of a general, Piar, is a great plunderer and vagabond."

Piar, however, was the ablest commander of them all, and very far superior to Bolivar, not only in personal bravery, but in knowledge of military tactics and opera-

tions. He was so beloved by his subalterns, foreigners particularly, that they preferred him as a leader to any of the other chieftains. He was cold in his manner, but plain, and attentive to every one of them, treating them kindly, and taking the greatest care of their general welfare. But his discipline was rigorous; and he never overlooked a fault committed under arms, not even the slightest. His cold, reserved, and often sullen manner, inspired them with respect and fear; his personal bravery and skill, with courage and confidence. He constantly supported the cause of independence in Venezuela, and many times successfully in 1813 and 14. When the two dictators fled, Piar remained and fought with good success against the Spaniards. The chieftains, and particularly Boves, feared him and Paéz more than any other. He was successful in Barinas and Maturin; and, lastly, we have seen that the conquest of Guayana was conceived and executed by him, and this conquest had undoubtedly the most favourable effect upon the welfare of Colombia.

Piar was proud of his personal merits, and a firm and warm friend of liberty and the republican form of government. He had rough and harsh manners, the natural consequence of a neglected education, and of a life led in camps. He was neither a flatterer nor a courtier. He was greatly attached to General Marinno, who had distinguished and advanced him. Marinno's soft and weak mind seemed always to be in need of Piar, who at last directed every thing of any importance that Marinno transacted.

Piar, in speaking of Bolivar, often said, that he was a coward, and an ignoramus in military operations;

that he deserved no command, because he absconded when his presence was most needed at the head of his army; that, indeed, he never had been at the head of his army; that he had never seen him at the head of a corps charging the enemy and deciding the victory; that thence it happened that Paez had gained so many actions when left to himself; that the actions of Bolivar were gained by others and not by himself, for that he always took care to keep himself at a respectful distance from the shot; that he appeared in his proclamations to be at the head of his troops; and lately would appear to have liberated Guayana, whilst he had absconded to the plains of Cumana; and that he most ridiculously and contemptibly imitated Napoleon.

When Bolivar arrived at Angostura, these words of Piar were officiously reported to him. But his feelings were chiefly hurt by his seeing that he was no longer the object of so much respect as he had formerly received wherever he went. He saw himself in a measure deserted, and even despised by those who were acquainted with his last flight from Barcelona, by which he caused the miserable fate of a thousand men. Piar, who was then governor of the province, commanded of course, and made himself many friends by his bravery, and also by his cordial attention to every one. His house was constantly filled with strangers, and his evening parties were much more brilliant than those of the supreme chief. This was very natural, for General Piar did the honours of his house perfectly well. He was attentive to every one, and at his house the guests were much more at their ease than in the evening parties of the supreme chief, where a certain etiquette was observed

and where any man of sense and honour was sure to be disgusted by witnessing the vile flatteries of such persons as Charles Soublette, Anzoatigui, and others.

Some biting sarcasms which escaped Piar in full company, were the signal for his destruction.

At that time many men of colour were in the service of the patriots, and particularly in the division commanded by Piar. Many foreigners, clever military men, said loudly that general Piar was superior to Bolivar in every thing relating to military affairs, of which the latter was quite ignorant, and that they preferred to serve with Piar rather than under the orders of the supreme chief. Admiral Brion hated Piar, and, I lament to say, contributed greatly to his destruction. He advised his arrest and trial before a court-martial. When Bolivar, fearing the consequences, hesitated long to take any vigorous measure, it was Brion undoubtedly who decided him to arrest Piar. This fact has been affirmed to me by more than twenty persons of rank and credit. Among other words against Piar, they heard him say the following. The question arose who would be named president of the court-martial, and Brion being told that he probably would be named, said, "If I should be named the president of that court-martial, I would accept it under one condition, viz. that the court-martial condemn Piar to capital punishment; he is a mulatto, a vagabond, a man of the lowest class, dangerous and mischievous to all whites," &c. These persons assured me that Brion that evening behaved like a madman, and that he had expressed himself in the same manner before. With respect to morality, Piar's character

was equivocal. He was known to be over fond of money, and to raise it as he could. He raised a great deal by exactions at Angostura, and converted the whole into doubloons. He loved luxury of every sort, and was vain and ambitious.

When his friends informed him that Brion had advised General Bolivar to arrest and try him before a court-martial, as a coloured man who conspired against the whites, and sought to overturn the existing government, but that the latter had not yet decided to follow the advice—fearing the consequences of such an arrest, he lost his presence of mind and his usual bravery. He was conscious of what he had said against Bolivar, and knew that Brion was his enemy. In fear of their united power, he took the worst course a man of his standing, and in his circumstances, could take. Instead of consulting his friends and adherents, submitting to them his critical situation, and forming a powerful party to support him in case of necessity, in the first place; and then demanding an explanation of the supreme chief, and of Brion also, he took all his gold, and departed clandestinely in the night, following the bank of the Orinoco, in order to embark on board some vessel in which he might leave the country. Bolivar had surrounded him with spies, and was soon informed of his escape. He ordered General Sedenno to take a strong body of cavalry and pursue him, arrest him, and bring him back to the city. Some people are confident that Sedenno received a secret order to kill him wherever he could find him; but this is not certain, though Sedenno afterwards told some of his friends that he had received such an order. But it is

certain that Sedenno, with his troops, overtook him about six miles from Angostura, and forced him to return. On arriving at the city, he was put in the public prison, where the guard was reinforced, and many patroles were walking the streets with orders to disperse any groups that might assemble to release him from prison. But as he had communicated his plan to no one, all his friends were astonished at the news of his arrest, and utterly unprepared to defend him, otherwise it would have been easy for General Piar to assemble a respectable force against any attempt upon his liberty.

The supreme chief was highly pleased with Sedenno's report that he had put Piar into prison. He took no rest during the whole night, fearing some accident might happen to himself; he doubled his guards, and ordered his strong body-guard to be ready at the first call. Brion, deeply interested for the welfare of Bólivar, to whom he had entrusted his large fortune, advised him to strike a decisive blow and to condemn Piar, in order, as he said, to frighten Marinno, Arismendy, and others, (who were secretly opposed to the usurped power of the supreme chief, and in favour of a congress,) that by this example he might prevent all future attempts to resist his power. This decided Piar's fate, and that the more fully, when, after two days, Bolivar saw no hostile movement in favour of Piar. The fact is, that although many thousands were secretly indignant at the arrest of Piar, and much more so to see him treated like a common criminal, there was no leader, nothing prepared beforehand. They had no point of union, and feared the vengeance

of the supreme chief, if they made an open declaration in favour of their general. Some of them have assured me, that they had never thought of the probability of the condemnation of such a man as Piar, who had rendered such eminent services to the republic; and that after his condemnation, it was too late to attempt any thing, because the supreme chief, powerfully assisted by the admiral, had increased his forces by means of the crews of vessels, and by calling various dispersed bodies of troops into the town. A council of war was immediately assembled, over which Admiral Brion presided, and Charles Soublette was appointed by Bolivar to act against Piar. Soublette, the vilest of the vile instruments of his master's wishes and orders, had been rapidly advanced, and was at this time chief of the staff and major-general of the army. This person, in his long catalogue of accusations against Piar, inserted so many and such horrid charges, that the latter was highly irritated, and interrupted him vehemently, calling him publicly an impostor and a vile and infamous liar; but Soublette continued his accusation with the greatest coolness. All that Piar said was in vain. His fate was decided beforehand. Various false witnesses, bribed by brilliant promises, testified under oath, that General Piar had proposed to them to murder the supreme chief, saying he was a tyrant, an usurper, &c. and that Piar was afterwards to proclaim a republican government. Others testified that General Piar had formed a conspiracy to murder all the whites, and to establish a republic of coloured and black people, of which he, Piar, was to be the president.

Among these witnesses was the Brigadier-General Sedenno, the same who assisted Piar in the conquest of Guayana, and who, by some altercation between them, was embittered against him, and had arrested him as already mentioned. Another witness was Lieutenant-Colonel Hernandes, Dr. M. a surgeon, and various others. The two latter were men of colour. Piar was astonished at the testimony. He said in his defence, that if he had intended to murder the supreme chief, he should not have wanted the assistance of these witnesses, his intrepidity being well enough known to prove the absurdity of such depositions; and that so many persons were not wanted to kill a single man. He said, that with regard to the infamous accusation of the most vile and servile impostor, Soublette, of his having proposed to murder all the whites, he appealed to all the foreign officers who had served under him as to his kind treatment of them, and as to his having preferred them to any others, coloured and black officers; adding, that he had then white officers among his aides-de-camp.* He styled the whole accusation a treacherous and horrible conspiracy against him who had served the country with so much distinction and honour. He spoke with such strong and convincing eloquence, that the whole audience was deeply moved in his favour, and entirely convinced of his innocence. But his speech, and the defence of his council named officially, and *pro forma*, were of no avail. He was convicted and condemned

* Colonel Martin, a Polish officer, was his aide-de-camp at this time.

to be shot on the public square, as a conspirator against the security and safety of the republic! A republic then, and now, in September 1828, existing in the person of the supreme chief, and dictator, Simon Bolivar! Here, as in every instance of any consequence, General Bolivar has always had the art to identify his person with the, so called, republic of a free and independent people. But where is the republic? where is the freedom and independence of Colombia?

In the afternoon previous to the day of General Piar's execution, Dr. F. called on him in prison on account of some hundred dollars the former owed him. He was quiet and at ease, flattering himself he should not be executed, but banished, notwithstanding all the Dr. could say against his opinion. He grounded his hopes upon the great services he had rendered, but particularly upon his innocence of the crimes imputed to him. He spoke with warmth, and in a firm tone, showing that he felt no fear or anxiety.

The 16th of October having been fixed for the execution of General Piar, the strongest precautions were taken to prevent any commotion. From four o'clock in the morning, the numerous troops of the garrison were under arms, and formed a square in the public place. A strong detachment was sent for him to the prison. Soon after he came into the midst of the guard, in a kind of great coat, his arms crossed upon his breast. He walked firmly to the middle of the square formed by the troops, where a chair was placed for his execution. When arrived before the chair, he urgently requested the officer that he might see the

supreme chief, for that he had something of great interest to reveal to him in person. This request was positively denied. The officer requested him to sit down. One of them approached with a handkerchief to blindfold him, but he would not permit it, saying, he could well dispense with such a ceremony; that he feared not, and never had feared to die. But when they insisted upon it, he said,—"Well, well, do as you please." More than five-and-twenty muskets, close by the chair, were directed against him; and when the officer uttered the command, Piar exclaimed, "Viva la Patria," and fell pierced with balls. The troops and great crowd of people now cried, "Viva la Patria, Viva la Republica, Viva Justicia!!" soon after, his body was taken into an unfinished chapel and buried with great solemnity, but without any particular ceremony.

Thus died Piar, against whom there was no evidence except his precipitate and extremely ill-judged flight from Angostura. His enemies, with some appearance of justice, seized upon this and took his life.

On the night previous to Piar's execution, the supreme chief could not sleep. He was constantly in fear of some revolution in favour of Piar, notwithstanding the troops were under arms, and ready to act at any moment of the time.

General San Iago Marinno was implicated in Piar's trial, in consequence of what had been done respecting a congress in May, 1817, at Cariaco and at Carupano in 1816. He was at this time in the neighbourhood of Cumana. Brion hated and despised him; and in speaking of Piar, uttered some threats against Marinno.

which alarmed his friends who had before known the hostile feeling of both Brion and Bolivar relative to him. Those friends immediately despatched a trusty messenger to Marinno, advising him of his danger; upon which he departed for the Island of Trinidad, where he was safe.

Some days after the execution of Piar, Bolivar published the following proclamation:—

"Soldiers! Yesterday was a day of mourning for my heart. General Piar was executed for his crimes of high treason, conspiracy, and desertion. A just and legally formed court has pronounced sentence upon this unfortunate citizen, who, infatuated with an ardent desire to make his fortune and to satisfy his ambition, had formed the plan to bury this country in ruins.

"General Piar had certainly rendered great service to this republic, notwithstanding his behaviour has been that of a factious man. His services have been always reasonably rewarded by the government of Venezuela.

"Nothing for desire was left to a chief who had attained one of the highest ranks in the army: the second magistracy would have been confided to him by the absence of General Marinno, but all this sufficed him not; he aspired to the supreme command; he was plotting the most atrocious plan which could be invented by a perverse soul. Soldiers! he meditated not only to kindle a civil war among us, but to introduce anarchy, to the most inhuman sacrifice of his own brethren, and of his companions in arms. Soldiers! you know that freedom and independence are our motto! Has not mankind recovered their rights by the establishment of our

laws? Have our arms not broken the chains of slavery? Has not the order been given that national property should indiscriminately be respected among you all? Has not your merit then been amply recompensed? Or has it not been fairly so at least? What could General Piar desire more for you? Are you not free, independent, respected, and honoured? Could Piar promise you greater benefits than these? No, no, no; Piar wished to dig with his own hands the grave in which to bury the republic, in order to destroy the life, the property, and the honour, as well as the welfare and the glory of the brave defenders of Venezuela, by destroying its children, its husbands, and fathers.

"Heaven has contemplated this cruel paricide with horror; heaven has given him up to the vengeance of the laws, and has not permitted that a man who so grievously offended both the divinity and mankind, should sully our terrestrial globe with his horrid crimes a minute longer.

"Soldiers! Heaven protects you and the government, which is your parent, and is earnestly watching over your security. Your chief, who is your companion in arms, and who has always shared, at your head, your misery and your dangers, as well as your triumphs, has placed his confidence in you. Rely then upon him, and be persuaded that he loves you more than if he were your father or your son.

(Signed) "SIMON BOLIVAR."

Head-quarters of Angostura, October 17th, 1817.

The hypocrisy and duplicity of General Bolivar's character are shown throughout this notorious procla-

mation in their true light. No other man could have had the assurance to say, in the face of the world, that the day of General Piar's execution was a day of mourning to his heart, when we are acquainted with the circumstances of this scandalous act of arbitrary power; when we know that the whole transaction depended on his will, and that a single word could have saved this man, whose only crimes were, that he was the true friend of constitutional liberty, and a foreigner. If we inquire what Arismendy and Bermudes did against Bolivar, we shall find that these two were much more decided against him than Piar was. Arismendy treated the dictator as a coward, who deserved death, and declared that he would shoot him as such if he put his foot on shore (August 1814). Bermudes said the same in 1814, at Ocùmare; and much more in Maturin, in June, 1817. The following are the particulars of the transactions:—The reader will recollect that Bolivar was recalled, in December 1816, from Port au Prince, to resume the command of the army, upon the express condition that he should assemble a congress, and confine himself to the military operations alone.

By means of martial law being proclaimed, Bolivar again assumed the supreme power, and destroyed all that was done in Cariaco by the provisional congress, installed in virtue of a general assembly, held at the cathedral church on the 8th of May; the majority of its members being at the time convinced that Bolivar was dead.

This absence of Bolivar was certainly caused by his own cowardice; by his escaping in the night from Barcelona, and secreting himself in the plains of Cu-

mana. Hearing that the danger was over, he appeared again, and again indulged his haughty and despotic disposition, by annulling the transactions of Cariaco. Being made acquainted with Piar's conquest of Guayana, he passed from Barcelona into that province. In his journey he found General Bermudes established with his troops at Maturin; and with his usual meanness and impudence, thought to gain over Bermudes, whom he knew to be attached to a republican or constitutional government. He was received by the latter and his staff with the most bitter reproaches for his desertion from Barcelona, his absconding to the plains of Cumana, and his measures against the members of the congress of Cariaco. Notwithstanding all this, Bolivar gained over Bermudes, who is weak, and in truth has no fixed character. As they sat dining together quietly, but under a good deal of constraint, Bermudes, who drinks hard, grew warm, and renewed his reproaches to Bolivar, treating him as a deserter, a coward, and, in short, the lowest of mankind.

Bolivar would never bear such treatment from his equal, much less from his subaltern. Bermudes' passion rose so high, that he stood up and told Bolivar he was tempted to cut him in pieces, and that his recollection of his glorious march from Carthagena to Caracas, with his cousin Ribas, alone restrained him.

The supreme chief, trembling like a child, sprung upon his horse and decamped as soon as possible, lest Bermudes should put his threats in execution, for he knew him to be a cruel uneducated barbarian.

Bolivar's proclamation of the 17th of October, is the production of a mind triumphant in a bad cause. The

impartial reader will justly appreciate the charges of Bolivar against his already slain victim. The reader will also give due weight to his declaration, that he has shared the dangers, as well as the triumphs, of his brethren in arms. A moment's recurrence to the facts of 1812, at Porto Cabello; in 1814, at Cumana; in 1816, in the naval action of the 2d of May; in Ocumaré, in July of the same year; in Barcelona, in 1817; &c. &c. will afford a sufficient comment upon this part of his proclamation. I have undertaken to show the President Liberator in his true light, and to strip him of the mask with which he has even covered his person and his transactions.

I must now relate the conduct of San Iago Marinno, and make the reader better acquainted with the character of a man, who, for a long time, was the equal, and has even been the rival of Simon Bolivar; of the hero of South America; the Napoleon; the Liberator; and father of the republic of Colombia.

As soon as Marinno arrived at Trinidad, he wrote Bolivar a letter in a very submissive and supplicating style, in which he entreated him to pardon all his offences, committed without his fault; he said the pernicious counsel and advice of Piar had robbed him of the favour and affection of the supreme chief; that he would hereafter follow his guidance alone, would never deviate from his duty, and would act directly according to the orders of the supreme chief, &c. &c.

Bolivar, gratified and exulting, showed this letter to his flatterers, and was himself the first to laugh at and ridicule it. He nevertheless pardoned, and most *graciously* recalled Marinno to his former rank and com-

mand, rightly judging that Marinno without Piar would never impede him or his views, whatever they might be. Marinno, on his return, issued the following proclamation :—

"San Iago Marinno, general-in-chief of the armies of the republic, and of that entrusted with the operations against Cumana, &c. &c. to the officers and soldiers composing his division. Officers and privates! my soul is, even now, filled with the most appalling sentiments, when I think, that but yesterday, neither you nor myself were reckoned a part of the great family, who, under the direction of the supreme chief of the republic, fight for liberty and independence! How delightful are the sentiments which this day again fill my heart—when I see that the government, like a good father, relying upon my promises, and forgetting all that has passed, receives us again under its protection, and directs me to put myself again at your head, and to command the whole province. (Cumana.)

"Officers and privates! if, through a mischief ever to be regretted, we have until now been considered as dissatisfied, and have, under this character attracted public attention, it is now, and from this moment, our most sacred duty to become a model of submission and obedience to the supreme chief! My sincere wish is, that the whole universe may be convinced of the sincerity of our intentions, and find in us the most faithful supporters of our government. I swear by the ashes of so many of our famous companions in arms—I swear upon my honour, and upon all that is sacred on earth, that this is now the only felicity to which I aspire.

From you who have always given me so many proofs of your love and your devotion, I expect a much stronger proof—namely, that you will co-operate to execute the orders of the supreme chief. Separated during nearly a year from government, from the father of the people, and the armies, and but now re-incorporated into the large and free family of Venezuela, our hearts beat with the most delightful sensations for such unexpected good fortune. Long live the republic! Long live the supreme chief! Long live General Bolivar!

(Signed) "SAN IAGO MARINNO."

Head-quarters of San Francisco, January 26th, 1818.

Such language requires no comment: it displays the character of the man; and such are most of the Colombian chieftains. This being the fact, the reader will readily discover how much, or rather how little, real character was requisite to enable General Bolivar to usurp and hold the supreme power during so many years. He will also, I think, be satisfied as to what must be the disposition of a leader, who can not only suffer, but encourage, language so disgusting to men of delicacy, good sense, and honour.

CHAPTER XVII.

Campaign of 1818—Foreign Legions—Conspiracy against Bolivar's power.

In the beginning of 1818, the situation of the two belligerent parties had entirely changed in favour of the patriots, owing chiefly to the conquest of Guayana. This rich province alone afforded more resources to the patriots than the seven other provinces of Venezuela taken together. The friends of independence now conceived the most sanguine hopes of seeing, at last, their oppressors driven from the territory they had sullied by their cruelty and barbarity during these last years of war and distress.

I will give here a short sketch of the situation of the royal party, that the reader may be enabled to judge whether these hopes were well founded, and might have been realised, under any other leader of common talents and experience in the act of war. Unfortunately for the cause of freedom and independence, the districts of Venezuela were in the hands of Bolivar. I say unfortunately, because her freedom and independence were, by that means, completely lost. The history of this campaign is nearly a repetition of that of Bolivar's dictatorship in 1813-14, when, as now, every thing depended on his exertions, and all circumstances concurred most favourably to produce a happy result. Bolivar, by his own fault alone, irreparably lost, a second time,

the most promising occasion of driving the enemy out of Venezuela, and giving to its miserable and worn out people, liberty and repose. These reflections will be justified by the facts related in this chapter.

By the disgraceful expedition of Morillo against the Island of Margarita, he lost about 4000 of his best troops. The folly and cowardice of Miguel de la Torre, lost the rich province of Guayana, the heart, as it were, of the royal family. The extensive plains, and two-thirds of the provinces of Venezuela, were in the hands of the patriots, who marched with numerous and superior forces against the Spaniards. Industry, commerce, and agriculture, were ruined by taxes, contributions, and a continual change of masters. Scarcity of hands, and an utter want of security, left the royalists destitute of the means of repairing the immense losses they had lately suffered. The public stores and treasury were empty. The general-in-chief no longer enjoyed the confidence once reposed in him. His own discouragement deeply affected his troops. This, together with the general want of every thing, produced daily desertions, and from thirty to fifty sailors frequently passed over to the patriots in one day.

Notwithstanding all their losses, and the gloomy prospects of the royal cause in Venezuela, such is the obstinacy of the Spanish character, that they still determined to persist in their cause, and to make every exertion in support of Morillo. European Spaniards of the Main had become averse to the emancipation of their country, not because they did not like freedom, but because they saw no leaders in whom they could confide to give them a fixed and good government, in

place of the one under which they then existed. We have seen that many native Spaniards took an active part in the struggle for independence, and supported their chieftains. But their hatred of Bolivar had now become great. It began with his desertion from Porto Cabello in 1812, was increased by his cruel decree of February 1814, by which he ordered to be put to death, not only those of their countrymen who were prisoners of war, but peaceable inhabitants, many of whom had never taken part in the existing struggle. From that time hatred took the place of that admiration which had been excited by his rapid and early success in 1813. Rich and poor, therefore, all the Spanish families on the Main rivalled each other in making the utmost sacrifices to put Morillo in a condition to take the field, and to commence with renewed vigour the offensive preparations of this campaign. It is to be lamented, that these almost superhuman exertions were made in favor of such a man as Ferdinand VII. whose name includes all that can be united for the persecution of men of feeling and character, and of whom Morillo was a faithful representative.

In consequence of this resolution to resist the numerous patriot armies to the last extremity, a general assembly of the civil and military authorities of the city of Caracas was called together. They met on the 16th of January in the capital, and canvassed the miserable situation of the royal cause. They unanimously resolved upon prompt and vigorous measures. They determined to improve the condition of their soldiers, by giving them better rations, better pay, and if not the whole arrears at once, enough to quell their dissatisfac-

tion, and, in case of desertion, to pay the inhabitants of the place where the deserter had been enlisted, the value of his uniform and accoutrements, and compel them to furnish another in his place until he should be found. Any young man who should arrest a deserter, was declared to be free from service. The cavalry was re-organised, and all possible means were employed to re-establish confidence, and revive the public spirit. Their exertions were, in general, successful. Large voluntary contributions were made. Many ladies gave up their jewellery, gold chains, &c. Many rich possessors of land gave, besides money, their harvest, slaves, horses, mules, cattle, &c. Horses kept for pleasure or show were given to the cavalry. The merchants offered money, provisions, &c. &c. Many persons who were present have assured me, that, during several days and nights, Caracas and Laguara were complete pictures of besieged cities, wherein were seen vast warlike stores, carried upon mules and horses.

New Grenada afforded no better prospects for the royal cause. The Viceroy, Samano, residing at Bogota, and lately appointed to his office, wrote to General Montalvo Torres, Governor of Carthagena, "that it would be impossible to maintain himself any longer in this capital or in the kingdom, one of his divisions having been defeated in the plains of Casanare, out of which, the commander and seventeen others only returned to the capital, while a second division sent by him to the same plains had met with the same fate." General Urdaneta gained these two victories in October and December 1817.

The tyranny and cruelties committed by the Spa-

niards upon the inhabitants of New Granada; the miserable fate of many among the most respectable householders in Bogotà, who, during the stay of General Morillo, were arrested in their houses, and shot by his order, without even a plausible pretext, had excited such detestation of the Spanish name, that even the fair sex were active to do them all the harm in their power. One of them procured a detailed list of the Spanish forces in the capital, and had the courage to carry it to the patriots at Casanare. She was unfortunately detected: the list was found between her stocking and shoe, and she was publicly executed. She was deeply lamented by her countrywomen, whose hatred of the Spaniards was greatly increased by this instance of their cruelty.

The garrison of Mompox, 400 men strong, was surprised in the night, and all put to death by the patriotic inhabitants, among whom were many women, who fought bravely, and contributed much to the success of the enterprise.

The city of Carthagena, then in the power of the Spaniards, was in a kind of uproar. As soon as its inhabitants were apprised of General Urdaneta's victory, gained on the 6th of October, 1817, over the Spaniards, and that in consequence of it, the patriots were in possession of the province of Pamplona, the garrison and its cruel and cowardly governor, Montalvo Torres, were terribly alarmed, and forced the inhabitants to great contributions for obtaining provisions of every kind in case of being besieged. The inhabitants were, moreover, embittered against the tyranny of Montalvo, and that of the president of the criminal court, Cano.

Placards had been found on the church doors, and in the walls of Carthagena, which, in bold and seditious language, proposed killing the two tyrants of the people. In spite of the several requisitions, and great rewards offered, the authors could never be detected. They were supposed to have been posted up by some non-commissioned officers or privates, who were dissatisfied with their wretched condition. Numerous patrols were sent day and night through the streets of Carthagena to preserve order and quiet.

Many patriot bands of guerillas were formed in the provinces of New Grenada, which greatly annoyed and distressed the Spaniards. In Venezuela they were still more numerous and formidable.

Such was the situation, in both countries, of the royal cause, at the end of 1817, and the beginning of 1818, when Bolivar commenced his operations against Venezuela.

After having given to his various divisions the necessary orders to march towards the points intended, General Bolivar departed with his staff and a numerous body-guard, at the end of December 1817, from Angostura, and directed his march towards the rich plains of Apure. He left about 1800 men to protect the province of Guayana, and united his forces (about 3000 men) with those of Generals Paez, Monagas, and Sedenno. He arrived the 12th of February before the city of Calabozo, where Morillo had fixed his head-quarters.

When at Sombrero, he published, on the 17th of February, the following proclamation :—

"To the inhabitants of the plains—Your territory is free from the enemy. The armies of the republic have gloriously triumphed over the Spaniards, from the middle of New Grenada to Maturin, and the mouth of the river Orinoco. The armies of Boves and Morillo, which before were very numerous, are now buried in the fields consecrated to liberty. The cities of Calabozo and San Fernando have been taken under the protection of the republic, and the remainder of the armies of Morillo, routed the 12th and 16th January, (by General Paez,) fly before us, to seek a shelter in Porto Cabello; but in vain! soon will they be thrown from thence into the sea! It is impossible to resist an army of freemen, brave and victorious. Fame will guide our steps, and the cruel oppressors of Venezuela be forced to surrender or die!

"Inhabitants of the plains—you are invincible; your horses, your lances, and your deserts, protect you against your enemies. You must absolutely be independent in spite of the haughtiness of Spain. The republican government guarantees your rights, your prosperity, and your lives. Unite yourselves under the banners of Venezuela, which is your victorious country. This campaign will end with the surrender of the capital. You will again enjoy peace, industry, and the blessing to be free and honest men; your enemies have deprived you of these advantages. Be grateful to providence, which has given you a wise government, adapted to the welfare of mankind.

(Signed) "BOLIVAR.

Head-quarters at Sombrero, 7th of February, 1818.

The style of this proclamation is an intended imitation of that of Napoleon. The truth is, that the remainder of the *armies* of Morillo, which were *flying before his victorious troops*, consisted of small foraging parties, which Morillo detached from his head-quarters, to procure pay for his cavalry. So far was Morillo from flying, that he remained, as is notorious, quietly in his head-quarters at Venezuela. That the cities of Calabozo and San Fernando were taken under the protection of the republic, is one of the mistakes of the supreme chief. On the 7th of February, the first was in quiet possession of Morillo, who had established his head-quarters there. General Bolivar must have known this fact, for he marched against Calabozo, and arrived before that little city no earlier than the 12th, *from whence Morillo had not moved!* San Fernando was evacuated by order of Morillo, to concentrate his forces. Thus, and no otherwise, was the place under the *protection of the republic.*

"The remainder of the armies of Boves and Morillo fly before us, to seek shelter in the walls of Porto Cabello; but in vain! soon will they be thrown into the sea!". This is an imitation, though a poor one, of Napoleon's style. In the most important point it fails entirely; for Napoleon generally kept his word. Whoever places any reliance upon these proclamations will certainly be deceived. The style of them would be a matter of little consequence if they contained the truth only; yet surely this kind of language is beneath the dignity of a true republican.

The first bulletin published by the liberating army, dated from opposite the city of Calabozo, and signed

Charles Soublette, says "that the liberating army, commanded by the supreme chief, departed the 31st of December from the city of Angostura, towards the plains of Apure, and was joined by the division of General Monagas, Sedenno, and Paez, and arrived the 12th of February in sight of Calabozo, which at that time was the head-quarters of the royal army, under the command of General Morillo. There took place an engagement in which the Spanish army, composed of the regiments of hussars, Ferdinandos' half of the infantry, and all their light troops, were engaged; the regiment of Castillo, who fought on the left wing, escaped from the general havoc of the enemies' army, being close by the city of Calabozo, which it entered. General Morillo, surprised in the midst of immense plains by an army which had marched 300 leagues, was completely beaten, the first time he drew his sword in South America, without ever attempting a general battle, or waiting for a single discharge from our infantry. He escaped almost alone from the field of battle, after having been saved twice by two hussars, who parried the strokes directed against him by two of our lancers. General Morillo, the proud Pacificator of South America, was besieged in the centre of Venezuela, in consequence of his own cowardice, and our extraordinary promptness. Such is the interesting picture of the action of Calabozo presented to the military world. We have lost no more than twenty men."

I shall not consume the reader's time in pointing out the follies and absurdities, apparent to every military man at least, upon the face of this bulletin. The facts are these: when the cavalry of the patriots approached

near Calabozo, on the 12th of February, they met with a foraging party of seventy or eighty men, who had sallied from Calabozo, and made a halt before a watering place to water their horses. They had dismounted, and the horses were without saddle or bridle. The men had on, their short jackets, and no swords or other arms, so that it was impossible to defend themselves. They were all killed except two, who jumped upon their horses and escaped into Calabozo, and reported the news to their General, Morillo, at his head quarters. During this time General Bolivar detached 400 men to surprise the grand advanced guard of the enemy, which were defeated. This gave time to the troops of Morillo in Calabozo to form, and not only to resist the patriots, but to force them to retire. The Spaniards were not 1800 strong, whilst the united force under General Bolivar amounted to upwards of 8000 men.

Morillo, fearing that he should become destitute of provisions and forage if he remained any longer in Calabozo, where the enemy could easily intercept his convoys, resolved to evacuate it. He took his sick, baggage, stores, and a good many of the inhabitants who chose to follow him, and placing them in the centre of his 1800 men, on the 14th of February, marched out of the city, directing his course towards Sombrero, in presence of the patriots, who had about 3000 cavalry. He was obliged to march twenty-five leagues through sandy and arid plains, under a burning sun, until he arrived at Sombrero, at the foot of a strong chain of mountains. The patriots followed; but, notwithstanding this great superiority, did not attempt to attack him. Their cavalry, far more numerous than his, could have

acted on these plains with vast advantage. At Sombrero they attacked him, and were repelled with the loss of several hundred men. They pursued no farther, but retired towards Calabozo, where General Bolivar arrived the 22d February, whilst Morillo directed his course upon Barbacoa, Camatagua, and arrived in March at Ortiz, near Villa de Cura, where he effected his junction with Morales and Colonel Lopez, and found himself at the head of 4000 men, nearly all infantry. Here he had full time to recruit and form his cavalry. General Calzada had been posted at Guardazenaga with 1000 men, to observe the movements of the patriots.

General Bolivar, who, when united with General Paez, Monagas, and Sedenno, had above 8000 men in Calabozo, took possession of San Fernando de Apure, and gave orders to occupy the province of Barinas. He gave the command of these operations to General Paez, while he himself remained inactive at Calabozo.

Bolivar left his head quarters, and directed his march towards Guadatinasus, San Jose, and San Francise de Pimados, and joined, on the 5th of March, the cavalry of General Zarasa, composed in a great measure of Llaneros. On the 7th the patriots began their operations against the capital, Caracas, and on the 22d the valleys of Aragua were occupied by the different columns of the patriots, whilst their advanced posts were besieged in Cabrera and in Consejo.

General Morillo, finding that the city of Ortiz could no longer furnish him with supplies, departed with most of his troops towards Valencia. He detached De la Torre, who had been advanced to the rank of brigadier-general, to occupy Villa del Cura, Vittoria, and Las

Cocuisas (where he found no resistance), with orders to maintain himself there until further advice, Calzada, with his troops, 1000 men, occupied San Carlos, and Colonel Lopez the city Del Pao.

General Bolivar, on the evening of commencing his decisive operations against Caracas, received the unexpected news that General Monagas, whom he had detached to supply the fortifications of La Cabrera, had been forced to leave this post not far from Caracas, and to retire towards Cagua. This greatly deranged his plans.

Meanwhile General Morillo had redoubled his activity, and supported by the zeal of the Spaniards, having provided himself with many useful warlike stores, had recruited, remounted his cavalry, and united as many forces as he could in so short a time. He now thought proper to begin his offensive operations. The 12th of March he detached General Morales from Valencia, with 3000 men, following him on the 13th with 300 cavalry and 1000 infantry. Morales, on the 14th, between Guarara and San Joaquin, had a little skirmish with a small detachment of the many who fled towards the post of La Cabrera, whence they sallied out with the forces under General Monagas, 1500 strong, and took a strong position at Tapatapa. Morales attacked and routed them. They lost 300 men, baggage, &c. He pursued and attacked them again at Villa del Cura, and forced them to retreat as far as Boca Chica, two leagues.

When General Bolivar heard of Monagas' defeat, he immediately united all the forces near him, and arrived on the 15th, with about 3000 men, in the camp

of Monagas, and marched with his troops from Boca Chica towards Semen, where they encamped. The Spaniards attacked them at two o'clock in the morning, but were repelled. A second attack with the bayonet decided the combat. Bolivar was completely routed, and lost more than 1000 men, his artillery, baggage, &c. In attacking at the head of his cavalry, Morillo received a slight wound, and gave over the command to the new brigadier de La Torre, instead of Morales, who was mareschal de campo. La Torre pursued the remainder of Bolivar's army, attacked him on the 29th March at Ortiz, and routed him with the loss of 500 men. Here General Morales distinguished himself in directing the charge, whilst La Torre, as I have been well informed, remained at a respectful distance behind. On the 6th of April, Bolivar was again beaten at La Puerta, by Calzada and Lopez, whom De la Torre had detached in pursuit of him. He lost here 600 men, killed and wounded; 1200, including the wounded, were taken prisoners. The remainder of his artillery, (two field pieces,) and of his baggage, &c. was taken; and Bolivar escaped, by the speed of his horse, with a few officers. Morillo, cured of his wound, soon afterwards joined the army, and resumed the command.

After these defeats, Bolivar retired to El Rincon de Los Toros, and there united 600 cavalry and 300 infantry, the remainder of his forces. Colonel Raphael Lopez was detached against him, surprised his out-posts, and penetrated into the midst of his camp, at two o'clock in the morning, killing 400 men, and taking nearly all the rest. Bolivar had just time to get out of his hammock, mount his horse, and escape in the dark-

ness of the night. Colonel Raphael Lopez, the Spanish commander, was killed; so was the patriot Colonel Palacios, who fought bravely at the head of his battalion; which gave Bolivar time to escape. To complete these defeats of the patriots, Colonel Francisco Ximenes attacked Marinno at Carupano on the 12th March, and routed him completely.

General La Torre marched the 2d May from San Carlos upon the city of Coxedè, where he expected to find the enemy, but met with the advanced posts of General Paez near Camaruco, who, on his part, had determined to attack the Spaniards at San Carlos. La Torre, after having defeated the out-posts of Paez, marched against him and routed him not far from Coxede. Morales, on the other side, having marched against Bolivar, who had reinforced himself at Calabozo, attacked and routed him, and retook possession of the city.

General Bolivar retired towards San Fernando de Apure, and recruited from the plains as many Llaneros as he could; and, being unmolested during the whole month of May, he had time to unite again a sufficient number of chieftains, separated at different posts. Two strong detachments of English troops, under Colonel Wilson, came to join Bolivar at the end of May.

A short account of the different corps that came over from Great Britain to the Main, may, perhaps, be interesting. They contributed much to the success of Bolivar's campaigns, and were rewarded with ill treatment, misery, sickness, and death.

The supreme chief, seeing the behaviour of the battalion of Guiria, composed of coloured men from

Guadaloupe, of which I have already spoken, remembered what Brion and I had said to him in 1816, in Carupano, on the usefulness of foreign legions; and thought, at last, that it would be well to have some foreign troops with him. He directed his agent in London to have an understanding with the English houses to which Admiral Brion and others had written, for the purpose of forwarding such a plan. He directed his agent to send as many such troops as could be procured. The character of Bolivar, and that of all Caraguins, is, on occasions, that the moment a project is adopted they are impatient and restless until it is accomplished, and will hazard every thing for that purpose. So it was here with Bolivar. But, having no money, no personal credit, no produce or merchandise, nothing to give in exchange, he could accomplish nothing but by the great exertions of Admiral Brion, and by means of promises, and holding out prospects of great rewards to such as would come to the Main, and serve a cause, which, indeed, had in itself great attractions. Propositions were therefore made to Lieutenant-colonel Hippisley, an Englishman devoted to the American cause, to come over and bring with him a number of his countrymen. No money, but great promises were given to him, and to such as he should bring with him. Colonel Hippisley, being rich and in good credit, with great pains procured 300 men, who were armed clothed, and equipped in England, and arrived at Angostura a little after the departure of General Bolivar for the army, at the end of 1817. But when the men came to see the wretched state of the service, and that the promises made them in England

could never be realised, they found the condition far worse than in their native land; and made loud and just reproaches to Colonel Hippisley for having seduced them into this service! He had no intention to deceive his men; he was himself deceived probably with the same hopes that induced them. After some months' service, he took his leave, greatly disgusted with the military service in Venezuela. His second in command, Lieutenant-colonel English, remained in England to procure more men; and sent 1000 men, in detachments of from 100 to 200 each, to the island of Margarita, and arrived there himself after them. Before his arrival these troops were divided into three companies, commanded by Captains Johnston, M'Intosh, and Woodstock. To these were joined about 50 or 100 men of different European nations who made this campaign with General Bolivar, who committed the great fault of distributing them among his division, and those of Paez and Monagas. This distribution was made, as I have been informed, for fear that they might, if left together, be dangerous to Bolivar himself. The foreigners were greatly displeased and discouraged; Thus separated, they could be of but little use; whereas 100 such men, or even a less number, acting together against the troops of the royalists, might have been of very great service to the republic. Many of them left the service, disgusted with this and other ill treatment; the remainder perished miserably for want of food, or fell victims to the climate.

When Colonel Hippisley retired, Colonel English was appointed commander of a second legion, which increased to about 2500 men, among whom were

officers, of distinguished merit. Lieutenant-colonel English, was advanced, successively, to the rank of colonel and brigadier-general. He arrived, in the beginning of the year 1819, at Margarita, where Admiral Brion, received him very handsomely in the port of Pompatar.

Colonel Wilson brought some few hundred men, who served in 1818. He was arrested and took his leave.

The third legion was called the Irish legion, because it was composed chiefly of Irishmen, and commanded by General Devereaux, a native of Ireland, and son of General Devereaux, to whom he had been aide-de-camp. His father died and left him a handsome fortune. Young and enthusiastic, he departed for Buenos Ayres, where he offered his service in that new republic. Not finding what he expected, he did not remain long, but came, in 1818, and offered his services to General Bolivar, with a certain quantity of arms, ammunition, and warlike stores, upon advantageous conditions, and long terms of payment, as he was authorised to do by his friends in Ireland and England. The supreme chief accepted his offers, and this encouraged Devereaux to go farther, and propose the formation of a legion in his native country, to be brought here and to serve under his orders. He had the good fortune to please the supreme chief, who authorised him to raise such a legion, consisting of 5000 men.

Bolivar told him frankly that he had no money at his disposal. Devereaux replied, "that he wanted only an ample commission from him to act with full powers, and according to circumstances, for the benefit

of Venezuela, with Bolivar's promise to approve his transactions in Great Britain, where he could obtain what he desired."

Devereaux arrived in Ireland with the necessary papers. Such was the state of the people, that, by the hope of greatly improving their condition, and by means of his splendid representations and promises, numbers of his countrymen readily consented to take service in Venezuela: there have been various statements in the public papers relative to the manner in which he succeeded. He sent, at different times, about 5000 men to Angostura and Margarita, the greater part of whom had served before. He went to London, and succeeded there also. Among his officers were many, who, being apprised by their friends in St. Thomas and Jamaica of the miserable condition of the service on the Main, refused to embark; the number of these increased daily, and it has been reported that many endeavoured to give up their commissions and get back the money they had paid for them, but that Devereaux, apprised of their intentions, kept out of their way, and hastened the departure of the remainder.

He embarked at Liverpool in the English brig Ariel, with two aides-de-camp, one colonel, one major, one surgeon, one chaplain, and twenty-two privates. The general had chartered this brig, under a feigned name, to transport him and his companions to their native country, he purporting to be a merchant who had been shipwrecked.

After sailing about a fortnight, having taken his measures well beforehand, he informed the captain and

crew that he was the patriotic General Devereaux, and ordered the master to take him to Margarita; on arriving there, he found neither his people nor the necessary provisions. Being told that Brion and Montilla were gone with part of his men to Rio Hacha, he determined to join them. On arriving before this port, he saw the Spanish colours hoisted, and his signals were not answered; he therefore cruised for some days, and not learning where Admiral Brion was, he sailed to Jamaica to obtain information. As soon as the brig anchored in Port Royal, a guard of marine troops came, by order of the governor, to remain on board the brig until the Duke of Manchester should determine what should be done with her. General Devereaux asked leave from Commodore Huskinson to go on shore with one of his aides, but could obtain permission only for himself. During the passage the ship's crew had revolted three times, and generally had behaved very ill.

General Devereaux left Port Royal in July. He was well received at Savanilla, by Admiral Brion, but very coldly by Colonel Montilla. Caraguins are generally of a jealous temper, particularly with regard to strangers. Montilla's aversion to them is notorious. The people of Carthagena (where he is now, by Bolivar's appointment, intendant and commander-in-chief of three departments,) generally complain of his harsh manners, which I confess struck me, when I first met with him, but, upon further acquaintance, I found him attentive, polite, and kind. He commanded part of General Devereaux's division, which had embarked with him for Margarita. He feared that, by the superior

rank of the general, he should fall under his command, and refused to submit to his orders. Some provocation passed between them, but no duel was fought. General Devereaux being urgently advised by his friends to take no step against Montilla, but to absent himself for a while from the province of Carthagena, which he did, and they never met afterwards. After this difference with Montilla, general Devereaux departed for congress, which was then sitting at Cucuta, and of which General Antonio Narinno was vice-president. Though Bolivar conferred upon Devereaux the rank of brigadier-general before his departure for Great Britain, he had never served otherwise than as aide-de-camp to his father, and was not a military man. But being a handsome and fine-looking man, of great address, wit, intrigue, and discernment, he easily perceived the character of the supreme chief, and flattered him so adroitly as to gain his full confidence, and to obtain from him full power, with the rank above mentioned. I have been assured that he never actually commanded his legion, or joined it; and that he never has had any command since he has been in the service of Colombia. He remained at Cucuta as a brigadier-general.

After the death of General English, his young and handsome widow went to Cucuta to receive from congress the arrears of pay due to her husband, and a pension for herself. Some evil-minded persons spread a report that she was not the lawful wife of the General; and the Vice-president, Narinno, called on her, with witnesses and an interpreter, in order to ascertain the fact. Mrs. English did not understand Spanish, nor Narinno a word of English. When the interpreter

had explained to her the motives of Narinno's visit, she was shocked, and spoke to him in such a manner that he felt deeply ashamed of his commission, which he certainly ought never to have accepted. This singular visit came to the knowledge of Devereaux, who, being at Cucuta, immediately wrote a letter to Narinno, in strong terms, certifying that the lady had been married to General English. Still they made objections and raised difficulties. General Devereaux, informed of their unjust proceedings, undertook her defence, and sent a formal cartel to Narinno. The latter, indignant that a stranger should dare to question *him*, a magistrate of high rank, immediately sent the general to a dark and damp dungeon, where he was confined as a criminal. He found means to apply to congress, and complained bitterly of this treatment, demanding a commission of inquiry to examine his conduct. This was granted him, and, after he had remained six weeks in the dungeon, without air or light, or allowed any communication from abroad, he was sent, under a strong guard, from place to place, until he reached Caracas. There he was tried before a court-martial and honourably acquitted in November 1821.

The base treatment received by General Devereaux excited in the members of congress so much resentment against the Vice-president Narinno that they turned him out of his office, and put in his place Dr. German Roscio, who had taken great interest in General Devereaux. As soon as President Bolivar was acquainted with the injustice done to Devereaux, he appointed him general of division, or major-general, and ordered the widow of General English to be paid.

We return to General Bolivar, whom we left at San Fernando de Apure, ready to re-commence his offensive operations against Caracas. He took possession of the city of Calabozo in June, and gave orders to the different patriot columns to march again upon Caracas. Their advanced party reached effectively to Curayto, five leagues from the capital, while the inhabitants were in great consternation. But Morillo, who had closely observed all the movements of the patriots, and was much better served by his spies than Bolivar, gave orders suddenly to attack these separate divisions one after another. Bolivar had neglected to combine his movements with those of his other divisions. The patriot divisions were separated, routed, deprived of their brilliant successes, and of all the advantages they had gained. They were beaten in nine different actions, at Sombrero, Maracay, La Puerta, El Cayman, Ortiz, El Rincon de los Toros, in the Savanna of Coxeda, upon the mountains of Los Patos and Nutrias. They lost in seventy days more than 5000 men in killed and prisoners, many thousand stand of arms, twelve standards, seven field-pieces, more than 3000 horses and mules, a quantity of cattle that followed the troops, their amunition, baggage, &c. They were compelled again to leave in the power of the Spaniards all the cities and places on the plains and provinces which lay on that side of the river Orinoco. The supreme chief, leaving the remaining scattered troops to the command of general Paez, retired in haste to the fortress of Angostura.

I will give an extract of a letter, written and published by Colonel M. F. P. a native of Caracas, who

was in the service of Venezuela, but had leave of absence, for the purpose of restoring his health in the Island of St. Thomas. It was addressed to Mr. F. a merchant, in Caracas, dated St. Thomas, July 12th. This colonel, a man of talent, knowledge, and military skill, was so disgusted with the conduct of Bolivar, that he realized a great part of his fortune, left the service, and went to live in London.

"I have waited patiently the result of the last campaign, which began at Calabozo. It has been most dreadful, and yet, such as might have been expected from the dispositions of Bolivar. After having approached the capital, at about six leagues distance, he constantly kept himself in such a position as to expose his forces to be beaten in detail; committing, at every step, faults which would have been unpardonable in a corporal. In consequence of these dispositions, he had been forced to remain on the right side of the Apure, after having sacrificed the strong and brave army which the several generals had placed under his command. The last news received from the Orinoco says, that the people begin to open their eyes upon this hero. May Heaven grant that it may at last be in our power to appreciate his merit, his talents, and his worth.

"It is astonishing that we should not have been able to expel a handful of Spaniards from our country, with a force of more than 9000 men, well-armed, equipped, and amply furnished with all the necessaries of war! But this is one of the consequences of the confusion and disorder which direct our operations."

Whilst General Bolivar was securing his person at

Angostura, Generals Paez, Barmudes, and Marinno, retired to their respective plains. Paez again took possession of the city of Araura, and made himself master of that part of the plains, whence he recruited himself with great activity and success. Marinno and Bermudes blockaded Cumana, which the Spaniards had fortified, and reduced it to great distress. The patriots again took possession of Guiria, of Carupano, and of all the coasts of the gulph of Paria.

As soon as the inhabitants of Guiria were acquainted with the results of this campaign, many of them murmured loudly against the supreme chief. Five of the most influential men, as I have been well-informed, held a secret consultation on the subject of turning him out and putting General Paez in his place. All were strongly enough opposed to Bolivar; but one of the five was quite as much opposed to Paez, whom he justly represented as illiterate, and utterly ignorant of civil affairs. He said too, that though Bolivar was by no means fit for the place, it might be pernicious to displace him at that time, and that he might now, after so much loss, probably listen to good advice, and change his conduct. After warm debates, which lasted two or three hours, the others yielded to his reasons, and Bolivar remained at the head of the government. This he owed to a foreigner, who has never mentioned these particulars. I have them from two others of the five, one of whom is dead, the other is still living. I am acquainted with the name of this foreigner, and know that, at that time, he held a high rank in Angostura. My informants said the change might easily have been

effected at that time, in spite of Bolivar's strong body-guard; for that the aversion to the supreme chief was universal, arising partly from the condemnation of Piar, (who left many secret but warm friends,) but chiefly from his conduct in the last campaign. But the dissatisfied had no leader, and they knew that the supreme chief had numerous spies, so that they dared not communicate their sentiments one to another.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Bolivar and Sanander—Council of Government at Angostura—Roscio and Torres—Situation of both contending Parties—Generals Urdaneta and English—Bolivar's Expedition against New Grenada—His Return to Venezuela—Events at Angostura—Fundamental Law of the Republic of Colombia. (Years 1818-19.)

THE supreme chief, however mortified, appeared with his usual retinue, and acted as if nothing adverse had happened. Through his emissaries he received the welcome news that the inhabitants of New Greneda, oppressed and vexed by their Spanish tyrants, waited only for an imposing force to declare their independence, take arms, and join the patriots. General Anander, or, as he now signs, *Sanander*, the vice-president of Colombia, and known to be the greatest opponent of Bolivar, was at that time in Angostura. He is a native of New Grenada, where he had many friends, who urged him to come with whatever forces, arms, ammunition, &c. he could bring with him. He informed the supreme chief that the Spaniards were daily harassed, not only by the victorious divisions of General Urdaneta, Valdes, and others, but also by the numerous and strong parties of Guerillas, which augmented on all sides in Grenada. Sanander urged Bolivar to send him with 1000 men, 3 or 4000 muskets, ammunition, and other warlike stores to New Grenada, and to give him the command of the ex-

pedition. But, as the supreme chief had conceived the idea of going himself, sooner or later, into this province, and as he was always jealous of any who possessed more talent and character than himself, so in this instance, as is said, he feared that Sanander might supplant him, or at least do much better than he could; and that he took his measures accordingly. The opinion that he did so, is supported by the following facts:—

At the end of July 1818, there arrived at Angostura a three-masted vessel from London, and a brig from New York, with large cargoes of muskets, pistols, gunpowder, swords, saddles, and every description of warlike stores for an army. The whole was offered on good terms to General Bolivar, who purchased them. When Sanander heard of this, he pressed the supreme chief to grant him 20,000 stand of arms, which were needed in New Grenada, together with the necessary ammunition, &c. which he offered to have transported safely to that province. But Bolivar, on various pretexts, (with which he is always ready,) refused his request, and gave him only 2000 stand; he had in the stores at Angostura about 50,000; of which, afterwards, (at the time of his marching himself into that province) he took a quantity with him, as well as of other warlike stores. By this conduct, as was then with good reason believed, he intended to convince the Grenadans, that he alone was able to afford the powerful assistance they were in so great need of. Whatever may have been his motive in refusing to furnish Sanander with sufficient means, he certainly delayed the emancipation of this extensive and beautiful

country for one whole year at least. When he lost the cause of liberty and independence, in 1815, he was evidently actuated by a spirit of vanity, ambition, and revenge.* And it was neither natural nor unjust to suppose that he was now actuated by the same kind of spirit.

General Sanander was now sent to New Grenada with a very inadequate supply of arms and warlike stores, far less than the Grenadans demanded, and than might have been with perfect convenience spared from the vast store of every thing at Angostura. Sanander left Angostura for New Grenada with his 2000 muskets, &c. accompanied by the son of General Urdaneta, some other officers, and a small escort of soldiers. The object of his commission was to unite the numerous bodies of Guerillas in favour of the patriots, to assemble them on the fine and vast plains of Casanare, to arm, organise, and fit them for action, and then to march them, united with General Urdaneta's strong division, against the capital, Bogota, to drive the Spaniards out of Grenada, and intercept the communication between the royalists in this province and those in Venezuela. But how was Sanander to do all this without the necessary means? These were withheld from him by Bolivar. He, however, effected more with his limited means than Bolivar himself had done in his campaign of 1818, with powerful forces. He is brave, ambitious, active, and laborious. He speaks and writes with facility. He possesses a perfect knowledge of the whole face of

* See Chapter VIII.

his native country, which affords great advantages in choosing military positions. His countrymen placed great confidence in him, knowing that he had been accustomed to hardships, and that, by his own personal merit and exertions, he had raised himself from the lower class, in which he was born, to the rank of a general. His countrymen, therefore, preferred him to any other general, particularly to Bolivar, who was not liked in Grenada. He was so highly thought of that his name alone terrified and discouraged his enemies. He gained various battles, and fought bravely; but he stained his glory by his cruelty. After gaining the battle of Boyoha, he ordered twenty-eight generals and other officers, who had surrendered themselves prisoners, to be shot; and that after this practice was abolished by agreement. By those who were well acquainted with the campaigns of 1818-19, the emancipation of New Grenada was attributed principally to him. Bolivar only finished what Sanander began, and would have accomplished a year sooner, had not the means been withheld from him by Bolivar.

After the departure of Sanander from Angostura, the true friends of liberty saw nothing in the established patriot government upon which they could form a reasonable expectation of stability and welfare. Under the administration of the supreme chief, the state was like a ship in a stormy sea, without a firm and skilful pilot. They looked in vain for energy, activity, and talent. They saw that his operations were the result of momentary impulse. There was a mutability in his actions, which showed them that he acted without firmness, skill, or system.

Before his departure from Angostura, in 1817, Gen. Bolivar established a *council of government*, of which he appointed Francisco Antonio Zea, president. Mr. Zea (who afterwards died while minister at London,) was undoubtedly an honest and upright man, but he was suffering from ill health. His malady affected his mind and prevented his acting at all, or with the requisite energy. Blindly submissive to the will of the supreme chief, he dared to do nothing without his express consent. Thus it happened, that the most trifling decisions of this council of government at Angostura, were sent to the supreme chief "wherever he could be found," for his sanction, before any step could actually be taken. General Bolivar, in his continual movements from place to place, often left large packets unopened, while some were decided upon after a hasty glance, and sent back to Angostura. It is impossible for any human being to do every thing; but Bolivar appeared not to have the capacity to know this, although he appeared to be actually incapable of working in his closet more than three hours at a time. Another hindrance to business was, that Mr. Zea, having lived in Spain above twenty years, followed strictly the old Spanish principles, habits, and manners. It was impossible that two such men should govern an extensive country agitated by passion, civil war, and troubles of every kind. The unexpected result of the last campaign was not of a nature to inspire confidence in the general. Disappointment enhanced the general misery. Every branch of the administration was in complete disorder, and the finances exhausted.

The government affording no security for a loan

from abroad, Bolivar had no way left to raise money, but by extraordinary and forced contributions. These were imposed, and in a very arbitrary manner too, upon the inhabitants of Venezuela. But it was hard to procure money in a country where industry and commerce were ruined. The few who had money in their power were either Spaniards, and secretly averse from the government, or such as placed no reliance upon the supreme chief, so that these forced measures increased the general dissatisfaction. Under these circumstances, the inhabitants of Angostura saw, with a kind of abhorrence, the increasing splendour of the household of their supreme chief, his luxury, his manner of rewarding his old and new mistresses, his body-guard, and the numerous officers who surrounded him. These were his flatterers and spies, and they lived in high style, drawing hard upon the few and scanty resources left for public use.

The greater part of these officers were useless to the army; being ignorant themselves, they were most of them incapable of drilling or affording any instruction to the soldiers. Generally speaking, they gained their epaulettes and rank like Soublette, by flattery and devotion to the supreme chief, who was the only source of recompense and honour. As he had no instruction in military matters himself, he was jealous of every foreigner who had the reputation of being well instructed in them. Thus it happened that, at the court of Bolivar, sycophants held the places of the brave, and flatterers, of men of skill and talent. The luxury of these officers of the household, excited great dissatisfaction among the other officers of the army;

and the more so, because the cowardice of several of them had been displayed—as was Soublette's at Ortiz, and on other occasions. The Irish Colonel T. who was present, assured me, that he had never in his life seen so much cowardice beneath epaulettes as Charles Soublette showed at the battle of Ortiz. He was so often insulted, and had become so contemptible at Angostura, that the supreme chief was obliged to interpose his own authority for the protection of this worthy friend.

The republic of Venezuela was, in fact, a despotic military anarchy, like that of 1813-14; so that the supreme chief, had he possessed talent, would have been puzzled to know where his attention was most requisite. He daily received news of defections, and reports that the dissatisfaction of the people was increasing, and was kept from breaking out only by their fear of the bayonet. At this embarrassing and critical time, unexpectedly arrived a man of sense, talents, and character, who saved this miserable government and his country from total ruin. This man was Dr. German Roscio. I must give here some interesting particulars but very little known.

The Dr. was a native of Venezuela, and had been a distinguished member of the first congress of Venezuela, assembled at Caracas in 1811. He was, like many others, arrested in July 1812 at Laguaira, and sent to Cadiz with General Miranda. He was put into a dungeon at La Caraca, not far from Cadiz. He had friends there, by whose assistance he effected his escape to Gibraltar. From thence he went to London, and thence to the United States of America, where he met

Mr. Manuel Torres, another Caraguin, who lived at Philadelphia, as an emigrant from the Main, in a private and retired manner. They soon became intimate friends. Mr. Torres died a few miles from Philadelphia in 1822, in miserable circumstances; being however at the time the accredited chargé des affaires of Colombia. He was sick in his bed during the last three or four months of his life, and would have perished with his family, if the necessaries of life had not been furnished to them by a number of respectable citizens to whom he was known, and who will attest the facts here related. His small salary was not paid to him by his government.

Both Dr. Roscio and Mr. Torres were firm patriots, men of superior talents, and of sound knowledge in every branch of civil administration, particularly in the department of finance. They were competent to form a constitution of government adapted to the condition, character, and genius, of their countrymen. Both were honest, and their dearest interest was the welfare of their country. They saw with deep regret the inauspicious turn which the revolution of Caracas had taken. They lamented the fate of Miranda, and justly venerated his character and memory. They loudly censured the memory of General Bolivar, who had usurped the dictatorial power, and seemed determined to retain it, though he possessed neither talent, firmness of character, nor dignity sufficient to qualify him for such an office. Notwithstanding their private opinion of General Bolivar, they determined to use their utmost exertions to save their country, and were resolved to convince him, if possible, of his errors, and bring him

into measures conducive to the welfare of their countrymen.

Mr. Torres, being of a feeble constitution, chose to remain in Philadelphia, where he could be free and independent; and being out of the power of the supreme chief, could address him in plainer and stronger language than he would be permitted to use whilst under his immediate control. He therefore determined to commence a correspondence with General Bolivar.

Dr. Roscio departed alone, and arrived at Angostura in the beginning of 1818, soon after Bolivar had marched against Caracas. He was the bearer of many letters and papers very interesting and important to Venezuela; but particularly of a very long letter from his friend Torres to the supreme chief, flattering the vanity of Bolivar, and paying him many compliments upon his good intentions, his perseverence, &c. &c., but frankly telling him, that the government which he had established in Venezuela was not at all suited to the character of its inhabitants, nor to the complicated interests of so extensive a republic; that, moreover, a military government would lead to anarchy, which would bring along with it the ruin of the country, and the certain destruction of the man, whoever he might be, that should attempt to support such a government.

I have already said that Bolivar abhorred the despotic Spanish government, and that he could listen to the advice of enlightened men, and approve of their plans—but that, unfortunately for himself and the country, he was surrounded by vile and ignorant flatterers; to whom he listened, and for whom his affection was so great, that he often acted in compliance with

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their wishes against his own conviction.* If Bolivar had acted according to his own judgment, the interest even of his country would probably in many instances have been promoted.

In the absence of General Bolivar, Dr. Roscio was received by the president of the council of government, Zea, in the manner he deserved. During his stay he made many friends: he appears to have been one of the editors of, or writers for, the Courier of Angostura, a gazette which was protected by Zea, and for which he sometimes furnished articles himself. This circumstance excited a kind of rivalship between these distinguished men. As the Dr. announced his principles strongly and clearly, and wrote in a superior style, Zea began to grow jealous of him, to receive him coolly, and to be reserved towards him. Every one was anxious to be introduced to Dr. Roscio, while the house of Mr. Zea became less frequented. Bolivar, on his arrival, received the former as an old acquaintance, having known him at Caracas in 1811-12. The Dr. presented Mr. Torres's letter, which made the desired impression upon the supreme chief. Possessed of an agreeable and persuasive eloquence, and supported by an unsullied reputation, Roscio, in various private conversations with Bolivar, spoke with the warmth of a feeling heart in favour of the principles advanced in the letter of his friend Torres. He was strongly seconded by Dr. Ramon Cadix and Palacio Faxar, men of talent, and respected by the supreme chief. The result of these exertions was, that General Bolivar

* See Chapter XIII.

consented to convene a congress. He appeared to be satisfied of the necessity for changing his measures; but when he came to act, he allowed the congress very limited powers only, still reserving to himself the supreme authority. Whether he did this in compliance with the wishes of his flatterers, or was directed by his own ambition, is uncertain; these probably coincided. His new plan, however, evinced a total ignorance of the principles of modern republican free governments, and of the excellent treatises extant upon the subject. It was of course unsatisfactory to the enlightened patriots. He had drawn out with his own hand a pretty extensive project of a constitution, which he proposed to introduce into Venezuela. In this project he proposed to institute a House of Lords and a House of Representatives; the members of the Senate or House of Lords to have the title of Baron, Count, Marquis, or Duke, &c.: these offices to be held for life, and titles to be hereditary. From this plan, obviously in imitation of the British constitution, it is plain that he wished to establish a permanent aristocracy.

Bolivar was so enchanted with his plan, that he privately communicated the project to the council of government, and, I regret to say, the president, Zea, highly approved of it. But Dr. Roscio, being informed of the project, consulted with his friends, Cadix and Faxar, and they united in such representations to the supreme chief as brought him, first to hesitate, and then to suspend the execution of his plan. The Dr. immediately wrote to Torres, stating the plan to him; and he, by an eloquent and persuasive letter directed to

the supreme chief, prevailed with him to reject the aristocratical part of his project.

It was resolved to convene a congress, and Bolivar a second time had the merit of subjecting his own ardent desire to the superior wisdom of his friends. These two instances, heretofore known to but few persons, render it probable, that if Bolivar had chosen for his friends men of information and integrity, instead of surrounding himself with vile flatterers and ignorant and selfish advisers, he would have been a very different character. Dr. Roscio, and others of his ablest and best friends are dead: he appears now to be left to flatterers, and if he continue to be so much longer, will destroy himself or his country.

Upon the assembling of the deputies of congress, the installation of this assembly took place the 15th February, under the most solemn and imposing ceremonies, which, however, it would be useless to detail here. Franc. Ant. Zea was elected president, and General Bolivar intrusted with the executive power.

The appointment of this congress changed the form, but did not affect the substance, of Bolivar's government. Zea, an honest and virtuous man, was nevertheless weak, and entirely devoted even yet to the general, who, by private intrigue, procured him to be named president of the new congress, knowing that Zea was altogether unable to command the army, and that he had not friends and adherents enough to pretend to govern the republic. The election was made by calling on the members by name, and not by secret ballot: the supreme chief was present. Some ten or twelve deputies proposed Mr. Zea, others dared not to

oppose the nomination; and so Mr. Zea was unanimously elected against the secret wishes of many, probably a majority of them.

On this occasion General Bolivar gave a new proof of his love of power and distinction. In his proclamation, dated Angostura, February 20th, he said; "The general congress of Venezuela has taken the supreme power, which until this day you had confided to me; I have returned it to the people, by rendering it into the hands of their legitimate representatives. The national sovereignty has honoured me by putting into my hands the executive power, with the title of Provisional President of Venezuela. Venezuelans! I feel myself unable to govern you; I have often said so to your representatives, who, in spite of my well-grounded refusal, have forced me to command you.

"Soldiers of the liberating army! my only ambition has always been to partake with you the dangers which you incur in defence of the republic."

The name of congress made a favourable impression upon public opinion, and the newly-organised government was powerfully supported by the inhabitants of Venezuela; so that General Bolivar succeeded in collecting an army of from 13 to 14,000 men, which enabled him to act on the offensive.

He received from England, besides the legion of which I have spoken, large cargoes of arms, ammunition, warlike stores, &c. Numbers of French, German, Polish, and other officers, came to Angostura and Margarita to offer their services, with sanguine hopes of advancement and fortune, and of enjoying the honour of being admitted into the ranks of those who

fought for the sacred cause of liberty and independence! General Bolivar received them well: his polite and easy manners, when in good humour, have fascinated thousands who were unacquainted with his profound dissimulation, and his concealed jealousy of strangers. But when these foreigners found that they received neither pay nor good rations, and were looked upon by the native troops among whom they served with a jealous eye, while they were obliged to traverse marshy or arid plains, their zeal changed to disappointment and dejection. Many retired in a pitiable condition, as the inhabitants of Jamaica, St. Thomas's, Curaçao, &c. can testify, from 1819 to the present time.

The great exertions of the patriot commanders, and the reviving spirit of the people, excited sanguine hopes that the campaign of this year would be the last, and that the Spaniards would now be driven from the country, and an end be put to this distressing war.

General Bolivar, anxious to efface the impression of the unfortunate campaign of 1818, conceived for this year an excellent plan, which in good hands must have succeeded. He made a display of an intention to attack Caracas, and free Venezuela from the Spanish yoke. By this he induced Morillo to weaken New Grenada, and concentrate his forces upon this point; whereupon turning suddenly, he united his forces with the numerous guerillas, and marched in column against Bogota.

He had sent General Santander forward to prepare every thing, as I have mentioned; he had revived the public spirit by gaining advantages over the enemy; so that he might easily have raised the inhabitants of

these twenty-two provinces against their oppressors, whom they hated.

Bolivar, sure of retaining his supreme power, named Zea as vice-president of the government during his absence; sent Generals Urdaneta and Valdes with about twenty officers to the Island of Margarita, to organize the troops which were there, and departed, February the 27th, for the army. He had with him a numerous and brilliant staff, and 2000 men. He directed his march towards the left shores of the river Araura to join General Paez, who had about 3000 Llaneros, all mounted.

General Bolivar named San Iago Marinno commander-in-chief of the corps under Bermudes, Monagas, Zarasa, Roxas, and Montes, about 6000 men strong; and ordered him to march against Barcelona and Cumana, and if they should refuse to surrender, to take them by assault. These corps marched in February.

Besides these forces, the patriots had in the sea-ports of Pompatar and Juan Griego, in the Island of Margarita, twelve armed vessels, and among them one corvette, four brigs, and three hermaphrodite brigs; the rest were schooners manned with Englishmen and Americans. On the Orinoco eight vessels were constructed, consisting chiefly of gun-boats, well manned and armed.

Against these forces which threatened his total destruction, the Spanish general, Morillo, had neglected nothing to put himself in a good state of defence. In January, he departed from Valencia at the head of 5000 men, and ordered San Fernando de Apure, where La Torre commanded, and where Morillo esta-

blished his head-quarters, to be fortified. Soon afterwards General Paez, having evacuated the city, retired towards the river Araura to effect his junction with General Bolivar. Morillo moved forward and established his camp before the borough of Caujacal.

General Morillo, hearing that many English troops had already joined the patriots, became apprehensive that their numbers would become so great that it would be impossible for him to resist them. He therefore issued a proclamation, directed "to the chiefs, officers, and privates of his Britannic Majesty, actually serving with the insurgents," to induce them to desert to the Spanish army. Among other things he said—"The government of his Catholic Majesty, and I myself, particularly, have been informed of the manner in which many subjects of his Britannic Majesty have been seduced in England by Mendes and other traitors, to unite their fortune with those who style themselves Independents of South America. The revolutionary agents have represented to them that there existed a republican government, well established laws, armies, and inhabitants, who have voluntarily submitted to such a republic. By such illusions many have been seduced to leave their country, with the intention of establishing themselves there, and obtaining as a recompense for their services, property, fortune, and honour! But how cruelly have they been deceived! Englishmen! it is to you that I address myself—to you, who already know this famous personage (Simon Bolivar) whom you compare in England with a Washington; but now that you have seen this hero of this miserable republic, his troops, his generals, and the crazy fools which compose

its government, you know you have been grossly deceived. You serve under the orders of a man who is in every respect very insignificant, and you have united yourselves with a horde of banditti, who are known but by their cruel deeds. I know there are many Englishmen and other foreigners who have been deceived, yet cannot separate themselves from this unjust cause, for want of means. I offer and promise, therefore, to those who voluntarily present themselves to the army under my command, perfect security for their persons, whether they may choose to be admitted into the service of his Catholic Majesty, or to retire to any other country. In either case they shall be in safety.

(Signed) "PABLO MORILLO."

General Head-quarters at Achaguas, March 26th, 1818.

A decree of Ferdinand VII. dated Madrid, January 14th, 1819, and addressed to the minister of foreign relations, differs pretty widely from this proclamation of his representative on the Main. His Catholic Majesty, the protector of liberal opinions, and the benefactor of humanity, says in his decree, "That all strangers taken with arms in their hands, and serving in the cause of the insurgents, within his possessions, and all who have furnished arms for them, shall be condemned to death, and their property, being within the jurisdiction of his Catholic Majesty, shall be confiscated."

On the 20th of March General Bolivar united his forces with those of General Paez, whom he made acquainted with his new plan of operations against New Grenada, requesting the support of his cavalry of Lla-

neros. Paez told him that he was ready to follow him, but that he doubted whether his Llaneros could be prevailed upon to do so. It is notorious that these Indians dislike to fight at a distance from their plains; and in spite of the urgent entreaties, both of Bolivar and Paez, they refused, and declared that if force were used to compel them, they would desert, and return to their native plains, where alone they were used to fight. The two generals were obliged to yield to their refusal, and appeased them not without difficulty. This act of insubordination, and the consequent total want of cavalry, greatly dispirited the troops of General Bolivar.

Before his departure, he and Paez were attacked by a Spanish column, under Colonel Pereira, to whose support the forces under Morillo came soon after; and on the 27th of March an action took place, a little way from Trapiche de La Gamarra, where the patriots were beaten. In their retreat they were greatly harassed, the Spaniards following them along the right bank of the river Araura, during the 29th and 31st of March, and the 1st and 2d of April. General Morillo, in his official report, ridiculed the disposition made by General Bolivar. He said, "the want of boats, which were unluckily destroyed in the river Apure, hindered me from crossing the Araura, in order to finish the destruction of the forces under Bolivar and Paez, who were advancing, as they said, to take the capital in two days, a rumour spread by Bolivar, when he departed from Guayana with his famous reinforcement of Englishmen, &c."

But the Spanish triumph lasted not long. Bolivar and Paez obtained more troops, and marched against

Morillo, whose head-quarters were at Achaguas. They attacked him on the 15th of April, and, after a warm engagement, he was totally routed, with the loss of about 1200 men, and compelled to retreat, with the remainder of his troops, to Calaboza. Colonel Donato Paez, brother of the general, destroyed thirty-six Spanish gun-boats, and took eighteen pieces of cannon of large calibre.

The troops under the Spanish general, La Torre, were also routed, and compelled to make their retreat along the plains of Aragua, and join their general-in-chief in Calabozo. The consequence of these two victories was the occupation of Barinas by the patriots, which opened to them the way into New Grenada.

Morillo again united a force of 6000 men, and attempted to invade the plains of Apure, and to avail himself of the absence of Bolivar, who had entered the province of Barinas to recruit, and to unite with the English troops, which had directed their march towards this point. General Paez cautiously endeavoured to avoid a battle, and to draw the enemy into the interior of the plains, that he might afterwards cut off their retreat. In this short campaign, Paez manœuvred with such skill and success, that he harassed and even beat various detachments of the enemy, took and killed more than 1500 of them, and cut off the convoys, provisions, and other aids, intended for the army of Morillo, who was at last compelled to retreat to the Island of Achaguas.

General Bolivar arrived in May, with his troops of foreigners, at Nutrias, where he allowed them some rest. Paez, with about 2000 cavalry and 800 English infantry, observed and besieged Morillo in Achaguas.

He even sent strong parties towards Calabozo and San Carlos, to watch their actions in this part of the country.

If Bolivar had possessed ordinary knowledge of the military art—if he had united his and Paez's troops with those of Marinno, he could have destroyed Morillo's forces at a blow; he could have cut him off from all means of supply, and forced him to hazard an attack, or to perish by famine, or to capitulate. Instead of this he only watched the Spaniards in Achagua, without making any attempt against them. When Morillo saw this, he united his forces, placed himself at their head, and opening his way through the camp of the enemy, arrived in June, without any considerable loss, at Caracas, whence he immediately detached two battalions, to reinforce Cumana and Barcelona.

Meanwhile, General Marinno reinforced himself daily at the Pao of Barcelona, preparing to attack the Spanish colonel, Aldama. Bermudes closely besieged Cumana, and Urdaneta was destined to act in unison with General English, and the English troops who had arrived with him at Margarita, upon one of the points on the eastern coast of Venezuela.

This expedition, called the expedition of the foreigners, sailed on the 13th of July, from Margarita, in twenty-five armed and transport vessels. On board the squadron were 1400 English and Hanoverian troops, and about 1000 sailors, commanded in chief by General Urdaneta. They anchored on the coast near Barcelona, and after effecting their debarkation, the squadron was directed towards Cumana, in order more closely to blockade the place. Marinno, after having routed

Colonel Aldama, on the 12th of June, near Chispero, joined the forces of Sedenno, Zarasa, Monagas, Roxas, Bermudes, and Thomas Montilla, in one encampment near San Diego of Cabrutica, where the English troops, under Urdaneta, were daily expected. From that time every one was satisfied that such an imposing force, of more than 13,000 men strong, would be more than sufficient to conquer Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas, and the whole country of Venezuela. The patriot chieftains were so certain of success, that they detached 2000 men towards Cucuta, in New Grenada, to reinforce General Santander (who, at various times, had obtained some troops and more arms), in order to strengthen and encourage the patriots, who, since his arrival, had not ceased to join him, whilst he had already penetrated as far as Sagamosa, not far from the capital of Bogota.

The English troops, under Urdaneta, instead of uniting with the forces of San Iago Marinno, near Cumana; landed, as I have stated, not far from Barcelona. It has been said, that this evil course was ordered by General Rafael Urdaneta, to avoid acting under General Marinno, whom he despised, and from service under whose orders he had ever been solicitous to keep himself. Urdaneta was jealous, too, of General English, on account of his great authority and influence over the English troops, who, very naturally, were more ready to obey him than Urdaneta. He therefore did every thing to counteract him. As soon as their debarkation was effected, a strong Spanish column opposed their advance into the interior of the province; and, having no provisions, they embarked again on

board the Spanish squadron, the 3d of August. They sailed towards Cumana, and debarked near that place, at Bordones, which the Spaniards had fortified. General Urdaneta, without waiting for the forces under Marinno, ordered an attack upon Cumana, where he was repulsed by the garrison. On the 8th of August, the English troops renewed the attack with the bayonet, and, in four different charges, which they made with the utmost bravery, were again repulsed with great loss. The greater part of these heroic troops perished afterwards, before a small battery, called Agua Santa. Part of them fell on the field of battle, and some at Maturin, where they retired after their defeat. As this city was entirely ruined, they found but scanty means of subsistence, and perished miserably for want of food, the effects of fatigue, and the climate. General English retired to the Island of Margarita, disgusted with such a service, and particularly with the behaviour of Urdaneta towards him and his troops. The squadron directed its course towards the same island.

Thus ended this expedition, from which the patriots justly expected great success, and in which the English troops were uselessly sacrificed, as there is good reason to believe, by the ignorance and jealousy of General Urdaneta.

Among the foreigners who came with General English was a major, named Guillemore, an engineer, and an officer of distinguished merit. He directed the fortications of Santa Rosa, a fort which protected the small port of Juan Griego, on the Island of Margarita, which Morillo could never take, and which caused his entire defeat in this island, as I have already related. Major

Guillemore was entirely opposed to an attack upon Cumana, and spoke with warmth and eloquence, to show that it must prove unsuccessful. Urdaneta treated him harshly, and, though he was supported by the most reasonable representations of General English himself, obstinately persisted in ordering the attack. The consequences were as I have related. When the result was known, Urdaneta, Bermudes, Marinno, and some other native chieftains, had the baseness to exclaim loudly against *these foreigners*, and to call them cowards. They most impudently imputed to General English the mischievous consequences of the ignorance and obstinacy of General Urdaneta.

General English was an enthusiast in the cause of civil liberty, and was a brave officer. He died of a broken heart, in consequence of the treatment he rereceived from Urdaneta, and of the loss of so many of his brave companions, through the jealousy and meanness of the Spaniards. He died at Margarita, destitute of almost every thing, and lamenting his engagement in such a service. Major Guillemore retired, with the same opinion of the service.

The patriots succeeded at last in getting possession of Barcelona, on the 5th August. General Urdaneta found no more than forty men acting in the fortified Charity-House. He and Bermudes, with their united forces of more than 2000 men, were engaged about two months in getting possession of an ill-fortified Spanish garrison, posted at a single house rather than a fortification, and consisting of less than a hundred men, and these becoming destitute of food and munitions of war.

This fact may afford a pretty just notion of the military skill of Urdaneta and Bermudes.

Urdaneta ordered the forty Spaniards found acting in the Charity-House to be shot, by way of retaliation for the following instance of Spanish cruelty. When the patriots approached Barcelona, Lieutenant-Colonel Gorin, who commanded the Spaniards in the city, sent a detachment of thirty cavalry to reconnoitre the enemy, who marched towards the suburbs of the city without encountering any opposition. In the night, this detachment surprised an advanced guard of six men, commanded by a sergeant, and put them to the sword before they could give the alarm. They advanced rapidly towards the house where General Urdaneta was sleeping; surprised his guard, commanded by an English officer (a lieutenant), and killed them, but spared the officer, whom they disarmed and threatened to cut in pieces if he were not quiet. They then stuffed a handkerchief into his mouth, and two Spaniards fastened him to the tails of their horses. Urdaneta was awakened by the noise, escaped through a back door of the house, and gave the alarm to his troops. The Spaniards were obliged to retire, and departed at full gallop, so that their prisoner was literally torn to pieces alive!

In June, General Bolivar left General Paez for the purpose of penetrating into the heart of New Granada with a very strong column. He rejoined the latter, and endeavoured to make himself master of the province of Barinas, in order to cover himself on this side. Bolivar found the enemy in the valley of Samagoso, in the province of Tunja. He himself had 2000 infantry,

of which the greater part were European troops, and 500 cavalry. The Spanish General Barasino had about the same number. The battle, fought on the 1st of July, was warm and obstinate: the English, at last, decided the combat, by a vigorous charge, which forced the enemy to retire in great disorder. Barasino soon reinforced himself, and, on the 23d of the same month, attacked General Bolivar at Patano de Barg, near the capital of the province of Tunja. He was defeated a second time, with the loss of his artillery, baggage, and many of his troops, among whom were his staff-officers. A considerable number of deserters, principally cavalry, came over to the patriots.

General Bolivar proclaimed martial law, in virtue of which all the inhabitants of New Grenada capable of serving, were compelled to bear arms and join his troops, under penalty of capital punishment. His army soon increased to 3000 infantry and 1600 cavalry. With these he marched towards the capital, Bogota. He found General Barasino at a large farm called the Venta Quemada, sixty miles from the capital. As the ground was hilly, and covered with bushes, some of the English officers advised General Bolivar to use stratagem, which he did successfully. He placed most of his infantry in ambush, and ordered his cavalry to gain, unseen, the rear of the enemy, so that his line of battle presented a front of small extent. The enemy made the attack with great bravery; but at this moment the infantry in ambush, and the cavalry, rushed forward and attacked his flank and rear. The Spaniards were routed with a loss of more than 1000 men, and were not rallied until they reached Mompox. This battle of

the 7th August decreed the fate of New Grenada, and its success was attributed to the European troops.

The viceroy, Samana, received intelligence of this engagement in the night of the 8th; and Bogota being an open and defenceless city, he gave orders to evacuate it immediately. In the morning of the 9th, he, with some hundred persons, left the capital.

His retreat was so rapid, that he arrived at Honda in thirty hours, a journey which usually occupies three days. He left at Bogota half a million of dollars in silver money. Bolivar made his triumphal entry the 12th of August, and ordered the city of Ocanna to be taken possession of on the 17th.

On the 28th, the viceroy arrived at Tambuco, and sent expresses to Morillo to inform him what had happened. He also sent General La Torre (the same who behaved so ill at the battle of San Felipe, and lost Guayana) with various Spanish troops to New Grenada, to take the command of the royal forces in that province. The Spaniards arriving at Mompox, worked day and night to entrench themselves.

In Venezuela the scene of war was too frequently changed to afford anything interesting to the reader. Bloody struggles resulted in nothing. The Spaniards driven from one place, occupied another. They were routed, and recruited again. The case was the same with the patriots, and war raged in every corner of Venezuela, without producing any effect important to either party.

I will now proceed to events which took place in the congress at Angostura, during the absence of General Bolivar. There was in congress a strong party of true

patriots and republicans. These men were disquieted by the devotion of their president to the will of Bolivar, which, together with the decline of his health, led him to refer every measure to head-quarters. Much business was left wholly undone, and more was delayed. The general dissatisfaction had risen already to a high pitch. Some members told him frankly, that if he did not change his course they must consider it their duty to procure his removal and to put another into his place. Others reproached him with vile submission to Bolivar. He was just then engaged in framing a code of laws for the republic, and was unusually regardless of the executive business. He was compelled to resign, and General Arismendy was elected in his place, as vice-president of congress, and president of the republic, in the absence of General Bolivar. This happened in the month of October.

As soon as Arismendy was in power, he procured a decree, to the effect that Admiral Brion no longer deserved the confidence of the republic; that he was, therefore, dismissed, and that, in his stead, his brother-in-law, Commodore Foley, was appointed Admiral. Arismendy ordered Brion before congress, to give an account of his conduct, and sent to Foley the ribbon of the order of the Libertadores.

Meanwhile Bolivar succeeded in setting free New Grenada; and all the provinces having risen in favour of independence, the Spaniards were obliged to retreat and shut themselves up in Mompox, which, as well as Santa Martha and Carthagena, they had fortified.

Bolivar, who never lost sight of Caracas, in his usual hasty manner, which he mistakes for dispatch, settled

all business in Bogotá. He ordained a kind of congress of which he was the regulator. He left General Sanander commander-in-chief, and General Anzoatigui, one of his most devoted flatterers, as second in command, and directed his march towards Pamplona, where he arrived the 20th of September, and remained about two months, occupied in festivals and balls.

He departed at last with about 2000 men, for Guadalita. About 800 of these deserted, having been taken by force from their families, and being, besides, greatly disgusted with the imperious manner of this *Caraguin general*, as they called Bolivar.

The general arrived the 3d November at Montecal in Venezuela, where he had directed the patriot chieftains of that province to assemble with their troops. He had with him about three millions of dollars, which had been collected from the inhabitants of New Grenada in taxes, and by forced contributions. He is said to have extorted a formal promise from the different authorities in the province, to send him regularly every month a million of dollars. The troops, however, were never regularly paid, and the foreigners became the more dissatisfied when they found that, instead of being paid to them and others, who had dearly earned it, the money disappeared, by going into the hands of flatterers, and the officers who more immediately surrounded the general. These fared sumptuously, whilst the army was straitened for want of pay, food, and clothing. Many hundred of the foreigners were worn down in this march by heat, fatigue, and want of food. These were neither carried on, nor left provided for, and, of course, perished miserably.

As soon as Morillo heard of this numerous collection of troops, he gave orders to evacuate San Fernando de Apure, united his different detachments, and concentrated his forces at San Carlos. The Spaniards again lost the province of Venezuela, and various families left the country, embarking at Laguaira and Porto Cabello for the West Indies and the United States.

The patriots had again in Venezuela a force of about 9000 men. Among them were 3000 English, Irish, and Hanoverian troops, of which many had lately arrived at Angostura and Margarita. They now marched towards the plains of Calabozo, so that the head-quarters of each were about two days march asunder.

Every one was now again certain that the Spaniards, who had not above 4500 men, and of those two-thirds natives, would at last be driven for ever out of the territory of Venezuela. The patriots had nothing more to do than to advance and act, and they were sure of success. They knew that the Spaniards had lost much of their confidence, and that the native troops were only kept from passing to the other side by their Spanish officers. But all these advantages, the benefit of the country, and the course which General Bolivar pretended to defend, were overlooked in the sad tidings of the change that had taken place at the seat of government. On receiving these despatches Bolivar was thunderstruck. His own personal welfare, and the gratification of his personal feelings, had always and everywhere been pre-eminent with him. The cause of freedom was but his tool. Instead of attacking the enemy with his 3000 well dis-

ciplined European troops, which were dreaded by the Spaniards on the Main, he suffered himself to be overcome with the news of Arismendy's advancement; and, in consequence, took a resolution, the result of which was that the war was protracted for five years, and the lives of thousands sacrificed to his love of power.

With these 3000 troops, among whom were his body-guard, he marched towards Angostura, or rather against Arismendy. He knew that Arismendy, after all that had passed between them, would not be his friend; and there was no prospect of his being able to bring Arismendy to be as Zea had been, his devoted minister. He knew too that Arismendy was a decided republican, and would probably use all his power to establish the authority of congress, and to limit the power of the supreme chief. He knew also that he was a far more able military man than himself, and that this was manifested to the country by his wonderful defence of the Island of Margarita. He knew that he was a brave, enterprising, and ambitious chieftain; and it was perfectly natural for Bolivar to suspect him of a design to obtain the first office in the republic. Arismendy's conduct and services had made him many adherents; while Bolivar's cowardice and misconduct left him as supporters only his immediate dependents and flatterers. In this condition he felt more anxiety than he had ever appeared to feel before. Various persons have assured me, that for twenty-four hours he appeared like a madman; speaking to none; looking dejected; lying in his hammock; and then jumping out of it and

pacing his room. At last he decided to leave the command of his remaining forces to General Paez, and to march himself with his best troops to Angostura. He arrived the 14th of November, unexpectedly, with his 3000 men, fully devoted to him, at the seat of government, Angostura, in the province of Guayana. Arismendy having only about 600 men, and these poorly clad, armed, and disciplined, was obliged, of course, to submit to the imposing force of Bolivar. He was exiled from Guayana, and ordered to retire to his native island, Margarita. Previously to his formal dismission from the service, he was condemned to lead a private life, and to come no more upon the Main. It was not because Arismendy was less dangerous in the view of Bolivar, than Piar had been, that his life was spared. But he knew that Arismendy had many friends in congress and in the army, and that the brave-spirited inhabitants of Margarita would rise in his defence; whilst that the greater part of the Llaneros were his friends, as they were the friends of republican government. He therefore listened to the advice of Dr. Roscio, and did not venture to take the life of Arismendy.

Mr. Zea was re-installed president of congress, and vice-president of the republic.

Dr. Roscio, and various other true friends of a free republican government, now united in representing to General Bolivar the instability of the government he had established; and after long, earnest, and eloquent discussions, at last prevailed upon him to consent to the establishment of a congress, upon a new and more extensive plan.

The conquest of all New Grenada, except Santa Martha, Carthagena, and Mompox, rendered necessary a national representation. Those provinces of Venezuela, which were in the power of the patriots, were in the same situation. The inhabitants of both were anxious to have a congress and a republican government; and it was therefore urged to Bolivar to unite these two great provinces under one congress, and to call the new government "The Republic of Colombia." This memorable act, which is entitled, "Fundamental Law of the Republic of Colombia," is generally attributed to the enlightened mind of the deceased. Dr. German Roscio, of whom I have already spoken.

CHAPTER XIX.

Events from the Proclamation of the Fundamental Law of the Republic of Colombia, December 1819, to the Armistice between General Bolivar and Morillo, November 1820.

AFTER having re-installed Mr. Zea, General Bolivar, on the 25th December, 1819, left Angostura, with a numerous corps of troops, and directed his march toward the plains of Apure. He arrived the 20th of January at San Fernando de Apure, the capital, where he learned that the cause of independence was declining in New Grenada. I have stated, that before his departure from Bogota, General Bolivar settled the pending business in his hasty manner. *His manner* has, from 1813 to the present day, consisted in pretending to do every thing by himself—to be soldier, legislator, and administrator; he seems to be unable to understand how his supremacy can be retained in any other way, whilst with his very limited talents and constitutional aversion to serious business, this way of his has kept every thing in confusion in every department, particularly that of the finances. Agriculture, commerce, and every branch of industry, have been kept down and destroyed by heavy taxes, charges at the Custom-House, forced contributions, and the like. No officer, civil or military, of whatever grade, could count upon receiving his regular salary or pay; these men, thereupon, let slip no opportunity of defrauding the

public, or of taking bribes. Governors of provinces, and all the military men who had it in their power, extorted from the people, besides their taxes, a proportional sum for the support of their persons, their troops, and retinue; what the people were unwilling to give was very often taken from them by force. The capricious decisions of an individual, united with the vexations inflicted by civil and military officers upon the Grenadans, who had done so much for Bolivar, and who were entitled to better treatment, fell so heavily upon them, that they began to compare their present distressed condition with what it had been under the Spanish government: many of them preferred the latter, deserted, and joined the Spaniards, under La Torre and Calzada. Calzada, seeing his forces suddenly increased by these desertions, again took the offensive, and was preparing to march against the capital of Bogota. La Torre, hearing that the patriots had retired in haste from Los Publicos, advanced towards the plains of Quarta, to support the movements of Calzada, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy, who were in these plains. The rapid progress of the Spaniards in Grenada caused great alarm among the members of the provisional government established by Bolivar, and preparations were made for retreating.

General Bolivar heard these tidings while he was in San Fernando de Apure; he determined to march again, at the head of 4000 men, against the enemy in that province; he left his head-quarters the 26th of January, and directed his march towards Cucuta. General Morillo, fearing to be attacked at San Carlos,

had retired towards Valencia, intending to get into the strong-hold of Porto Cabello, in case of any loss or sudden attack. The departure of Bolivar, with his 4000 troops, gave him a second opportunity to reinforce himself.

Meanwhile, General Bolivar was marching towards Cucuta, in Grenada. General Paez, intrusted with the chief command of the army in Venezuela, established his head-quarters at Maturin, where he collected an army of 12,000 men, in which were 3000 Europeans, chiefly of the Irish legion of Devereaux. Contrary to all expectation, he remained at Maturin without attempting to attack Morillo, or even moving against him. Morillo, therefore, returned again to San Carlos, where he recruited considerably, as he had done before at Valencia. The spirit of the Spaniards was raised by tidings of a formidable expedition, fitted out at Cadiz, by order of the king, under the command of General Henry O'Donnell, (Count of Abisbal); this expedition had been ordered in consequence of the urgent representations of General Morillo, who had sent pressing letters to the king, in which he strongly and truly stated the precarious situation of the royal cause in Spanish America. Morillo had received great assistance from the commerce of Barcelona, Cadiz, Malaga, Alicante, &c., which suffered exceedingly from the war in the colonies. The richest merchants of these places offered the king large sums of money, and support of every kind, if he would send a force sufficient to put an end to the war at once: this was accepted, and, since March 1819, the greatest preparations had been making in Spain to that effect. A force of

25,000 men was collected, to be divided into two *corps d'armée*, under the command of O'Donnel; one of which was destined to act against Peru, and the other against the Main.

The royalists in Venezuela, (who had seen how Morillo, in 1818, with far less force, destroyed that of Bolivar,) on hearing this news, doubted not the success of their cause. The patriots were indebted to Colonel Quiroja's revolution in Spain, which happened a little after this time, for the destruction of an expedition which was destined to forge new chains for the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies.

General Bolivar, pressed on all sides for money, was advised to send an agent to London for the purpose of negotiating a loan sufficient to enable him to prosecute the war with more vigour. He chose the ex-vice-president, Zea, (whose place was supplied by Dr. Roscio,) and gave him full and ample powers; he departed in March 1820, for St. Thomas's, whence he embarked for London.

Until the latter end of March 1820, the positions of the two armies in Venezuela presented nothing important. The operations of the patriots, however, afford satisfactory proof of the narrow capacities of their leaders; at Achaguas, General Paez had about 4000 men. After Morillo's evacuation of San Carlos, Urdaneta had, at that place, 3500 men; Bermudes had, at Maturin, 1600 men; Zarasa and Sedenno had 800 men at Quebrada Honda; Monagas and Diego had 1000 men in the province of Barcelona, without mentioning the numerous guerillas and smaller parties of armed patriots which had no fixed camps; in the

Island of Margarita, there were 1200 Irish troops, and 4000 chosen men with Bolivar. With all these mighty means, they were not able to expel Morillo and his far inferior force at once from the country, even though he was so hated, and the Spanish name so generally detested. It is a fact well known that Morillo had not, at that time, 2000 European Spaniards at his disposal that were able to take the field; all the rest of his troops were natives, and he could place but little reliance upon them, knowing they would desert him upon the first defeat. From this diminutive force a deduction must still be made of as many men as were necessary for the several places held by the Spaniards. In addition to these disadvantages, the Spanish colonial finances were deranged, while the army was in want of every thing, and discouraged by the failure of O'Donnell's expedition. All these circumstances united, would have ensured the success of the patriots under leaders of ordinary skill and talent. Instead of attacking the Spaniards vigorously and at once, they wearied and discouraged their own troops by marches and countermarches, until desertions into the interior became frequent, and their troops greatly diminished.

In this campaign General Bolivar committed his usual fault, that of scattering his forces. While he marched with 4000 men towards Cucuta, and ordered General Paez to attack Morillo and get possession or the capital, Caracas, he directed a third expedition against Santa Martha, and accomplished nothing. Some circumstances of this third expedition are worthy remark.

Ever since the year 1813, Colonel Mariano Montilla

had been one of the greatest enemies of General Bolivar. He served against Bolivar in Carthagena, and challenged him to a duel in 1816, at Aux Cayes, as I have related; he had engaged to accompany General Mina in his expedition against the Spaniards in Mexico, and was prevented only by sickness; he then went to Baltimore, and hearing there of the success of the cause, and that Bolivar was at the head of the government, he desired several of his friends who were going to the Main to exert themselves to effect a reconciliation between him and the supreme chief; he wrote for the same purpose to his intimate friend, Admiral Brion, who was much attached to him; he succeeded at length, and came over to Angostura, where he had a long, and, to him, very satisfactory interview with the supreme chief, who advanced him to the rank of colonel. He was sent soon after to the Island of Margarita with 80,000 dollars, to accelerate the sailing of the squadron by the payment of arrears; he was directed to have an understanding with Admiral Brion at Pompatar, and with General Urdaneta, who was destined to command in chief the expedition against Santa Martha. From that time, Mariano Montilla was entirely devoted to General Bolivar.

General Urdaneta, at the head of 4000 men, marched from San Carlos towards the province of Maracaybo, to act in unison with the troops expected from Margarita. The squadron departed from Pompatar, a seaport of the latter island, in the beginning of March, having on board about 1200 men, chiefly European troops. They arrived at Rio Hacha on the 12th of March, and took possession of the place without resistance. It is a small

and poor place, affording no resources whatever. It is an open seaport, not far from Santa Martha, and has a small fort. Montilla, who commanded these troops, expected to be joined by some Indians from the interior, who had promised to go with him against Santa Martha. He departed from Rio Hacha in April, and directed his march towards the valley Dupart, where he arrived on the 4th, with 1000 English and 500 Creole troops that had joined him. The latter were furnished with arms brought from Margarita. After some success, Colonel Montilla was stopped in his further operations by a sudden mutiny of his English troops. Among the correspondence found in the baggage taken from the enemy, was a letter from the governor of Santa Martha to the Spanish general, Lima, whom Montilla had beaten in three successive actions, wherein it was stated that General Urdaneta was advancing with 3000 men from Ocanna upon Santa Martha; and he was urged to join him as soon as possible. Montilla therefore determined to march and join General Urdaneta, but was prevented by the refusal of his English troops to march any further until all arrears were paid them; he used every effort, promising them more than their due, but in vain: the insubordination was complete, and Montilla was forced to abandon his march and embark on board the squadron, under the command of Admiral Brion, who remained at anchor before Rio Hacha with thirteen vessels: there were on board six months' provisions, 5000 muskets, and a large quantity of ammunition and other warlike stores.

The governors of Carthagena and Santa Martha, threatened with an attack, took the strongest measures

of defence, and the latter sent his wife and children to Havanna.

At this period the Main was surprised by the news of the revolution at Cadiz, effected by Colonel Antonio Quiroja, in January of the same year, (1820) in consequence of which the Spanish constitution of 1812 was again introduced, and the inquisition and arbitrary power were abolished. This saved the cause of independence in the Spanish colonies; for the formidable expedition under O'Donnell was disbanded.

General Morillo, who had placed his hopes in these forces, was so vexed, that he refused for several days to speak to any one. At length he yielded to necessity, and the constitution was proclaimed with great solemnity, in May and June, at Caracas, Laguaira, and other places in the power of the Spaniards on the Main. He was now confident that the introduction of the constitution into the country would make a favourable impression on the patriots. He, therefore, published two proclamations, one of these was from the king to the inhabitants of the continent in America; wherein he said: "What can you ask more? Hear the voice of your king and your father." The second was from Morillo himself to the army, dated Caracas, June 8th 1820. He sent, besides, a circular letter to the different governors of the West India Islands, and to the Spanish Minister at Washington, requesting them to order the insertion in the public papers of another proclamation from himself to the emigrants from the Main, dated Caracas, June 12th, in which he invites them to return to their own country; and promises oblivion of the past, and protection, tranquillity, and prosperity for

the future. "Your security is sacred and inviolable; it is founded upon the will of the king. It is in unison with my honour, my word, and my desire!" All these proclamations, however, and the earnest endeavours of the king and general were in vain. They were convinced of the duplicity and cruelty of their Spanish leaders, and Morillo was again reduced to depend upon his own means and exertions.

We have seen how Colonel Montilla was obliged to embark in consequence of the dissatisfaction of the foreign troops, arising from want of pay and subsistence, and from the general ill treatment they received. Montilla's hatred against foreigners seems to have been particularly great against Irishmen. More than 500 left the service and went to Kingston in Jamaica, where the worthy inhabitants rivalled each other in relieving the sufferers who came among them in a most destitute condition. More than a third part of them died in the hospital in consequence of fatigues and privations which they had suffered in the service of the patriots.

The expedition directed against Santa Martha and Carthagena, to open a free communication with Bagotà, and to get command of the river Magdalena, greatly weakened the force directed against Caracas and the Spaniards, who had again united many troops in the centre of New Grenada. It ended with the burning of Rio Hacha, and cost 700 men and a great deal of money.

On the 10th of June, the Colombian squadron, under Admiral Brion, with the remainder of the troops, was near Santa Martha. After firing upon the batteries of this fortress it sailed towards Savanilla, a small

seaport in the neighbourhood of Santa Martha, consisting of about a dozen huts. The redoubt, consisting of three pieces of artillery, was immediately taken possession of, the Spanish garrison having fled without attempting any resistance. The Colombians landed their few remaining troops, expecting a large reinforcement, which had been announced as coming from the river Magdalena. Colonel Montilla directed his march towards Baranquilla, Soledad, and St, Stanislaus, where the Colombians were received with acclamations.—Many of the inhabitants came to join the troops, and lent their aid to put Montilla in a condition to besiege Santa Martha, as soon as the Margaritan troops should arrive. But he had neither besieging artillery, nor other materials fit for attacking the two strongest places in New Grenada.

Admiral Brion published a proclamation directed to the inhabitants of Carthagena, in which he exhorted them to rise against their oppressors, and join the Colombians. This had the desired effect. It roused the spirit of the inhabitants, and many hundreds came and placed themselves under the patriotic banners. The conquest of Carthagena was feasible and easy, inasmuch as the inhabitants, harassed by great and constant vexations, had become disgusted with their Spanish leaders. The Spanish authorities disagreed among themselves; some desired an absolute king; others, forming the majority, were in favour of the constitution. The viceroy, Samano, (who had taken shelter within the walls of Carthagena,) and the Brigadier-General Cano, were both arrested by order of the other Spanish authorities, for having opposed the proclama-

tion of the Spanish constitution. They were dismissed from their places, and others elected in their stead.

The situation of Santa Martha was like that of Carthagena. In these fortresses, as in all the places in the power of the Spaniards, there existed three distinct parties among the inhabitants and the Spanish administration; the friends of independency, those of the Spanish constitution of 1812, and the friends of the ancient absolute power of the king. The Spanish brigadier, Vicente Sanchez de Lima, (who, with 2700 men was thrice beaten by Montilla and his 800,) having retired to Santa Martha, put himself at the head of the friends of the Spanish constitution, and introduced it, in spite of the opposition of Governor Porras. The anarchical state of the provinces of Carthagena and Santa Martha greatly favoured the enterprise of Brion and Montilla. But such was the peculiar character of this war, that in the whole extent of Colombia, notwithstanding their increased moral and physical strength, no decisive operation, nothing of important consequence, took place. The incapacity of the supreme chief become, if possible, more apparent. Morillo's situation was also precarious and critical. The revolution in Spain rendered any efficient reinforcement from the mother country impossible. He was aware that the new assembly of the cortes, like that in 1811, would never consent to recognise the republic of Colombia; and would persist in the obstinacy peculiar to the Spanish character, although such recognizance was demanded by reason, policy, and justice, would put an end to bloodshed and misery, and would give vast advantages to Spain. The miseries of a des-

tructive and protracted war might have been obliterated by a treaty of defence and alliance between Colombia and Spain; and by opening a free and profitable commercial intercourse between two countries so long and so closely connected. In the government of the colonies by the king and cortes of Spain, neither liberality nor generous principles existed. The total want of money and provisions in the Spanish army on the Main, long and continued marches, and the discouragement of the soldiers, who could judge of their precarious situation, as well as their officers, greatly weakened the Spanish forces. To these circumstances were added sickness and frequent desertions. Still the Spanish chiefs flattered themselves that the people of Colombia would eventually receive the Spanish constitution, and return to their former obedience to the Spanish authorities; whilst the patriots were engaged at the congress, in active and zealous efforts for the discussion and adoption of their own constitution by that assembly. On this subject, the following letter is worth attention. It was written by a Spanish chieftain to one of his friends at St. Thomas's:—

"Letters from Caracas, Laguaira, and Cumana, confirm the news that two commissaries of the congress at Guayana, Messrs. Roscio and Alzuru, have presented themselves before the commander of one of the royal divisions, Arana, asking leave to pass to the headquarters of Morillo to present a dispatch to the general-in-chief, which is presumed to contain a proposal of this congress to submit to the Spanish government in case of the taking of the oath to the Spanish constitution at Caracas. This was not done until the

8th of June. Commandant Arana had refused to let them pass on, but sent the dispatch to General Morillo. The patriots are probably anxious to submit and to swear to our constitution, following the example of Spain; and thus to make a virtue of necessity, which perhaps, later, it might not be in their power to do."

This is a specimen of Spanish vanity and presumption. The following facts, which ought to be better known, explain the expressions of the writer: General Morillo, sensible of his critical situation, had secretly sent an agent to General Bolivar, to acquaint him with the change of government in Spain, and, adroitly, to sound his views and designs with regard to it. In consequence of this private communication, Dr. Roscio and Alzuru were sent with a letter to Morillo, with proper instructions to negotiate a treaty of peace; but the letter contained not a word relative to submission, nor to the acknowledgment of the Spanish constitution. General Bolivar, in this letter to General Morillo, grounded the proposition contained in it upon his desire to avoid the further useless effusion of blood, and his hope that, with the change of government, the minds of the Spanish leaders might change also. This blundering step of Bolivar produced consequences most mischievous to Colombia. It was the means of giving time to her enemies to carry on the war four years longer, and to the destruction of at least 20,000 lives. If Bolivar had boldly refused to negotiate with his faithless and obstinate enemy, and had attacked Morillo with his powerful forces, in the position he then occupied, there can be no doubt but that the territory might have been for ever cleared of its Spanish tyrants.

The first false step of Bolivar was duly appreciated by Morillo and his private council. Upon the reception of Bolivar's letter, he sent two commissioners, Brigadier-General Thomas de Cires, and Adjutant-General Jose Domingues Duarte, to Angostura. In June they left Caracas for Laguira, whence they embarked for the Orinoco, for the purpose of proposing to the congress at Angostura their acceptance of the Spanish constitution, and of offering to General Bolivar the station and rank of a captain-general, and to the other chieftains the continuance of their respective offices and rank. But, soon after the departure of these commissioners, Morillo learned that General Bolivar was not at Angostura, but in his head-quarters at Montecal, not far from him. He, therefore, sent two other commissioners, Don Francisco Linares, and Don Carlos Machado, with a copy of his letter and proposals.

General Morillo's long letter was directed to the congress, not of Colombia, but of Guayana. He gives himself the title of Pacificator, and speaks of liberal principles, in virtue of which he is authorised by the king to diffuse the blessings of peace and reconciliation among a people born Spaniards, &c. &c. At the end of this letter, which is dated June 17th, 1820, he says, "the deputies would submit to the congress the basis of this reconciliation."

The two deputies of Morillo then proposed an armistice of one month; for General Bolivar the rank of a Spanish captain-general, and the conservation of their offices and rank to all the rest. The armistice was granted, notwithstanding that the *letter* of Morillo pro-

posed only that the congress of Colombia should acknowledge the Spanish constitution, and submit to the Spanish government.

The reply of the congress ran thus—"Sir, the sovereign congress extraordinarily convened to discuss the dispatch of your Excellency under date of June 17th, from your head-quarters at Caracas, stating that Brigadier Don Thomas de Cires and Don Domingo Duarte have been named to come to this capital, in order to solicit the union of these countries with the constitutional monarchy of Spain, and that these gentlemen will explain the principles of the reconciliation proposed by the nation—have resolved, the 11th of this month, in public session, that the following decree should be transmitted by me to your Excellency in answer."—"The sovereign congress of Colombia, desirous to re-establish peace, will readily hear all propositions made by the Spanish government, under the condition that the basis of this peace be the recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Colombia. No other shall ever be admitted, which shall in any way deviate from this basis, so many times proclaimed by the government and the people of the republic. The president has the honour to be, &c.

"FERNANDO PENALVE,
"*President of the Congress.*
"FELIPE DELAPAINE, *Secretary.*"

At the Palace of Congress at New Guayana,
July 13th, 1820, year 10th.

Besides the letters written to the congress and to General Bolivar, Morillo ordered that the different

generals, governors, and other Spanish commanders throughout the territories of New Granada and Venezuela, should direct letters of the same kind to the different chieftains of Colombia. In this manner a general correspondence was established on the whole line, but as the subject of it was the recognition of the Spanish constitution of the cortes, and their king, without a word of the republic of Colombia, all discerning men saw that the object of it was to amuse the Colombians and continue the armistice, until Morillo could reinforce himself and prepare for a new campaign. The Colombians lost thereby the opportunity of expelling their enemies.

It is proper to state here, that Morillo acted by the express order of the king; and that he was encouraged by the advice of various Spaniards living on the Main, who flattered themselves with the hope that the congress and the chieftains of Colombia, tempted by the offer of retaining their rank and titles, would gladly accede to their proposition. Morillo and his advisers were, therefore, surprised and mortified by the answer of congress, his advisers particularly, for his own principal object was to gain time, and prepare for a new exertion. None of the Spaniards, from the king down to the lowest subject, for a moment contemplated acknowledging the republic.

On the expiration of a month, the armistice ceased, and the war raged with new fury on the part of the Spaniards, who had employed the time in gaining strength, and who were exasperated by the failure of their attempts to procure the acknowledgment of the Spanish constitution. The Spaniards on the Main

supported Morillo with redoubled exertions and zeal. The constitutional government excited a national spirit, and produced union. The king alone had formerly been the object of every exertion; but by the constitution every exertion was directed, or at least intended to be so, to the benefit of the whole Spanish nation.

Before the negotiations, General Urdaneta, having routed General Miguel La Torre,, marched against the fortified place of Maracaybo, and besieged it. The Colombian colonel, Cordova, came from the province of Antiochia with 600 men, descended the river Magdalena, and on the 24th of June, took the city of Mompox without resistance. He then directed his march towards Teneriffa, where he encountered 400 men and eleven armed gun-boats, which he attacked and beat—the gun-boats remaining in his power. He joined Admiral Brion and Colonel Montilla at Savanilla, in the beginning of July. Brion detached two of the armed vessels to Carthagena, and two others against Santa Martha. The patriot colonel, Lara, was in the environs of that fortress with about 2000 men, whom he had recruited in the province, and his communication was open with Montilla.

In June, General Bolivar, with 3000 men, was at Cucuta. He advanced to Cuenca, and opened a communication with Montilla.

The 6th June, Valdes routed the Spanish colonel, Lopez, in the province of Popayan, and its inhabitants again declared in favour of Colombia.

By the conquest of Mompox, and the destruction of the Spanish gun-boats by Colonel Cordova, the river

Magdalena was entirely in possession of the patriots, and the communication between Baranca, Savanilla and Baranquilla, as far as Bogotá, was again open to the Colombians, which greatly facilitated the operations against Santa Martha and Carthagena.

Colonel Montilla established his head-quarters at Baranquilla, three miles from Savanilla, where Brion remained with his squadron to assist his further operations. At the former place 600 volunteers presented themselves, armed and organized. This reinforcement put him in condition to direct his march against Carthagena, which is about thirty leagues from Baranquilla. In his march he was every where received with enthusiasm, and assisted with every thing. The tyranny and cruelty of the Spaniards was so great, that besides many other recruits, Montilla was joined by some hundred young men on horseback, who had mounted and equipped themselves at their own expense. The ladies joined in the general enthusiasm, and I have been well informed that hundreds of them followed the troops, in different parts of these marches, on foot, carrying a musket for one, handing food to another, to a third water, taking the greatest care of the sick, and animating the soldiers by their spirited behaviour cheerfulness, and vivacity.

As soon as the Spanish governor at Carthagena was informed of Montilla's march, he sent a detachment of 330 men to reconnoitre the patriots, which was attacked at Pueblo Nuevo and completely routed. Twenty officers and some privates were taken; the remainder gained Carthagena, which was destitute of provisions, and, as I have said before, divided into factions, some

persons being arrested every day, and public feeling strongly in favour of Colombia.

A false rumour which the secret friends of independence in Carthagena had spread throughout the city, that General Bolivar was coming with 12,000 men, so terrified the Spaniards, that the ex-viceroy, who continued to reside there, asked as a favour that he might be permitted to embark, which was granted him, and he left the place, together with some monks and priests, foreseeing that Carthagena would fall into the power of the Colombians.

During the stay of Colonel Montilla at Baranquilla, he received various dispatches from the Spanish chieftains, who, by the express order of their general-in-chief, Morillo, made him proposals similar to those they had made to General Bolivar, and to the congress of Colombia. Among them was a letter of Brigadier Don Vicente Sanches de Lima, who had been three times routed by Montilla, and was despised by his own party for his cowardice. Having taken shelter within the walls of Santa Martha, he published a proclamation full of abuse and insult against the Colombians. He said in it that Brion and Montilla were robbers and plunderers, that they had set fire to the village of Rio Hacha, &c. This man, notwithstanding the cowardly assertions he had thrown upon the characters of these two distinguished chieftains, had now the impudence to write (21st July) to Colonel Montilla, proposing to him to unite with the Spaniards and fight with him against the enemies of the king and of the Spanish nation. To this Montilla answered, "I have already answered their Ex. Don Pablo Morillo and Don Pedro

Rieu de Porras, who made me the same proposals as you have done, in their official letter of the 21st of this month. I stated to them that, without considering what the supreme government might determine, I would not, for my own part, consent to suspend hostilities, nor enter into any kind of treaty which should not in clear and positive terms recognise the independence of South America; and that all other treaties should be founded upon this basis. I repeat the same to you, adding, that to the education and delicacy of a gentleman, the proposal to desert my colours, and become a traitor to my oath and my country, is most revolting. I send you enclosed a copy of your proclamation, with such notes and remarks as I have thought proper to make upon it. Permit me to add, that he who continues an unjust war, and deceives the people to conceal his own weakness, his indolence, his cowardice, and his numerous defeats, can be no other than a bad soldier, and a worse gentleman. God and Liberty!"

Head-quarters at Baranquilla, 28th July, 1820.

I request the reader to compare this answer with that made by the President Liberator to General La Torre, dated Christoval, 7th July, 1820, and to judge between them. Mariano Montilla is far superior to Simon Bolivar in patriotism, firmness of character, personal bravery, and military skill; and this is acknowledged by all who know them.

General Bolivar wrote to Miguel La Torre the following letter:—"I accept with the greatest satisfaction, for the army here, the armistice for the space of one month, dating from yesterday, proposed by your

Excellency as commander-in-chief of the Spanish army. I am sorry that the commissaries of the Spanish government have been obliged to make such a long and circuitous route, &c. &c.

(Signed) "S. BOLIVAR."

The ingratitude of General Bolivar, as well as his gross ignorance of civil administration, are apparent from his treatment of his constant friend and benefactor, Admiral Brion. When Brion arrived at the seaport of Savanilla, he, by a proclamation to the foreign powers friendly to Colombia, and particularly to those who were friendly to her commercial citizens, reduced the duties of the Custom-House from thirty-three to twenty-five per cent. This he did for the purpose of inducing foreigners to enter there, and establish a commercial intercourse with the Colombians. The measure was politic and wise; and met the hearty approbation of every enlightened friend of the cause. As soon, however, as General Bolivar arrived at Savanilla, and heard of the proclamation, he was highly displeased, and fell into a violent passion. When Admiral Brion attempted to explain his motives, and show the great advantage resulting from the change, Bolivar refused to hear him, and immediately ordered a military publication, called a *bando*, proclaiming by the sound of drums, that from that day the duties should be established upon the ancient footing of thirty-three per cent. The consequences of this act were, that he wounded the feelings, and compromised the authority of Admiral Brion, (who very sensibly felt this public affront,) and caused the

suffering and death of hundreds of his own people; for these high duties kept out vesssels, and cut off necessary supplies from the squadron, and from the land troops. Misery and want, united with the sultry climate, produced fevers, and other maladies, to which many hundreds fell victims. General Bolivar went further. He imposed such heavy taxes upon the inhabitants of Baranquilla, Soledad, St. Stanislaus, Baranca, &c., who received Montilla with enthusiasm, that he excited among them general dissatisfaction, by depriving them of all hope of reimbursement. All this was done after Montilla had gone from Baranquilla to Turbacco, whither Bolivar came and staid two days. It is his habit to wander from one place to another, giving laws, publishing proclamations and decrees, and altering the existing state of things, generally for the worse, as at Savanilla, A hasty glance, a report of one of his surrounding flatterers, even a sarcastic reflection, have sufficed to change every thing during his stay of twenty-four, and sometimes not above twelve hours. He acted thus at Baranquilla, Soledad, and St. Stanislaus, the inhabitants of all which places had made every exertion in favour of Montilla's troops as they passed. The latter had the good sense to treat them politely, to exact nothing beyond their means, and to depend on their voluntary kindness. The President Liberator, under the pretext of loans, forced them to their utmost efforts, and they, of course, bore him no good will.

Montilla, relying upon the factious state of the interior of the Carthagena fortresses, and those of Santa Martha, sent Colonel Lara with 800 men of his corps

against the latter place, while he himself marched with the rest to Turbacco, where he waited for reinforcements. Here he received from General Bolivar various despatches for the governor of Carthagena, Brigadier-General Gabriel de Torses, again treating of a new arrangement and of peace. The officers bearing the proposals were well received, but the offers of Bolivar were rejected. Letters were several times exchanged between Torres and Montilla, to no purpose. Bolivar went to Turbacco in August 1820, and renewed the negotiations, but having no success, he departed after a stay of two days.

On the 1st of September, the Spanish governor of Carthagena sent 600 men against Colonel Montilla, at Turbacco. His troops were surprised in the night of the 2d and 3d, and routed. Cannon, baggage, ammunition, &c. fell into the hands of the Spaniards. But among the routed troops of Montilla, were some fifty Irishmen, who rallied, formed themselves, and rushed with such vigour upon the 600 Spaniards, that they killed a considerable number, and forced the remainder, leaving their new acquisitions in the hands of these heroic Irishmen.

Carthagena was supplied with fresh provisions, and among other things, with 600 barrels of flour, by the Spanish corvette, Ceres; and was thus enabled to hold out for some time longer.

Colonel Lara had 800 men, chiefly natives, commanded by European officers. He directed his march towards the Cinega, whither Admiral Brion had sent Colonel Padilla with forty gun-boats, in support of the

movements of Lara, who expected reinforcements from the interior of New Grenada.

Montilla, finding that he could effect nothing against Carthagena by remaining at Turbacco, left there a small corps of observation; and marched, in October, with the rest of his troops, to join Lara, who was encamped on the borders of the river Cinega. He had reinforced himself considerably on his march, and Admiral Brion had sent him all the troops he could spare, so that when Monilla again took the command, he was at the head of about 2500 men.

Admiral Brion sailed from Savanilla on the 19th of October with eleven armed vessels, to blockade Santa Martha, whilst Montilla and Lara approached it by land. Montilla passed the Cinega, attacked Sanchez de Lima, and easily routed him on the 5th of November, at a place called Fundacon. This action was decided in half an hour. Governor Lima was one of the first who fled, escaping by the road to Upar, and leaving in the hands of his enemy, his artillery, baggage, and 500 of his men. When the governor, General Porras, heard of his defeat, he thought no longer of defending Santa Martha with his remaining 1500 men, but embarked in great haste, in the night of the 8th of November, on board the French schooner Frelon, with all his baggage, and sheltered himself in the stronger fortress of Carthagena.

After this engagement, Montilla met with little resistance, and being vigorously supported by the squadron of Admiral Brion, he entered Santa Martha on the 11th of November, having lost only a few men. They found large magazines and warlike stores in the

place. The occupation of this important fortress was attributed principally to the exertions and activity of Admiral Brion, and the bravery of Colonel Padilla, who commanded the gun-boats. The latter is the coloured man of that name who afterwards took the four forts of Boca Chica, (the strong hold of Carthagena,) Maracaybo, and in 1814, Porto Cabello. He is now (1828) arrested, and in prison at Carthagena. The taking of Santa Martha, which protected the mouth of the large river Magdalena, made the Colombians masters of this river as far up as Honda, and of the road thence by land. as far as Bogota, and of the provinces of the interior of New Grenada. After this, the fall of Carthagena could not much longer be prevented.

While this was passing at Santa Martha, General Bolivar started from Turbacco, up the river Magdalena, to the province of Popayan, and joined Generals Sanander and Valdes, who had collected a force of from 6 to 7000 men. As long as these two generals acted without Bolivar, they were almost constantly victorious. This is attributed partly to their knowing the ground better than their general-in-chief, but principally to their being at liberty to act freely and promptly, as circumstances required. They had several thousand more men than were necessary to drive General Calzada out of that province, and from the territory of New Grenada. General Bolivar's arrival disturbed all; for he would follow his own notions in every thing, and spurned at all advice. He took command of these superior forces, and was beaten in different actions and forced to retreat with only 2000 of these troops. He

had indeed a numerous retinue of emigrants, amounting to above 4000 persons, of both sexes, who fled with him towards the plains of Apure in Venezuela. On his arrival there, he complained much of the apathy of the Grenadans. His complaints had no other foundation but his hatred, as a Caraguin, against the good people of Grenada, whose dislike he had drawn upon himself by his forced taxes, levied without regard to order or justice. The product of these too was notoriously squandered upon his flatterers and favourites, so that little or nothing remained for the pay or support of the army. So discouraged were the troops, that Calzada routed them in four several actions; the consequence of which was the evacuation by Bolivar's troops of New Grenada.

The royalists not only gained more provinces, but the public opinion turned in their favour, insomuch that guerillas were formed under the command of Colonel Santipana, to intercept a great quantity of arms, ammunition, provisions, &c. destined for the independent army, many of whom too were taken prisoners. These successes of Morillo were consequences of Bolivar's entering into negotiations with his enemies, without having first laid a foundation for these negotiations.

Meanwhile General Morillo was not inactive. He came from Valencia to Caracas, and raised a new levy of 3000 men, and received 100,000 dollars, in cash, besides what was delivered him in provisions, uniforms, and equipments, to enable him to continue the war efficiently. The captain-general of the Island of Cuba, Cagigal, promised him a similar sum every month.

General Bolivar, after having made his tour from Savanilla to Baranquilla, Soledad, St. Stanislaus, and Turbacco, came back to San Fernando de Apure, whence he passed to the province of Popayan. General Morillo, perceiving that the Colombians made no movements, ordered General De la Torre, who commanded the Spanish forces in New Grenada, to march from Tunja upon Truxillo, uniting all his disposable forces, to join him, for the purpose of attacking General Bolivar; Morillo being too weak to attack the Colombians alone. Meanwhile, on two separate occasions, he gained some trifling advantages over the patriots. In spite of the great superiority of the Colombians in point of numbers, and in regard to public opinion, which was generally in favour of independence, and which every where powerfully supported them, they dared not to attempt any thing decisive, but remained in a state of suspense.

Suddenly every one was astonished by news that two officers had arrived at the head-quarters of General Morillo, sent by General Bolivar to treat again of peace and friendship. This occasioned the more surprise, as the latter had published the following proclamation, dated General Head-quarters, at Carache, October 14th, 1820.

Simon Bolivar, President Liberator, &c. &c.

" Two provinces more have entered into the bosom of the republic. The forces of the Liberator have advanced, amidst the blessings of the people restored to liberty. Caracas will soon be witness to a great act of justice. Our enemies will return to their country, and

ours will be rendered up to its children. Peace or victory will give us the remainder of the provinces of Colombia. They have offered us peace and a constitution; we will reply, peace and independence, because this independence alone can assure to us the friendship of the Spaniards, and to the people their free will and their sacred rights. Can we accept a code from our enemies, and disgrace the laws of our country? Can we violate the rights of nature, by crossing the ocean, in order to unite two countries so distant from each other? Could we confound our interests with those of a nation which had always been the instrument of our torments? No, Colombians! no one has to fear the liberating army, which approaches with the sole intention to break your chains. It has upon its standards the colours of Iris, and desires not to sully the glory of its arms by the effusion of human blood.

By order of the President Liberator.

(Signed) "ANTONIO DE SUCRE,"

Provisional Secretary of War.

Moreover, the province of Cuenca had, sometime before, declared its independence and elected a patriotic Junta. In consequence of the expedition sent by the Junta of Guayaquil against Quito, four departments of that province had also voluntarily submitted to the republican army. The province of Rio Hacha had done the same; so that, at that time, fifteen provinces of New Grenada out of twenty-two had already joined the government of Colombia, and the Spaniards had no more than the fortress of Carthagena and the Isthmus of Panama.

In Venezuela six provinces out of eight obeyed the laws of Colombia. Such was the situation of this republic, leaving out of consideration the numerous armies, the public spirit, the supplies from every quarter of Europe, the foreign troops full of zeal to distinguish themselves,—when Bolivar suddenly renewed negotiations with the Spanish commander-in-chief. In his letter to Morillo, he made overtures to him to terminate the South American troubles in an amicable way, and invited him to send, on the 23d of the same month, deputies to his head-quarters, with whom he might have a full understanding, and who might labour with him at this great work.

General Morillo, surprised at receiving such a proposal in a moment so critical to him, was anxious to accept it, and wrote immediately to Bolivar to that effect. He could not think that the proposal had been made without some occult motive, and therefore gave strict orders to his subalterns commanding the troops to redouble their activity and vigilance. He soon afterwards moved his head-quarters from Valencia to Calabozo, that he might be nearer to the President Liberator.

As General Bolivar had offered and required hostages for the security of reciprocal good faith, Morillo designated Don Carrea, the civil governor of Caracas, Don Juan Toro, alcalde of the same place, and Don Francisco Linares. They left the city of Caracas for Punto Pedregal, where they were to remain as hostages during the conferences between Morillo and Bolivar.

Meanwhile the Colombians moved towards Caracas, and took possession of the cities of Truxillo and Merida,

and of Carora, a small village, three days march from Coro.

On the 5th November, two officers arrived at the advanced posts of the royalists, encamped at Humucaro, not far from the advanced posts of General Bolivar. These deputies were the Colonels Sucre and Ambrosio Plaza, who were the bearers of proposals of peace and friendship from the President Liberator. They were immediately conducted to the head-quarters of General Morillo, at Carache, who received them very civilly, and invited them to spend the day with him. Bolivar had, among other things, demanded of General Morillo to send commissaries to him, at his head-quarters. The Spanish commander complied with this demand, by sending the two Colombian colonels, with the greatest politeness, back to their general. But Bolivar, impatient that no commissaries came to him from Morillo, sent to the Spanish general new deputies, who arrived November 16th, and who anxiously demanded the departure of the Spanish commissaries, already named by Morillo. These were Don Ramon Correa, Juan Rodriguez del Toro, and Francisco Gonzales de Linares, who received orders to hasten their departure from Barquisimeto, where they were on the 17th. When they arrived at Truxillo, the head-quarters of General Bolivar, they were received as if they had been conquerors. Two treaties were here made with great dispatch. One of them was an armistice between the two contending parties, which bore the title of "*Armistice between the Spanish and Patriot Armies.*" It began with the following introduction: "The governments of Spain and Colombia, anxious to finish the discords

existing between the two parties, and considering that the first and most important step to attain this end is a suspension of hostilities, in order to explain and understand each other, have agreed mutually to name commissaries to stipulate and to determine upon an armistice. To this end his excellency," &c. (here follow the names of the commissaries), after having exchanged their respective powers, dated 22d of the present month (November), and after having exhibited their proposals and the explanations offered by both parties, have agreed, and do agree upon a treaty of armistice, under the specified clauses in the following articles :—

Article 1. Hostilities of every description shall cease between the two armies, Spanish and Colombian, from the moment that the ratification of the present treaty shall be published. War shall cease; no hostile act shall be committed between them during the whole time of the duration of this armistice.

Art. 2. The time of this suspension shall last during six months, dating from the day of its ratification; but as the principal and fundamental basis of this treaty is the good faith and the sincere wishes with which both parties are animated to end the war, a prorogation of the term now fixed, may take place for so much more time as may be necessary, if this term shall have expired before the conclusion of the negotiations, which shall be commenced; in case, moreover, of there being a hope of bringing them to a conclusion.

The treaty consists of fourteen articles, in none of which is any mention made of recognizing the republic of Colombia, or of its independence. It was ratified

by Bolivar at Truxillo the 25th, and by Morillo at Carache the 26th of November, 1820.

The second treaty made and signed by the same persons at Truxillo, November 26th, stipulated to regulate this war upon a more humane footing, and in conformity with the rules of war among the civilized nations of Europe; that prisoners should not be put to death, but exchanged, and receive more humane treatment, the dead should be buried, &c. &c. These treaties do honour to the humane feelings of both parties. After all was done, the two generals, Bolivar and Morillo, met together, and spent some time in rejoicings and festivals. The details of their meetings have been published in many newspapers, and are not worth repeating here.

This measure of Bolivar excited the astonishment of all the more enlightened Colombians. They openly declared that he had no right to solicit an armistice with an enemy greatly inferior in force and in resources; and especially as he had, a few months before, formally declared against any treaty which should not expressly admit the independence of the republic. They asked among themselves, "what reason could he have for not explaining himself upon a matter so interesting to himself, and to the republic whose representative he was? How could he transgress the resolution of congress, who, in their letter to Morillo, had declared that no treaty should be made with Spain before the Spanish government acknowledged the independence of the Colombian republic?" Some said that General Bolivar had acted here as he had done every where else, rashly and precipitately, without consulting congress, or ad-

vising with any man. Finally, others said, he should have better known the obstinacy of the Spanish character, and the duplicity of King Ferdinand, than to flatter himself with a foolish hope that such a man would have been able to acknowledge the independence of Colombia, as long as there existed the least hope of subjecting them by the force of arms. The present Spanish squadron united under Admiral Laborde, in the harbour of Havanna, ready to attack either Mexico or Colombia, is the best proof of my assertion. The fact is, that General Bolivar, by acting with this rashness, brought upon his countrymen new scenes of bloodshed and war, as will appear from the following chapter.

CHAPTER XX.

Renewal of Hostilities—Manifesto of General de la Torre—Battle of Carabobo—Conduct of La Torre and Morales—Bolivar at Caracas—Surrender of Carthagena, Maracaybo, and Porto Cabello—Entire Evacuation of the Main by the Spanish Forces.—(1821-1824.)

As soon as the armistice was signed, ratified, and proclaimed, General Morillo hastened to leave his army, and to return to Spain, where a rich bride awaited him. He was glad to leave a country where he had lost much reputation by his ill administration generally, and particularly by his tyranny, cruelty, and capricious duplicity. This (I know not what to call him), after assuming the title of Pacificator of South America, at Bogota, in 1816, ordered some hundreds of the most wealthy and respectable inhabitants to be shot. In the Island of Margarita, he destroyed and put to death, hanged and shot, not only men standing upon their defence, but women and children also; at Passao Caballos, and Boca-Chica, he suffered the cruel Morales to burn a hospital of lazarinos: his cruelties were notorious everywhere. He signed the armistice on the 26th November; and on the 17th of December he embarked at Porto Cabello for the Havanna. He finished his course as he had commenced it: in violation of the right of Brigadier-General Morales, he named for his successor Brigadier-General Miguel de la Torre, who

was both unskilful and cowardly—who had lost many battles, and the whole province of Guayana, and who was despised by his own officers; whereas Morales had advanced from a private, to become a vigilant, active, and brave commander. Though detestably cruel to his enemies, he has been more than once seen, while encamped in the midst of his soldiers, giving them his own shoes, blanket, even his coat to cover the sick, while he lay almost naked upon the ground. The appointment of La Torre created jealousy and schism between these two chieftains, and finished what Morilla left undone towards the destruction of the remaining Spanish army in Colombia.

The same day that Morilla left Porto Cabello for the Havanna, a squadron of two frigates, one corvette, &c. with four transports, arrived at Laguira, from Cadiz, bringing 6000 muskets, 7000 uniforms, &c. but no troops; in their stead came four commissaries, whom the king had sent to the Main, to *pacify* it. They had received an express order to conclude a peace upon no other basis than that the seceders should previously recognize and obey the constitution of the Spanish cortes of 1818. When these commissaries were informed of the armistice of 26th of November, they were surprised, and openly expressed their dissatisfaction. They immediately spread a rumour that 10,000 Spaniards were ready to embark from Spain, and that in case the commissaries should not be able to effect a pacification upon the terms above mentioned, these troops would immediately sail for the Main, and join the loyalist troops remaining there. This rumour made no impression upon the patriots, because they knew it to be a fiction.

General Bolivar perceived, at last, that in proposing the armistice of the 26th of November, he had acted injudiciously; but instead of retrieving his faults as far as he could, by declaring that hostilities should recommence in eight days, if the commissaries and La Torre did not send him a formal recognition of the republic of Colombia, he adopted a crooked course, unworthy the chief of such a country as Colombia. He subjected himself to the just censure even of La Torre, as will appear by the Spanish manifesto, made out in the manner of La Torre, who exposed Bolivar's conduct by publishing his official letters. The two following documents show Bolivar's manner of acting. The first is a proclamation of General Bolivar to his army; the second to the inhabitants of Colombia:—

"Soldiers! Peace should have been the recompense of the armistice which is about to expire. But Spain has seen with indifference the sufferings which we have experienced on her account. The remainder of the Spanish Government in Colombia cannot, however, measure their power with that of twenty-five provinces which you have delivered from slavery. Colombia expects from you her entire emancipation: she expects more—she commands you imperiously, in the midst of your victory, to fulfil with vigour the duties of your sacred struggle. I have always relied upon your courage, your perseverance; but from your discipline alone I expect to have the satisfaction of your acquiring new glory. Soldiers! I hope you will have humanity and compassion even for your most bitter enemies. Be the mediators between the vanquished and your victorious

arms, and show yourselves as great in generosity as you are in bravery.

(Signed) "BOLIVAR."

Liberating Head-quarters at Barinas, April 17th, 1821.

The second was as follows, and of the same date and signature:—

"Colombians! The anxieties of our armies, our unheard of privations, the tears of the people almost expiring, force us again to take arms in order to obtain peace by expelling our invaders. This war, nevertheless, shall not be a war of death, nor even of rigour; it shall be a sanctified crusade. We shall fight to disarm, and not to exterminate, our enemy. We will struggle to obtain the crown of brilliant glory," &c. &c.

Now if it was true "the remainder of the Spanish government in America could not measure its power with twenty-five free provinces," and that "Spain saw with indifference the sufferings endured by him and his army," why not put an end to these sufferings, and those of the country, while he had the means of doing it in his own hands? That Colombia had "heard with joy the propositions for peace made by Spain" was absolutely false; she desired peace indeed, but she preferred war to dependence, to every thing but liberty and independence; and this had been unequivocally expressed by the voice of the whole country. It is certain that Bolivar himself was the first who proposed an armistice; and it is certain that he did this at a time when, with his far superior forces, he might easily

have destroyed those of the Spaniards. Morillo and his king had simply proposed that Colombia should acknowledge the Spanish constitution, and submit to the government. Their proposition was plain and unequivocal. How even Bolivar could propose, first an armistice of one month, and then six months, without claiming, or even mentioning the acknowledgment of the republic, is an enigma. Such is the man who directs the destinies of two millions of his countrymen, whom he rules with absolute power, and whom he makes daily more slavish and miserable.

During the armistice, the congress was removed from Angostura to the city Del Rosario de Cucuta, in the department of Bogota, and province of Pamplona (as being a more central position between Venezuela and New Grenada), there to remain until the new city of Bolivar could be built.

I will give here some extracts from the manifesto published at the expiration in April of the armistice, and dated head-quarters at Caracas, 1821, by Brigadier-General Miguel de la Torre, as general-in-chief of the Spanish troops in Colombia, respecting the continuation of the war.

For introduction, he says—"From the armistice concluded at Truxillo, and ratified by their excellencies the Count of Carthagena, and Don Simon Bolivar, human prudence might have hoped that peace would have reigned again over the whole territory of the Main; that unjust passions would have given way to reason, justice, truth, and the other virtues, &c.

"The principal motives which had served until now as a pretext to justify in the eyes of the world the trou-

bles in these countries, had, fortunately, disappeared. It was no more the despot Ferdinand who occupied the throne of Spain; it was no more an arbitrary power that disposed of the welfare of the Spaniards; no,—it was Ferdinand the Constitutionalist, who had voluntarily resigned this odious power, and who had restored to the law all its majesty and force. The Spanish monarchy, already spread over the whole world, was no more an union of slaves; the Spaniards were already free.

"The hopes which my predecessor had conceived of re-establishing peace and tranquillity, for so long a time, having vanished, he had nothing left him to do but to prepare again for war until he received an official dispatch from his excellency, the president, dated Cucuta, 21st September, by which he invited him to new pacific proposals. During this, he, (the president) accelerated his march under frivolous pretences, and absolutely contradictory to the proposed object. My predecessor was, nevertheless, obliged to obey the orders of his majesty, to neglect no means to restore to this country its lost prosperity. In such manner were the conferences began at Truxillo—*not to treat there of peace*, but to suspend hostilities whilst the commissaries of his excellency, the president, might depart for the court of Madrid, to present their demands and pretensions before the supreme government of the nation, which alone could decide definitely upon them. His excellency, the president, was very well informed that my predecessor had no power to do it; and it was upon this information that the ratification of the armis-

tice was grounded: the contents of this treaty alone will sufficiently prove this fact, &c."

In this latter assertion General La Torre was perfectly correct; in the two documents signed at Truxillo, one may search in vain for a passage, which would induce the reader to think that the republic had been acknowledged by Morillo or his commissaries. To cite the whole of La Torre's prolix and verbose letter would be useless, but he addresses some letters and facts which are strongly against General Bolivar; he accuses him and General Urdaneta of having violated the armistice of January 28th, in Maracaybo, of which the latter took possession on the 8th of April, at the head of a strong division, during the existing treaty, and entrenched himself, notwithstanding that hostilities were not to commence before the 12th. Before this Bolivar violated the treaty at Barinas, which he reinforced with a battalion of troops. In this document were also cited some letters which speak strongly against Bolivar, and expose his duplicity.

After having corresponded and expressed much regret, General Bolivar, at last, on the 10th of March, notified to La Torre, by letter, that hostilities should re-commence in conformity to the 12th article of the treaty, at the expiration of thirty days; the war was renewed accordingly. After receiving this letter, La Torre left Caracas and went to Calabozo, in the beginning of April; he prepared for fighting by giving out orders that his officers, after his example, should be confessed and receive the sacraments and absolution. It is reported, by eye-witnesses, that La Torre began

already to manifest symptoms of the same fever which attacked him at the battle of San Felix in Guayana. Before his departure from Caracas he published two proclamations, one directed to the army, the other to the few inhabitants remaining under his dominion; both were dated Caracas, 23d of March, 1821: he made a great display of words, without spirit or vigour; the productions were characteristic of the man, resembling more a *Capuchinade* than an address of a commander-in-chief. A third proclamation was issued by General Ramon Correa y Guevara, captain-general of Venezuela, on the 28th of March, in which he told the inhabitants "that one single sentiment should exist, one single opinion, one single cry—the constitution, the king, or death!" But, notwithstanding this display of heroic sentiment, Correa himself preferred flight to death, and set the first example by retiring from Caracas, after having, in imitation of his commander La Torre, duly confessed himself. He was governor of Caracas when he left the city secretly in the night of the 14th of May, and Bermudes, the next evening, entered the capital without having fired a musket. He found the city abandoned by all the people of any note; they had retired towards Laguaira and Porto Cabello, to live no more under the government of Bolivar: the greater part of these inhabitants embarked for the West Indies and the United States of North America.

The entry of Bermudes into Caracas resembled a funeral; in the streets were found a mass of miserable wretches, some begging a cent for charity; prostitutes mingled in the ranks of the soldiers, amidst the ringing

of bells and the sound of cannon. Bermudes gave a ball, at which not four ladies of distinction were found; all the others were coloured people or blacks: he ordered, under heavy penalties, a general illumination for three nights, gave dinners and festivals, and lived jovially at the expense of the ruined inhabitants; he published an appeal to the inhabitants, inviting them to join his troops, and, with great pains, obtained about 300 blacks of the lowest class; he attempted to raise, by imposition, some money for the support of himself and his troops, but could not obtain so much as 6000 dollars. The rabble broke into some stores and plundered them, and were with difficulty restrained by the troops.

In May, 1821, the forces of General Bolivar amounted to 15,000 in Venezuela alone; among these were more than 2000 European troops, whilst La Torre, (by his own fault, as is said,) had not 6000. Well-informed persons have said that he relied upon the deceitful promises of Bolivar, who had flattered him with hopes of peace, (and this appears from La Torre's memoirs,) so that, expecting the negotiations would end in peace, he remained inactive, whilst Bolivar was reinforcing himself on all sides. In La Torre's memoirs are found frequent expressions of his *good faith* and his love of peace, *and his unbounded devotion to peaceful measures*, which no one doubted who knew his military character. The feelings of the Spanish troops towards their leader are to be considered; the majority of them were displeased at his being their commander, saying that he was a coward, and that he had done nothing since the first breach of the armis-

tice at Barinas, in December, 1820; though, from that breach it was plain that Bolivar did not incline to observe the treaty of Truxillo.

After the action of Carabobo, well-informed men asserted that the loss of the Spanish forces in Colombia was entirely the fault of La Torre; that, instead of uniting all his forces in the little village, he contented himself with the first division, consisting of 2500 infantry and about 1500 cavalry, commanded by himself and Morales; whilst Bolivar, who joined Paez at San Carlos, had about 6000 infantry, among whom were about 1100 European troops, (called the British legion,) and 3000 Llaneros on horseback.

The village of Carabobo, celebrated for the famous battle fought there the 26th of June, is situated about half way between San Carlos and Valencia, six leagues distant from the latter city. There the Spaniards had taken a strong position. This position was judiciously chosen by Morales, who, in all military matters, was, beyond comparison, superior to his commander. The form of the ground afforded great advantage, or rather a decisive superiority over any assailant; for if an enemy forced a passage in front, they might retire to the next position, and so for several steps, disputing every inch of ground with advantage, while the assailants, fighting at disadvantage, must suffer considerable loss. It was a plain, interspersed with hills, of which the greater part were covered with trees, and full of rocks, which defended them on every side. Thirty thousand men might manœuvre on the plain with ease, having in front but one defile, and that, the only passage to Valencia. The Spaniards, confident that their wings were well

protected, (the left wing, moreover, resting upon a deep morass,) posted themselves on the public road. Upon a hill opposite the defile, they placed two pieces of cannon, and a squadron of cavalry on their right wing. In this position they waited for the enemy during twenty days, confident of success whenever they should be attacked.

Bolivar, knowing that the welfare of the republic depended upon this battle, when he saw the enemy's position, wavered whether to attack them or not. He assembled a council of war and again proposed an armistice. His subalterns, unanimously, and with disdain, rejected the proposal. General Marinno proposed to turn the position of the enemy; but, after having discussed and rejected various plans and proposals, the majority decided to risk every thing and attack the enemy in his strong hold. Against Bolivar's proposal to try another armistice, Paez and Bermudes spoke with great warmth and in strong terms.

On the 24th of June, the Colombians, about 8000 strong, came before the enemy. When Bolivar saw the passage so strongly guarded, he again hesitated to commence the attack. But Paez and Bermudes warmly insisted upon it. Whilst they were discussing the subject, there stood among Bolivar's retinue one of his guides, who overheard the conversation. This man, who was perfectly well acquainted with the country, approached the Liberator and told him, in a whisper, that he knew a foot path, through which the right wing of the Spaniards might be turned. Bolivar knew the man well, and after consulting with him a short time, secretly detatched three battalions of his best troops,

and a strong column of cavalry, under the command of General Paez, to follow the guide. This pass was one of the most difficult in the country, particularly for the British legion, who made part of the column. They were obliged to go singly, and their shoes were so cut to pieces by the sharp stones that their feet were wounded deeply. These brave men actually tore their shirts and made bandages for their feet to enable them to go on. They succeeded perfectly, being masked by the forest; but as soon as the enemy discovered them, he was obliged, of course, to direct part of his forces against them. The royal battalion of Burgos, nearly complete, and consisting of European Spaniards, at first intimidated the Colombian battalion called Los Bravos de Apure, which fell back upon the British legion. Encouraged by this success, they advanced against the legion which they mistook for a Creolian corps, and directed a well-aimed fire against it, which was well returned. Soon after the Spaniards charged with the bayonet, and discovered their mistake by being charged in their turn with the bayonet by the British legion. This charge was directed with such celerity and force, that the Spaniards began to be discouraged and to give ground. They were at last dispersed, and were followed by the English bayonets. What remained of these Spaniards were nearly all destroyed by a squadron of Paez's, called the sacred squadron. A squadron of the enemy attempted to charge the British legion, but were driven back by their well-directed fire of musketry, and forced to retire. This unexpected disaster upon the rear of the Spanish right wing so disconcerted General La Torre that he lost all presence of mind. The con-

fusion was soon spread among the Spaniards; their cavalry dispersed without having made one charge. The Spaniards retired precipitately, and in disorder, leaving their cannon, train, and baggage. General Paez displayed great activity and bravery. He placed himself at the head of the cavalry and pursued the Spaniards, but his men were so badly mounted, and the horses were so fatigued and weak, that, though the ground was even, he was not able to break the files of the Spanish infantry. If his cavalry had been good, not a single Spaniard could have escaped. In one of their unsuccessful charges, General Sedenno, Colonel Plaza, and a black man, who, on account of his bravery, was called El Primero, (the first,) were killed. These brave men, finding their efforts to break one of the enemy's infantry lines unavailing, precipated themselves into the midst of the bayonets.

In this battle the enemy lost more than 500 men. La Torre, with the remains of his force, shut himself up in Porto Cabello. Spaniards, who were eye-witnesses, have assured me that he was one of the first who entered the fortress. The loss of the Colombians was not great. The English legion had about thirty killed and one hundred wounded. Their commander received various wounds, of which he died. The Colombians were compelled to attribute the success of this march to this handful of brave foreigners. These received from General Bolivar the name of *Carabobo*. General Paez distinguished himself highly; but Bolivar, though he kept himself, as usual, at a respectful distance from the danger, assumed the principal glory of the victory, and entered Valencia the same day with his troops.

I have these details from the pen of a foreigner who at that time was a superior officer in the service of the republic, and who fought in this action in the British legion. His report continues as follows: "This affair, such as it is, will form an epoch in the history of Colombia. The two principal actions upon which depended the welfare, or rather the existence, of Colombia, were undoubtedly gained by the valour of the European troops in their service, viz. the action at Boyaca, which decided the fate of New Grenada, and this at Carabobo, which made the Colombians masters of Venezuela. It is certain that these troops have been rewarded in an ill manner! There exists not, I believe, soldiers more ill treated than those in Colombia; badly clothed and fed, exposed to all the inclemencies of a climate not very healthy, to a scorching sun in the day time, and to cold and rainy nights. To these must be added the forced marches, the fatigues, and the continual movements of a partisan war. Such a soldier must have a very robust constitution to exist for any length of time," &c.

In the battle of Carabobo, the Spanish infantry only fought; and, from the commencement of the action, the two Spanish commanders, La Torre and Morales were not united in regard to the command and the plan of operations to be pursued. Morales, who commanded in chief the cavalry, 1500 strong, well chosen, perfectly well mounted, and able to beat the 3000 Llaneros, whose horses were unable to resist one well directed charge, had the baseness not to order a single charge; and to remain a quiet spectator of the destruction of the infantry. He was highly displeased at

being under the command of La Torre, and, as I am well informed, so jealous, that he disregarded several orders from the latter to charge the enemy. His bitterness and obstinacy were so great, that he heard, unmoved, the most urgent entreaties of the Spanish cavalry officers under his command, to charge, or at least to permit them to charge the enemy, whilst they were in the plain. The officers pointed out to him (what he must have seen himself) the advantageous times and positions for charging. But he expressly refused them permission to move. When they saw his obstinacy, they became discouraged, left their ranks, and were followed by their subalterns. One single squadron, which remained, attempted to charge the British legion, but were driven back, as I have stated. The Spanish infantry alone sustained the whole battle, viz. 2500 men against 7600. I have heard, from good authority, that if the British legion had not been with the Colombians, they would, in all probability, have lost the battle. The regiment of Valencia, about 600 strong, covered the retreat, and at four different times repelled the cavalry of Paez, consisting of 3000 Llaneros, and that in a fine plain, where half the number of almost any other cavalry would have swept the ground clean of these 600 infantry.

The news of this defeat spread consternation amongst the Spaniards. Such was the confusion and terror in the fortress of Porto Cabello, that if Bolivar had marched against the place without loss of time, he would have got possession of it. More than twenty Spanish royalists, whom I saw afterwards at the Island of Curaçao, assured me of this. From that time above

20,000 inhabitants of Caracas, Laguaira, and Porto Cabello, seeing the royal cause upon the Main completely lost, and cursing the cowardice and apathy of La Torre, embarked for foreign lands.

After the action at Carabobo, the fortress of Porto Cabello was so filled with fugitives, that sixteen dollars a week were paid for the use of a single room; and the price of provisions rose a hundred fold! The apathy of La Torre excited great indignation amongst the most distinguished Spaniards. Of this I will cite, from among hundreds, one proof; a letter dated Porto Cabello, June 29th, 1821, and inserted in the Gazette of Curaçao.

"There has been no great change in the situation of this city since my last of the 27th. The unfortunate dissentions between La Torre and Morales are continual. The apathy of the first is so great, that the majority suspect him of treachery. He will not consent to the desire of the majority, that Morales take the chief command; nor will he listen to any solicitations to permit him to go out of the place with the 2000 chosen troops which remain in it, in order to make a junction with the forces of Pereira and Lopez, who have sent express after express to him for that purpose. It appears he fears that Morales, once out of the place, would turn him out, and put himself at the head of the army. We have here, in the place, more than 4000 men able to serve, and who would enlist themselves with great pleasure, if any body else but La Torre should be appointed commander-in-chief. Could you believe that since he has been in the city he has not ordered any efficacious measures to defend the place

in case of attack? Such is in fact the criminal inactivity of La Torre. God grant that we may have a change soon!"

After the battle of Carabobo, General Bolivar published an order of the day, under 13th July, announcing that he had given the name of the battalion of Carabobo to the corps before called the British legion; and, as Colonel Ferrier, their commander, had died, (of his wounds received in the battle of Carabobo), various promotions took place in the corps.

The news of this victory inspired the congress assembled at Cucuta with the liveliest enthusiasm. They immediately passed a decree that did honour to their sentiments, and is too well known to need insertion here. In speaking of this decree I must be permitted deeply to regret that the glorious death of Colonel Ferrier was not noticed in it. He died at the head-quarters of the British legion. His merit surely entitled his name to a conspicuous place in one of the four columns of a paper devoted to the fame of those who fought for the liberty of Colombia. I must add, that, notwithstanding the national gratitude decreed by the Congress of Colombia, the battalion of Carabobo, which, on the 1st of June, 1821, contained above a thousand men, in August, 1823, had not fifty men left; the rest, except a very few, perished in the country. The last commander of the battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Brandt, in August, 1823, arrived from Laguaira at Caracas in a pitiable condition, his uniform torn in pieces, without a change of clothes, having no boots, only a single pair of old shoes, and not a cent of money in his pocket. He was, besides, lame and deaf. He addressed him-

self to Charles Soublette, the intendant of Caracas, requesting an order for at least a small amount due upon his salary for past services. He could obtain nothing, though Soublette was then living in the highest style. Lieutenant-Colonel Brandt, for aught that appears, might have perished, but for the hospitality of Captain Maitland, commander of the Colombian brig Pinchita, and his officers, who kindly received him on board, in the harbour of Curaçao. Such is the gratitude of Colombia to her deliverers! Let their conduct towards the foreigners who so ably assisted them in the days of trouble be compared with that of the United States towards Steuben, Kosciusco, and La Fayette.

Caracas and Laguaira were lost, whilst La Torre, with more than 4000 men, was lying idle and detested in Porto Cabello. Colonel Pereyra, a brave and enterprising officer, being left to his fate by La Torre, was forced to surrender by capitulation. This increased the complaints and murmurs against the latter, who was now hated and despised by all.

On the 29th of June, in the evening, General Bolivar, with General Paez and a numerous and brilliant retinue, entered the city of Caracas, and ordered the taking possession of Laguaira. But he found not a white inhabitant in the deserted streets of Caracas. The greater part of the houses were empty; many of the stores were pillaged; the streets were filled with beggars and dead bodies. Some miserable negroes cried "Viva Colombia," and begged for cents: destruction, misery, and death, had taken up their abode in this once flourishing, rich, populous, and joyous

city. Bolivar compared this entry into Caracas with that of August 1813, and was surprised, and not a little alarmed. His indignation rose against all who had fled to escape from falling again under his dominion. He immediately ordered a proclamation to be published and fixed to the corners of the principal squares and streets, in which he said: "Caracas shall not be the capital of a republic, but the capital of a vast government, administered in a dignified manner, and worthy of its importance. The vice-president of Venezuela, enjoying all the attributes of a great magistrate, you will always find a source of justice in the centre of the republic, who will spread plentifully his benevolence over all the branches of public welfare in your country. Caraguins! be thankful to the ministers of the law, who, from their sanctuary of justice, have left you a code of freedom and equality.

Caraguins! lavish your admiration upon the heroes who have given existence to Colombia.

(Signed) "BOLIVAR."

General Liberating Head-quarters, Caracas, June 30th, 1824.

This great magistrate, whom this great general announced to the people of Venezuela as the worthy administrator who would diffuse plentifully his benevolence over all the branches of public welfare; this vice-president of Venezuela (whose title was afterwards changed to that of intendant), was Charles Soublette! and so well did he administer, that on three or four occasions the principal inhabitants of Venezuela exclaimed against him; and so diffusive was his benevolence, that, on account of his insolence and incapacity

(which have been generally described), his protector was obliged to recal him, and to give this intendency to General Tobar.

In order to remedy in some measure the evils of this general emigration, General Bolivar published the following proclamation :—

"Caraguins! The dissatisfaction felt at this moment from the general emigration which has followed the royal party, has caused me the greatest sorrow. Your flight, and the total abandonment of your property, could not have been the effect of a spontaneous movement; no—it must have been from fear either of the armies of Colombia, or of those of the Spaniards.

"Royalists! You may rely upon what has been agreed upon, as to the regularity of this war, and upon the policy of the day, which holds in detestation and horror the past times, when the genius of crimes had arrived at its highest pitch, so as to shock all sentiments of humanity. Royalists, return to your possessions.

"Caraguins! Your emigration is a manifest offence against the Spanish government, which you think to please and flatter. Your fears of the arms of the king, in his terrible reactions, are no longer well grounded, because the Spanish chieftains are the Generals La Torre and Correa, and no longer Boves or Morales.

"Caraguins! I know you are patriots, though you have abandoned Caracas; but could you in conscience fly before the arms of Colombia? No, no, no, &c. &c.

(Signed) "BOLIVAR."

San Carlos, July 3d, 1821.

The stupor of La Torre discouraged the royal party. All who were rich and faithfully attached to the royal cause, emigrated. Above 24,000 of them, unwilling to live under either La Torre or Bolivar, departed for the West Indies, Spain, and the United States.

The consequences of Bolivar's indignation at this extraordinary emigration were soon felt. Before he left Caracas he confiscated the houses and lands of the emigrants to a great amount, dividing them among his chieftains and courtiers; and he imposed heavy taxes and contributions upon the few inhabitants who had not emigrated, but had lived retired in the country, and devoted to the royal cause. He adopted two measures which greatly increased the misery of the inhabitants.

1st. The Spanish government had coined a small copper money, which was generally known under the name of the pauper's money. It was intended for the benefit of those who were poor, whether they had become so by the fury of civil war, inability to labour, or in any other way whatever. This money was every where received without hesitation. In Caracas, a Spanish dollar is divided into halves, quarters, and eighths. The eighth is called a *real:* the half of each real is called a *medio real,* and this was the lowest coin in value. In this state of the circulating medium the Spanish government emitted a copper coin, called *quartillo,* one of which was worth half the medio real, Four sols were the value of a quartillo; so that the dollar being divided into thirty-two parts, as many different articles might be bought with it. A poor man, therefore, (and the poor were very numerous) who earned one *real* a day, could buy sixteen different

articles for himself and family. This poor-money, besides enabling the poor to live, kept down the price of the necessaries of life, and thus benefitted both rich and poor. An ordinary family might live well with a dollar a day, whereas now they can live but poorly with twice that sum. When General Bolivar entered Caracas, in June 1823, there were above two and a half millions of dollars of this *poor-money* in circulation in the capital, and in the province of Caracas; and no one hesitated to receive it. He ordered, by a decree, that this money should circulate no longer. The price of every thing rose immediately, and with it the public suffering, and that to such a height, that many perished of hunger and want.

2d. The second measure was a decree, as an extraordinary war contribution, that the harvests of all the possessions belonging to emigrants should be collected and put into the stores belonging to the government. This was done in such hurry and confusion, that in the collection many frauds were committed. Such waste attended the collection, that from all these productions not more than a sixth part ever found its way into the public stores. He ordered that the landowners who had remained in the country should, under pain of capital punishment, give up their harvests of every kind, and deliver them into the public stores. He allowed to themselves one fifth part only.

The loss of the battle of Carabobo, and the stupor of La Torre in Porto Cabello, spread disgust and consternation among the Spaniards on the Main, insomuch, that, on the 21st September, 1821, the strong fortress of Carthagena surrendered by capitulation. La Torre

was at last removed, and was succeeded by Morales; but it was too late. The strength of the Spaniards, and their confidence that they should eventually regain their superiority, were gone. The expedition of Morales against Coro and Maracaybo served only to prolong the season of war and bloodshed. Nothing was produced by it of more importance than the circumstance that, by his usual course of conduct, Charles Soublette obtained the nick-name of Miss, or Lady Soublette. Paez and Padilla, fortunately for Colombia, retrieved such of her affairs as had been thrown into confusion, and well nigh lost, by the timidity and weakness of Soublette. Maracaybo, which had been in possession of Morales since September 1822, fell again (in August 1823), into the hands of the Colombians, after a bloody and destructive naval action, which did great honour to the intrepidity of the commander, General Padilla. Soon afterwards, Morales embarked for Havanna. He left the country loaded with the execrations of the inhabitants, which he deserved by his multiplied barbarities.

Porto Cabello surrendered at last, on the 16th of July, 1824, and this completed the evacuation of the Main by the Spaniards. No armed enemy was now to be feared. This surrender was also the work of Padilla, sustained by General Paez.

CHAPTER XXI.

Conduct of the Dutch Government in the Island of Curaçao against the Republic of Colombia and the Spaniards—Expedition against Porto Rico, and Spoliations committed by the Dutch Government of Curaçao, under Pretence of the Criminality of General D. H.

SINCE the revolution at Caracas, the Island of Curaçao had been the head-quarters of the Spaniards. It was rendered precious to them by its fine harbours, and its proximity to the Main. Having *gold*, they possessed the means of providing themselves with every thing requisite to carry on the war, and to furnish the fortresses and places of Porto Cabello, Laguaira, Coro, Maracaybo, Cumana, &c. with provisions and ammunition. The richer classes, members of the government, and merchants, were nearly all in favour of the Spaniards; the people were for the patriots.

In 1822, there appeared an official statement of facts, published by the fiscal of Caracas, Mr. Narvarte, and by the president of the court of admiralty at Laguaira, Mr. Francisco Xavier Yanes, in a pamphlet form, with the following title; "Exposition of the conduct observed by the Dutch government of Curaçao, in the pending war of the republic of Colombia with Spain.—Caracas. From the printing-office of John Gutierrez. 1822." The governor of Curaçao, Paulus Rœlöff Cantzlaar, whose conscience was not clear,

made every exertion to suppress this. But I had friends who provided me a copy, from which I will extract some curious facts that are little or not at all known out of that country. From these and other facts stated in this chapter, I shall show the corrupt perverseness of these leaders of a government, which Yanes, the president of the court of admiralty at Laguaira, designated by the name of "that *gang* called the Dutch government of Curaçao," of which Cantzlaar was at that time the chief. He said that "that gang" had treated the Colombians like dogs, particularly after the battle of Carabobo. "Here," said he, "are some proofs: The Colombian privateer, the Valoroso, Captain Bernardo Ferreiro, having lost his mainmast, in January 1822, not far from Curaçao, was forced to enter that port in distress, under protection of the laws and rights of nations. He was allowed to enter, but soon after his vessel was seized and illegally condemned, under the pretext of reprisal for two Spanish vessels taken by the privateer, Condor, in the territorial jurisdiction of Curaçao. This pretext was false, for the court of admiralty at Laguaira had proved that the two Spanish schooners, Fortuna and Experiencia, taken by the privateer Condor, were seized in latitude 11 degrees 50 minutes north, and longitude 68 degrees 35 minutes west, and consequently beyond the waters of Curaçao. Instead of examining the fort, inquiring of the captain of the Valoroso, or advising the government of Colombia that any reparation was claimed, the government of Curaçao passed by, at once, all forms used in such cases, and sold the vessel at public vendue.

"In the course of December, 1818, the privateer brig, Irresistible, (now called the Vencedor,) cruising under the colours of the East Shore of the river Plata, took two vessels bound to Porto Cabello and Laguaira, one of which was a Spanish, the other a Dutch vessel, called Armonia, and belonging to Mr. Theodore Jutting, which was retaken by a Dutch frigate in her passage from Bonair to Los Rogues, for Margarita, and restored to her owner. As soon as this was known in Curaçao, the government published a *ban*, ordering all the foreigners to present themselves before the fiscal, who, as soon as he ascertained the persons belonging to the Main, ordered them to leave the island within eight days.

"In the year 1819, the Colombian privateer, "General English," took a Dutch schooner, the Intrepida, coming from Cuche to Curaçao, to transport property belonging to the enemy. She was taken in tow by the privateer and conducted to one of the ports of Margarita for adjudication. There was at that time in the port of Curaçao a Colombian privateer called the Sosegada, which, on the simple demand of George Curiel,* owner of the Intrepida, was immediately sequestered by the government of Curaçao, by way of reprisal. It was not before this was done that complaints were made to the government of Colombia for damages, indemnification,

* This George Curiel is a coloured man, a merchant in Curaçao, entirely devoted to the Spaniards, as are Theodore Jutting and his two brothers Christopher and William. They and Frederic Lentz, have done great mischief to Colombia by the powerful support they have given to the Spaniards.

and satisfaction, for insults offered to the colours of his Majesty, the King of the Netherlands.

"At the time of the invasion of Coro, a citizen, Joseph Arnaes, was obliged to shelter himself in the Island of Aruba. He took with him a female servant, obtained at Coro, not for speculation, but for his own use as a servant. She came from the sequestered property of a Spaniard, Don Manuel Gonzales, who reclaimed her of the government of Curaçao. The latter gave an order to seize the servant in the house of Arnaes, and to deliver her to the Spaniard, notwithstanding that Arnaes, at the time, proved her to be his legal property. This act of the government of Curaçao, was, therefore, a plain violation of the law of nations.

"After the Spanish commander had taken possession of the city of Coro, in virtue of a capitulation made with Colonel Gomez, one of his first measures was to seize the slaves and mules upon the neighbouring farms belonging to republicans who had emigrated. These were ordered to be sold in the West Indies, or exchanged for provisions and warlike stores. Whilst vessels were preparing to transport them, the Dutch slaves were locked up in the prison. When two vessels came from Coro to Jamaica, bringing 380 slaves to exchange for provisions, the British government ordered the vessels to leave the port within twenty-four hours. They did so, and steered for Havanna.

"But in the Island of Curaçao all that were bought were indiscriminately admitted; slaves have been sold there for three barrels of codfish each! This horrid traffic being now prohibited by all civilized nations, the

government of Curaçao, by permitting it in their territory, have violated the laws of nations, no less than those of neutrality.

"These facts (and a great many more might be adduced) are sufficient to show the avaricious and cruel conduct of the government of Curaçao towards the citizens of the republic, who fled from tyranny, and sought shelter in their island. That government has received into its ports Spanish subjects and privateers, whilst it has refused or confiscated those of the republic. It has assisted the Spaniards with provisions and munitions of war, in opposition to a cause in which the whole human race is interested; at the same time that it has plundered those who were devoting their property and their lives to the support of that cause. It has, moreover, destined to hopeless slavery many human beings, who, by the existing laws of their country, as well as by those of nature, were entitled to freedom. All this, and much more, has been done by the Dutch government of Curaçao, for gold.

"All these facts are inconsistent with a strict neutrality, and are, therefore, in violation of the rights of the Colombians.

(Signed) "FRANCISCO XAVIER YANES.

"*President of the Court of Admiralty.*"*

Dated from the Harbour of Laguaira, April 15th, 1822.

In the morning of the 29th October, 1823, a prize of a Colombian privateer came into Curaçao, to escape from the chase of a Spanish armed vessel. The governor

* Of this document I have given only a short extract.

Cantzlaar, ordered her to sail immediately. The prize captain, an American citizen, represented in vain the danger to which she would be exposed by going out, and requested a delay of two days, which was refused. The captain of the Spanish privateer, Especuladora, being at the time in the harbour, and informed of the governor's order, sailed out and cruised before the island, to take the prize vessel. The captain's papers were in perfect order, and the actual cruising of the Spanish vessel affording a strong additional reason for staying in port, he went again to the governor, and told him, that he could not go out without losing his few men, himself, and the vessel. About seven o'clock in the evening a guard came on board, the commander of which, in the name of the governor, ordered the prize captain to weigh anchor and sail without delay. The captain and his crew again declared that they could not submit to so unjust an order. They were compelled, by blows with broadswords and muskets; and, favoured by the darkness of the night, escaped the enemy lying in wait for them. Such was the conduct of Cantzlaar, that a second memoir appeared against him, sent from Porto Cabello, in the month of January, 1824. I endeavoured, but in vain, to procure it. My friends have informed me that this was fuller, stronger, and better written than the former. Cantzlaar may be considered the *ne plus ultra* of bad governors. He was denounced by the merchants generally, and at length removed, to the great joy of the inhabitants.

Spanish doubloons were exchanged at Caracas at the rate of twenty dollars in the current money. Mr. George Curiel, a merchant, being obliged to pay eleven

thousand dollars in current money, sent the value in doubloons at the fixed rate of twenty dollars, as they were usually taken by the receiver-general; but Mr. Van Uytrecht told him that he had received an order from the governor not to take, from that time, a doubloon at more than sixteen dollars in current money; and Spanish dollars at only twelve, instead of fifteen, as they had been received. Mr. Curiel complained of the order, and wished to take back his doubloons. This was refused; he was given to understand that he might have them back, after he had paid his debt in current money. It was at that time impossible to obtain such a sum in current money, without paying very high interest; and this Mr. Curiel was compelled to do. This happened in April, 1823; whereas the 3d of May, then ensuing, was the time fixed by the governor for beginning to receive doubloons and dollars at the treasury, at the rate specified in it. The decree excited the public indignation against Cantzlaar, but it was not revoked.

In November, 1822, a seizure was made of some dye-wood, coming from Maracaybo, and belonging to Mr. Curiel. The pretext for the seizure was, that an exact declaration of the weight had not been made at the Custom-House, the exact weight of *four* pieces, among about *two thousand*, not having been declared. Report of this fact being made to the governor, he ordered the wood to be taken from the vessel, and deposited in the fiscal's yard. There it was weighed again, piece by piece. Two pieces only being found to vary, Curiel was permitted to take it back; but by the operation, which occupied seven weeks, the owner in-

curred great loss in time and expense—in fact, he was accused of an attempt to defraud the government.

In February, 1824, Mr. Samuel Lyon, merchant in Curaçao, had a controversy with the fiscal, who is the chief of the police, about a vessel which the police officer had neglected to visit until is was so late in the day that the vessel could not sail that evening. Mr. Lyon complained to the governor, who ordered the fiscal himself to examine the officer, and report to him!

The captain of the Spanish privateer, Centella, after having, in 1821, pillaged many vessels sailing under Dutch colours, and belonging to inhabitants of Curaçao, and having, upon the high seas, so ill treated the captain of the Dutch merchant schooner, "Admiral Vander Capellen," from Curaçao, that he died in consequence of it, a few days afterwards, had the audacity quietly to enter the port of Curaçao with his privateer. He was immediately charged, before the governor, with these criminal transactions, and positive proofs were adduced. The governor was entreated to arrest him, and detain his vessel until satisfaction for his crimes should be made by the Spanish government. Instead of complying with this just demand, he permitted the vessel to sail out secretly at midnight. It was loudly declared in Curaçao, at the time, that the captain obtained his permit to sail by the power of doubloons. The details of this villainous transaction may be found in the Gazette of Curaçao, No. 41, of the year 1821.

During the year 1820, and thence to 1823, of his administration, Cantzlaar issued above one thousand decrees, rules, ordinances, &c. These are carefully bound in six enormous folio volumes, and are to be

seen in the office of the fiscal, or secretary of state. For all purposes of government, they are worse than useless; but they are sure proofs of his obstinate disposition to vex and harass the small population of 23,000 souls committed to his government. He reduced the salaries of the officers of government so low, that their families could not be supported by them. Many of them were actually forced to ask charity, or to borrow, or to seek illicit means of subsistence; whilst he took care to provide himself abundantly with every thing. His master, the King of the Netherlands, attributed his reduction of salaries to a spirit of economy, and was so pleased, that he gave him annually a gratuity of 8000 pataques, in addition to his salary of 18,000 florins. This King is an honest man, but he knew nothing of the oppressive system by which the governor enhanced the misery and desperation of the inhabitants of Curaçao. Therefore, I wrote privately to his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, in April, 1824, what I now here repeat publicly—"That his governor of the Island of Curaçao, Paulus Rœloff Cantzlaar, disgraced the Dutch government." He was disliked by all who were obliged to have any thing to do with him, and obtained the name of "the little Jesuit."

The following are among hundreds of anecdotes current of him:—

He made a contract with a coloured man, named Barien, to furnish him a certain number of flat boat *(called puntje)* loads of stone for building a wall, at the rate of two pataques per canoe *(one dollar and sixpence)*. The stone was delivered according to contract; but

when Barien called for his money, the governor told him some of the boats were not well loaded, and that he had not stone enough for his purpose. The other replied that he could furnish more boat loads at the same price. "No, no," said the governor," it is better to weigh the stones, and pay you by the pound." Barien eventually got about half his money, which, it is to be remarked, was payable out of the public treasury.

The schout, or high constable, received every month eight pataques, for the purpose of cleaning the prisons, furnishing water, &c. In order to receive a good sum at once, he let it lie for ten months, until it amounted to eighty pataques. Cantzlaar decided upon his claim, "that a man who could advance eighty pataques could advance more," and the constable received nothing! The consequence of this villainy was, that the prisoners were wretched sufferers—often without a drop of water, which in Curaçao is not obtained easily.

In April, 1823, a schooner was lost near Pescadero, a small port of Curaçao. Cantzlaar ordered a clerk of the comptroller's office to go there and take an exact account of the articles saved from the vessel. Mr. Herman Boyer, after having strictly and fully complied with the order, was directed to present a bill of the particulars of his expenses in this voyage of about five miles. The whole amount was about eight reals (fifty cents.) After a fortnight the governor decided, that "as the bill was charged too high, he could not make an order for the payment." Mr. Boyer had a wife and children. Mr. Niebuhr, the comptroller, ashamed of such meanness, paid his clerk from his own pocket.

A young man named Weiss, a clerk in the fiscal's

office, having received no salary for about a year, was in want of a penknife and a small box of wafers, for the use of the office. He mentioned it to the fiscal, but, as the governor had given strict orders that not a quill should go from the public stores without his *fiat*, Mr. Weiss was obliged to draw up a formal request in writing, which was signed by the fiscal and sent to the governor. After three days' delay, the decision of the governor was sent to the office in writing, "that he granted the box of wafers, but refused the penknife."

On Tuesday, February 3d, while the governor was in town giving audiences, as usual on that day of the week, Mr. Elsevier, the fiscal, who is second in rank and dignity in the government of Curaçao, was in want of twelve sheets of wrapping paper, and a box of sand for his office. He made his demand in writing, and signed it. The governor, with his own hand, changed the figures 1-2 to 1-4, and then signed his fiat, "the *Schout by Nacht*, (rear-admiral in rank) and governor of the Island of Curaçao, and its dependencies." Upon this the fiscal received six sheets of brown wrapping paper, which cost the government of Curaçao about three cents. This second dignitary, the counsellor fiscal, Mr. Isaac James Rammelmann Elsevier, is designated by his favourite words, "he moot betaalen," (he must pay.) The third personage in the island is Mr. Daniel Serurier, president of the tribunal of justice (so called.) He is the devoted servant of the governor, and of his clerk Hayunga.

That the government of Curaçao in 1822-1824, was extremely base, I trust will further appear from

the relation of a transaction which excited great sensation at the time, and in which I was concerned. The proceedings of this government, to which I now allude as oppressive, fraudulent, and base in the extreme, were against myself, Bautista Irvine, and Charles Traugott Vogel. The projected expedition against the Spanish Island of Porto Rico, the object of which was to render its inhabitants *free* and independent of Spain, excited great attention and interest. With two brigs, which were intended to form part of the force of that expedition, I entered the port of Curaçao in *distress*. This being a neutral port, I had, of course, a right protection by the laws of nations. The brigs were laden with rich cargoes; and Cantzlaar and Compagnie, for the purpose of laying their hands upon this property, caused me to be arrested while I was in port, and in the condition just stated. For the purpose of covering this outrage and diverting the public attention from it, they and their coadjutors took great pains to occupy the columns of various newspapers with false and calumnious statements relative to my character, and to the objects of the expedition. I will give my statement.

When I took my final leave of the service on the Main, my desire was to retire altogether from such scenes as had engaged the greater part of my life; and to devote my time to my growing family. With this view, I engaged in literary pursuits, and gave lessons on various subjects, with which, in the course of my life I had become sufficiently acquainted to teach them to others. While I was living in this manner, I received one night, at Curaçao, a visit from some

rich foreigners who were settled in the Island of Porto Rico. They urged me strongly to place myself at the head of a numerous party of wealthy inhabitants of that island, for the purpose of expelling the Spaniards from it, and rendering the island free and independent. I had declined various proposals made me to join the patriots in Mexico and Buenos Ayres, and I now declined this urgent one of the inhabitants of Porto Rico, notwithstanding that they assured me they placed entire confidence in me, and in me alone; and that they would have nothing to do with any other military chieftain. About a month after, a larger number of them came to me, and gave me such proofs of their spirit and ability to accomplish their purpose, that I consented to their proposal. This happened at the end of the year 1821. I removed, with my whole family, from Curaçao to St. Thomas's, where I left them, and went myself to the United States, where I soon found many enterprising men ready to aid me.

The expedition against Porto Rico was, as yet, a project which could not be realized, until I should receive all the powerful means promised me. Proceeding with part of my vessels from St. Barts to Laguaira, I encountered a heavy storm at sea, and was forced to put into the port of Curaçao with the brigs, the Econdracht and the Mary, in a state of distress, the 16th of September, 1822. On the 23d I was arrested by order of governor Cantzlaar, in the house of the fiscal judge. The governor, conscious of the baseness, or rather of the odium, of the proceeding, exerted himself to throw the blame of the arrest upon the fiscal and the tribunal. But the

villainy was his own. He was indeed influenced by advisers who were interested with himself in the spoils they were to gain. I shall not detail the conduct of these men; it is too well known. I will say here, what I have authentic documents to prove, that Cantzlaar, Elsevier, D. Serurier, Hayunga, Van Spèn-glet, and their accomplices, are a set of men to whom nothing is sacred but gold.

Had I been sailing with an armament to attack Forto Rico, the government of Curaçao, a neutral power, would have had no right to impede me, nor to aid the subjects or allies of Porto Rico in doing so. I had committed no offence. I came in distress into the neutral harbour of Curaçao, and was entitled to such reception as is due to a distinguished stranger in a foreign country. I had done nothing to forfeit my liberty, nor my right to the hospitality of the place. My situation was perfectly known to Cantzlaar; he knew well that he had no right to arrest me, but, instigated by his own avarice and that of others, he did so; and thus rendered it necessary, for the purpose of covering the spoliations committed upon the property under my care, to accuse and try me as an offender. Parker, the United States' consul, who died afterwards at Curaçao; Van Spengler, who is now governor of the Dutch Island of St. Eustacia; and William Prince, the secretary of the government of Curaçao, in conjunction with those already named, were busy in procuring the insertion of false statements relative to me and my affairs in many foreign gazettes, and particularly in those of the United States. I could not contradict them at the time, because I did not know

of their existence. I found afterwards, that they had prejudiced the public against me, and the honourable motives which had actuated me; and I saw at once that they were intended to justify the robberies of Cantzlaar and his coadjutors.

Cantzlaar gave orders to institute proceedings against me. I protested in strong terms against both the arrest and trial, refusing to answer before the tribunal, and demanded to be informed why I was arrested in violation of the rights and laws of nations. Cantzlaar answered me that the fiscal had caused my arrest; the fiscal told me that the governor had done it. The governor accused me of an intention to attack the Island of Porto Rico, and to render it free and independent, after having driven out the Spaniards. But, as I had no troops, nor any means of prosecuting such an expedition, this ridiculous pretext failed. Most of the European and North American gazettes printed in the latter part of the year 1822, contain statements of this Porto Rico affair; and I believe all who have read them are satisfied that my views were upright and honourable.

The fiscal, Elsevier, seeing that the governor's accusation stood no chance of succeeding, set his own genius to work to invent another. He brought forth a grave charge of piracy, or as he expressed it, *similitude of piracy*. The evidence stated in this accusation, in support of his charge, was, that I had caused to be printed, in Philadelphia, various papers filled with liberal and republican principles.

The grand inquisitor Serurier, not satisfied with the form of either of the above charges, himself put the

accusation (upon which he afterwards pronounced me guilty, and sentenced me to death,) into the form of a charge of *high treason against all living sovereigns.* This course of proceeding carries absurdity, outrage, and villany upon the face of it, and needs no comment. The lawyers generally stood in such fear of the governor, that, for some time, none of them dared to undertake my defence; at last, the court, *ex officio*, named Mordecai Ricardo, a man in whom alone I had entire confidence. M. Ricardo made a bold and masterly defence; but, as my acquittal must have restored to me the brigs and their cargoes, his defence availed nothing; my fate was indeed decided beforehand. After the hearing was over, my friends, of whom I had a great many, and those of the most respectable inhabitants, came and congratulated me upon my prospect of speedy release; so sure were they that the court would not dare to condemn me. During the trial, which lasted eighteen months, M. Ricardo behaved like a true friend; and, after the sentence, which was sent to me in writing, and which I treated, together with the court, with all the ridicule and contempt I was master of, he insisted upon an appeal to the higher court of Gravenhague, in Holland; the appeal was denied: he applied a second time, and was again refused. The inhabitants almost universally understood the cause and the motives of the court, so that the decision excited general indignation. For my part, I kept my pistols and dagger at hand and in order, determined to defend myself to the last extremity. When the refusal to grant an appeal was known, the public indignation rose to the highest pitch; of which Cantz

laar being informed by his spies, sent for the president of the court to come and dine with him, and directed him to grant the appeal. They were seriously alarmed by the excitement among the inhabitants, and wished, also, for time to make up a plausible statement of the case, to be sent to the higher tribunal. The appeal, therefore, on a third application, was granted. I had asserted aloud, in presence of the fiscal, (in whose house I had apartments,) his son, and three clerks, that the court were a set of robbers, and that no one would dare to execute their ridiculous sentence. After my condemnation, I continued to occupy myself with my usual pursuits, to receive my friends, and to walk abroad as before. I gave out that I would send letters to his highness the Sultan, at Constantinople, and to the Emperor of China, notifying to them my conviction as a traitor and a conspirator against their lives. Hardened and brutish as Serurier had become, he could not resist the torrent of general ridicule, and was evidently mortified.

As I had declared that I would not go in a merchant vessel, nor without my family, to Holland, Cantzlaar fitted out the brig Swallow, a Dutch man-of-war, of twenty-two guns, for that purpose. In a few days, having made all necessary preparations, we were ready to embark, (November, 1823,) when one morning the fiscal entered the room where I was at breakfast with my family, and told me that he came from the governor who had just received dispatches from Holland, in which the minister of the colonies ordered the governor to suspend every proceeding against me, and by no means to send me to Holland, as this affair was not re-

garded as criminal, but altogether as political: that I must be treated with all the regard due to my rank and education, (an order to the same effect had been given by the governor to the fiscal at the time of my arrest, and was in force during the proceeding against me,) until his majesty, the King of the Netherlands, had received the advice of his council of state.

At last came the decision of the king, which was, that the whole of the proceedings against me should be annulled; that I should be immediately set at full liberty, and that all my expenses should be defrayed until I might arrive at whatever place I should choose to go to with my family.

At the time of my departure from Curaçao, various rumours were in circulation; one was, that the governor and the whole party had received a very severe reprimand for their proceedings against me. I know not the fact, but I know they deserved it.

The above is but a sketch of the cause; the principal rolls (or papers) remain in the hands of Cantzlaar, Elsevier, and Serurier. One of the articles of the sentence at large was that my liberal (I suppose they meant to call them licentious) papers should be burned by the hands of the common hangman, in the public square at Amsterdam fort, in Curaçao.

The king of the Netherlands is an honest and upright man; it therefore would become him to institute a full and particular inquiry into the conduct of these men, relative to my trial, and also to inquire why *Leonard Sistare*, who had been convicted of altering the ships' papers of the Endracht, was suffered to leave the port of Curaçao unpunished. Mr. Van Spengler,

the acting Dutch governor of St. Eustacia, as I am well informed, can give the best information on the subject. The *original acts.* which are kept at fort Amsterdam, will throw light on the subject. There are also, to my knowledge, facts and evidence sufficient to satisfy any impartial man of the corruption of those who originated and carried on the infamous and groundless prosecution. These facts and evidence shall be produced whenever (while I am living) his majesty the King of the Netherlands shall call for them.

CHAPTER XXII.

Biographical Sketches of Louis Brion, Francisco Pablo de Sanander, and Francisco Antonio Zea.

Louis Brion, of the Order of Liberators, admiral, captain-general, and commander-in-chief of the naval forces of the republic of Colombia, was born in the Island of Curaçao, the 6th of July, 1782. He was one of the most distinguished chieftains of Colombia, liberal, honest, and brave, and an ardent patriot. He was one of the principal supporters of General Bolivar, to whom he was, unfortunately for the cause of freedom and independence, too blindly devoted. His father, Peter Brion, was a native of Brabant, and a wealthy and respectable merchant. He was a counsellor of the council of state in Curaçao until his death. His mother, Mary Detrox, was born in Luttich. Both came from Holland and established themselves in the Island of Curaçao, where his father's business became very important and extensive, and greatly enhanced his wealth.

Louis, who was the second son of the family, composed of two brothers and one sister, was sent, when very young, to Holland for his education, where he completed his classical studies. He was placed in the office of a notary-public for the purpose of studying and learning the laws. But when the conscription came, young Brion waited not to be drawn, but presented himself voluntarily to serve in the foot chasseurs of

Holland. When the English and Russians made their descent on the coast of Holland, under the Duke of York, Brion distinguished himself by his bravery. He attracted the attention of his superiors, who offered him the grade of an officer, but his parents, fearing he might become attached to the military life, caused him to return to Curaçao, where his father employed him in mercantile business. But young Brion was of too active and restless a turn of character to be pleased with the life of a settled merchant. He wished to make voyages, and to enlarge his knowledge and his fortune. His father, therefore, granted his request to be sent to the United States for the purpose of studying navigation. While he was there for that purpose, his father died and left him a large fortune. Louis bought a vessel and visited various seas and countries, uniting the seaman with the merchant; and having made large additions to his fortune, returned to Curaçao in 1804, where he established himself as a merchant.

The English commodore, Murray, having received an order from his government to take possession of the Dutch Island of Curaçao, in 1805, sent a detachment of from four to five thousand men to the east side of the island. These English troops landed near a small fort called Caracas Bay Fort, and took possession of a hill commanding it, where they placed a battery and heavy guns, which threatened the destruction of the fort. Brion was that day accidentally there. As soon as he perceived the intention of the English, he sprang upon his horse and came full speed to the capital, which is two good leagues from Caracas Bay. In the capital he had many friends; and it was well known there,

not only that he was rich and active, but also that he had served with reputation in the military line. In a few minutes he was joined by above a hundred young men; his friends armed themselves, elected him their commander, and marched full speed against the English. With Brion at their head, they ascended the hill where the English had hastily entrenched themselves. Brion and his friends attacked them with such spirit, that they were killed with bayonet and sword at their pieces. The battery was turned upon the boats of the English, of whom a few escaped to embark; but all that were not killed on shore were destroyed by fire directed upon the boats, so that not a soul eventually escaped.

This heroic deed raised Brion and his companions to the highest estimation. On their return to the capital they were received with demonstrations of joy and gratitude. Festivals were given in honour of them. But the restless disposition of Brion impelled him again to travel. He bent his way to Laguaira; and, coming to Caracas, was received into the most distinguished families, and, among others, into that of Montilla, in which he soon became an intimate friend. This was some years previously to the revolution of 1810 at Caracas. From that time he became the patron of the eldest son, Mariano, who, as we have seen, was indebted to him for his reconciliation with the supreme chief at Angostura in 1819, and his promotion to the rank of colonel in the service of his country.

At the beginning of the revolution, in 1810, Brion offered his services to the new republic, and was appointed captain of a frigate in 1811. He accepted the rank, with the condition that he should not be subject

to strict service, but should be at liberty to act independently of any chieftain with his own vessel in his own way. He, in fact, sacrificed his large fortune and his credit for the benefit of the cause, and laboured incessantly in its service. He would undoubtedly have done much more had it been in his power to change the ambitious views of General Bolivar, to whom I have heard him a hundred times urge the necessity of having, not a congress alone, but a government established upon legal principles, by which the security of persons and property should be insured to the whole community.

I heard him speak with great warmth to Bolivar in favour of convening a congress, and adopting a constitution like that of the United States of America, where the federal system had been proved to be the best and the most in conformity with the different laws, customs, and character of the people. If Caracas and New Grenada had adopted the federal system, Bolivar could never have obtained the absolute rule over them which he now exercises. He himself was aware of this, and therefore it was that he rejected the federal system, under pretence of its being too weak and slow in its operations. A central government has thrown absolute power into his hands; and now that he has acquired the habit of reigning alone, it will be difficult, probably impossible, to introduce a free government, a government of laws, into Colombia during his life.

Bolivar soon forgot, or at least disregarded, all that Brion had done for him, or the cause. The great exertions of Brion, noted in these memoirs, met only with ingratitude from Bolivar. When I spoke to the latter

one evening at Aux Cayes in very high terms of Brion, and his great exertions, he said to me, "You are right, my dear friend, but we must both confess he is a very great fool:"—and he laughed heartily.

Brion could never recover the large sums he advanced; Bolivar put him off by saying there was no money then, but that he should be paid as soon as possible.

The leading traits in the character of a Caraguin are vanity, pride, and jealousy. In prosperity he is vain and insolent; in adversity, humble, and ready to listen anxiously to any one who is able to relieve him. When Bolivar came from Jamaica to Aux Cayes, he had not four doubloons in his pocket. He found Brion, listened to him, and followed his advice. But the *supreme chief*, at Margarita and at Carupano, rejected the wise counsel of Brion, and followed his own whims. Bolivar, when a fugitive from the field of battle at Ocumare, listened to the voice of Brion, who joined him at Bonair, and returned to the shore of Ocumare. When he was driven off by Marinno, Piar, and Bermudes, and treated as a coward by his own countrymen, the stranger, Brion, came again to his support, and placed him at the head of the government at the end of 1816. Bolivar, again in power, disregarded his word given to Brion and the chieftains of Colombia, to assemble a congress. When, upon his disappearance and concealment of himself in the plains of Cumana, Zea, Marinno, and others, had assembled a congress, Bolivar, the moment it was in his power, annulled their proceedings, and fastened again on the supreme power, reprimanding Brion and Zea. Brion being deeply engaged with Bolivar, was

obliged to submit to his commands. From that time Bolivar became jealous that Brion might supplant him; and from this jealousy arose the treatment Brion received from him at Savanilla. I have been assured, that, from the time of the transaction at Cariaço, the admiral was no longer treated by the supreme chief like an intimate friend and confidant, as he had ever been before that time,—and that he felt this coldness very sensibly. In consequence of that jealousy which is so strong a trait in the Caraguin character, Brion had to struggle, not only with Bolivar, but also with Mariano Montilla, and Lino de Clemente.

In 1819, Mariano Montilla was sent as colonel from Angostura to Margarita by the supreme chief, with a large amount of money, as has been related. After the taking of Santa Martha, where Brion so powerfully sustained the operations of Montilla, the jealousy of the latter rose high against Brion, who, as admiral, had a right to the command. Montilla, created brigadier-general, forgot that the other was his friend and protector, and refused to recognise his authority. This gave rise to many unpleasant scenes; and Brion, highly disgusted, retired to Maracaybo, where General Lino de Clemente was intendant.

The character of Brion was generally rough and haughty, and this brought him into disagreeable collisions with the general. Under so much trouble his robust constitution was shaken, and he became so ill that he was obliged to leave his squadron. He retired to Curaçao in the beginning of 1821, in a low state of health, and so poor that the captain of the privateer he went in lent him sixteen doubloons. He was so de-

jected and tired of life, that he refused medicine, ate very little, and drank what his physician advised him to abstain from. After a long and lingering illness he died, as he had long desired, (the 20th of September, 1821) deeply lamented by all enlightened and liberal men. All the property he left out of a vast estate, was not enough to pay the expenses of his funeral, which was attended by many hundreds of the inhabitants of Curaçao. His probity, his generosity, and the great services he rendered to Colombia, will transmit his name to posterity, and exalt it far above the name of any of his persecutors. The congress of Colombia has passed various decrees in honour of his memory.

Francisco Paulo or Pablo Sanander, of the Order of Liberators, general of division, vice-president of the republic of Colombia, &c. &c. was born in 1787, in a low condition, at the city of Bogotá, at that time called Santa Fe de Bogotá. His high rank and elevation are the result of his own merit. He is brave, active, and intriguing, with but little education or fortune. In the revolution he has distinguished himself on various occasions. His ambition is not so conspicuous as that of Bolivar: but they are great rivals, and Sanander is far the ablest man, and best qualified to be at the head of the government. During the four years of Bolivar's absence in the southern provinces of Colombia, and in Peru, General Sanander, as vice-president, was charged with the executive; and in the whole of this time there was no commotion, no partial insurrection, no civil war. Affairs proceeded, if not so regularly as could have been desired, certainly much better than after Bolivar's return to Colombia. As soon as the latter

returned, civil war began in Valencia, Caracas, and Laguaira; and afterwards at Porto Cabello and Carthagena. It is said, not without some foundation, that General Bolivar was the secret instigator of these commotions. This assertion derived credit from the fact that General Paez was not only not punished, but was continued by the liberator in his rank and command. Bolivar, indeed, convened his ridiculous assembly at Ocanna, which was but vapour. With his bayonets he gained his point, while Sanander, the constitution, and those shadows of the republican form, the senate and house of representatives, were disregarded. This was a struggle of the Caraguin against the Grenadan. The weapons of the former were bayonets, those of the latter, pen, ink, and paper.

Antonio Francisco Zea, doctor jurisprudentiæ, ex-intendant, ex-president of congress, ex-vice-president of the republic of Colombia at London and Paris, &c. &c. was born in 1768, in the city of Bogota. He was one of the first who thought of rendering his country free and independent of Spain. He had devoted his time chiefly to the study of the laws, political economy, history, and general literature; to all, in short, which conduces to form the mind and mould the heart of a gentleman. He devoted himself zealously to the study of botany, of which he acquired a profound knowledge. He was one of those rare characters that are distinguished by virtue, knowledge, and probity. He was the intimate friend of his countryman, Antonio Narinno, a young man of ardent and ambitious character, and of a leading family in Bogota. Narinno hated the oppressive government of Spain, and by his

passionate and energetic conversation, gained his friend Zea, and about twenty other young men of the best families, to unite for the purpose of exciting the attention of their countrymen to their debased condition, and inducing them to revolt. The imprudent zeal of Narinno, however, discovered his plan and his accomplices. They were secretly arrested in the night, by order of the viceroy, taken under a strong escort to Santa Martha, and embarked for Cadiz. (1794.)

Young Zea had the good fortune to find powerful friends and protectors at Madrid, where he remained for a long time. From thence he went to France, whither his parents came shortly afterwards, to establish themselves at Paris, where they remained with part of their family. Zea returned to Madrid, and became the conductor of the Court Gazette, and of the Mercury of Madrid. Soon after, king Charles IV. appointed him director of the beautiful botanic garden of that capital.

In 1808, Mr. Zea was one of the eighty-five deputies from Spain, convened by order of Napoleon, at Bayonne, to establish a new king.

The new king of Spain, Joseph Bonaparte, in whose retinue Mr. Zea entered Spain, named him soon afterwards, his prefect at Malaga, and gave him the decoration of his new order of knighthood. But the new prefect shared the fate of his new king, who, with his good qualities, soon gave way to the cruel and cold-hearted Ferdinand.

Mr. Zea returned to France, and resided some years at Paris. Part of his family were with him, and he occupied himself exclusively with science and belles-

lettres. When, in 1813, the congress of New Grenada sent M. M. Gutierres and Colonel Jules Duran to London to procure arms, ammunition, and other warlike stores, for the use of the patriots, Mr. Zea joined his countrymen, and rendered them great assistance in their business. But they were principally indebted for their success to Louis Brion, afterwards admiral of Colombia, who was at that time in London, and offered his large fortune and extensive credit in aid of the object of these patriots. By these means they procured a fine corvette, armed with twenty-eight guns, which brought a great quantity of warlike stores, and among them fourteen thousand choice muskets, for the use of the patriot army. Brion had beforehand made a written agreement with them, and very fortunately, as one of these deputies attempted, in 1816, to deprive him of his property.

In 1814, Mr. Zea went from London to Jamaica, where he remained until the beginning of 1816. He was joined, in 1815, by General Bolivar, after his siege against Carthagena.* The latter returned to Aux Cayes, where Mr. Zea joined him some weeks afterwards, and was appointed intendant of the army.

Mr. Zea and Admiral Brion, who made their acquaintance in London, became firm friends. The former being of a mild and accommodating temper, became also the friend of General Marinno, who was despised by Brion. In 1817, Brion found himself grievously disappointed by General Bolivar, who had made to him, Arismendy, Paez, and others, a solemn

* See Chapter IX.

promise, before he left Port au Prince, that he would convene a congress; and had, under various pretences, eluded their intimations to him about his promise, until, by usurping the title of supreme chief, he betrayed his determination to continue in the exercise of the supreme power. Brion, who loved a constitutional government, and hated an usurped military power, spoke frequently with Zea of his disappointment. When, therefore, Bolivar absconded from Barcelona, Brion thought the moment propitious to the calling of a congress. He spoke on the subject to Zea, and Zea to Marinno, and a congress was formed at Curaçao, which existed only a fortnight, being then dissolved by Bolivar, as before stated. They excused themselves to the supreme chief, and were pardoned, but never regained their former standing in his favour.

In 1817, Mr. Zea was created counsellor of the government of Angostura; as such, he proposed the establishment of a gazette, under the title of the "Courier of Angostura," of which he was, for a long time, the only conductor. After the arrival of doctor Roscio, Mr. Zea was assisted by him. This was the first and only official gazette published after the downfall of Bolivar's dictatorship in 1814. Bolivar, understanding the pliant temper and timid character of Zea, appointed him, without hesitation, to the office of vice-president of the republic, to exercise the executive power in his absence. We have seen how Arismendy forced him to resign, and how the latter was turned out by Bolivar, and Zea replaced.

Bolivar, knowing that Zea had left part of his family in Paris, and that he had sure and powerful friends in

London, sent him, in 1819, as minister plenipotentiary to both capitals. As such, he was sometimes in England and sometimes in France, as the business of his mission required. He was never admitted in his diplomatic character, but was well received as a stranger; and, by the friends of the South American cause, with distinction. Mr. Zea having been always steady and discreet in his principles, Bolivar hoped that the moderate party would be reanimated by him, and that, by his influence and exertions, a good understanding between the two contending parties might be established. At that time there existed a strong party, so far in favour of Spain, that they wished not to drive these who were attached to the old government to despair, but desired the correction of certain abuses, and made this their leading object. This was the plan of the celebrated General Miranda, who was so much calumniated in 1811 and 1812. All who knew General Miranda will agree that he was, in every respect, a much worthier man than General Bolivar. Miranda was a profound tactician; an intrepid soldier; a man of great ability in civil administration; disinterested in his views; and who never, in the least particular, abused the dictatorial power entrusted to him by congress during several months. He attracted to him men of talent and merit, listened to their opinions, and many times followed their suggestions. Bolivar is the exact reverse of all this. Colombia will, therefore, remain enslaved whilst the supreme chief remains at the head of her imaginary republic; and her government has, at present, no better foundation than his moderate talent and his character—such as it is.

The negotiations in which Mr. Zea succeeded in London are too well known to be noticed here, as are the attempts of M. Pedro Gual and Mr. Revenga, to degrade his character and his memory. History has already decided between them and the worthy Zea.

Revenga succeeded Mr. Zea as *chargé des affaires* in London, but met with a very different reception. The one was greatly respected and beloved; the other is now one of the most devoted partisans of that same General Bolivar, whom, according to report, he not long since hated.

A detail of the negotiations respecting the loan would place the candour, ability, and honesty of Mr. Zea in the strongest light, but such detail would exceed the limits of these sketches. On the 26th November, 1822, while acting in England as minister of Colombia, Mr. Zea died, at Bath, deeply regretted by every upright and enlightened patriot. The persecutions that awaited him, if he had lived to return to his country, are plainly indicated in the official letter of Pedro Gual, dated Bogota, 29th September, 1822.

CHAPTER XXII.

Biographical Sketches of Generals Paez and Arismendy.

JOSEPH ANTONIO PAEZ, of the Order of Liberators, general-in-chief of the armies of Colombia, Venezuela, &c. &c. was born in 1780, in the city of Aragua, of Indian parents of a low extraction, whose employment consisted principally in raising cattle, and cultivating some land. They were in comfortable circumstances for their station in life. Young Paez was raised amidst the herds of his fathers, and of course received no education at all. He took care of the herds, and could perform any operation used upon cattle or horses with great skill. He understood all the simples used in the cure of the disorders of cattle in that country, and knew how to apply them. He was a master at taming wild horses, and had great bodily strength and agility. He was also extremely patient of fatigue of every kind. When eighteen years old, he offered to make a journey from Aragua to the city of Barinas, where his mother was born. She had a lawsuit with her family, which had already lasted for several years. After some objections on the part of his parents, they consented to his taking the journey, in the hope that it would facilitate their lawsuit. He set off well mounted, armed, and supplied with money. On the road, he met with

two rogues whom he had known at Aragua, and who knew that he had money. They were lying in wait to rob him. He was not at all aware of their intentions, and, without suspicion, came near them. One of them attempted to seize his reins, but Paez, who had a vigorous horse, gave him the spur, and rode off at full speed, overthrowing both the robber and his horse. The robbers, not being so well mounted, but knowing a foot-path shorter than the road, took that, and upon the road at the end of it, again waylaid and endeavoured to seize him. When Paez found that all his entreaties were vain, he suddenly killed one of the robbers on the spot, the other fled, neither of them being armed. Young Paez, fearing the consequences of this encounter to his family and himself, thought it best to return to his parents and inform them what had happened, before the other robber could have time to denounce him. His parents immediately concealed him, and paid money and presents to hush up this affair. They placed their son as an overseer of cattle upon the hato (farm) of a rich and powerful Spaniard in the plains, where he remained, occupied only with that service, for several years. Being large, well formed, supple, vigorous, and brave, he became known for these qualities, and the affair of the robbers being learned in the neighbourhood, he became greatly regarded on account of it, and his name famous.

On the breaking out of the revolution of Caracas, in 1810, Paez declared himself in favour of freedom. The Llaneros placing great confidence in him, he easily persuaded them to join him, and they unanimously named him their chief. He chose from among them 150

mounted men, and this company soon began to be the terror of the Spaniards.

At the death of his mother, he inherited her property in Barinas, which he divided with his sisters, who had then fixed their residence in that town. In 1811 the Spaniards had again taken possession of it, and proclaimed a general amnesty for all who should wish to re-enter upon their property, promising to reinstate them in possession. Paez being informed of this, presented himself well mounted and armed before the Spanish commandant of the town, in order to profit of the amnesty, and recover his property. As soon as he was recognised by the inhabitants, they came by hundreds to shake hands with and welcome him. But when the Spanish governor heard that he was the famous Captain Paez, who had done them so much mischief, they ran to their arms, and raised a cry in the street for their commander to arrest him, and shoot him as a rebel and traitor. This commandant, who was aware of the bravery of Paez, and of his ascendancy over the inhabitants of Barinas, thought it not prudent to order his arrest, fearing such a measure would excite a general rebellion. He, therefore, appeased his soldiers, and Paez was permitted to retain his arms, and to retire into the house of his family. After some days, the governor was informed by his spies, that Paez had gone out unarmed, and this would be a good time to arrest him. The governor approved of the project, and some armed men entered the house and took away his sword and pistols. He returned in the evening, and finding what had been done, walked to the governor's house, and told him that he had broken his word. He stated

he had come to the place, trusting in the good faith of his promises; and that he therefore demanded that his arms should be restored to him, not to be used against the Spaniards, but for his personal security. He spoke in so firm a tone, and with such natural warmth, that the governor ordered his arms to be restored. At this moment the whole garrison of Barinas impetuously insisted upon his being arrested and confined in irons. He was taken in the night, put in irons, and locked up in the prison, where he found about 150 prisoners of war, and among them his friend Garcia, an officer of great strength and courage. Garcia complained to Paez of the weight of his irons, and of the miserable situation of the prisoners. Paez reproached him with pusillanimity, and immediately breaking his own fetters, offered him an exchange. Garcia took heart and ceased complaining. Paez then spoke in a low but earnest manner to the prisoners, exhorting them to one common effort for their delivery. This effort was made under his direction, and before morning their limbs mostly were free. When the jailor came to open the door, Paez fell upon him, knocked him down, and threatened him with instant death if he were not silent. They seized the arms of the guard, broke the fetters of all that were not yet freed, and the 150 prisoners marched with Paez at their head upon the Spanish garrison, about 200 strong; many of whom they killed, and routed the rest. Thus was Barinas again set free.

This exploit being very soon made known to the Llaneros, they proclaimed Paez their general. He rendered great service to Bolivar in 1813 and 14. He was adored by the Llaneros, with whom he distinguished

himself in the plains of Apure, Achaguas, and Casanare. He became acquainted with General Piar, from whom he learned much; and, during the absence of Bolivar, in 1814, these two chieftains fought in union, bravely and without interruption. They became the terror of Boves, Morales, Cagigal, Yanes, Cevallos, and other Spanish commanders.

In 1820, Paez, having fixed his head-quarters at Chaguas, had under his command, among others, the British legion, commanded by Colonel Bossett, about six hundred strong. At that time, there were attached to this legion, three colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, five majors, and many supernumerary captains. Colonel Bossett was a good officer and highly esteemed by General Paez; who likes foreigners generally better than does Bolivar, or any other Caraguin chieftain. Paez thought highly of the English troops, and used to call them, *mis amigos los Ingleses* (my friends the English.) Colonel Bossett, however, was disliked by his own officers and soldiers. They attributed to him the miserable state of their rations and clothes, and the want of their pay. Chaguas being a small place, the officers and soldiers were crowded together. They had nothing but beef for their rations; no bread, vegetables, nor spirits. The soldiers conspired together and fixed upon St. Simon's day for meeting, a day celebrated throughout Colombia as a festival or holiday, because General Bolivar bore the name of this saint. The heat being excessive in these plains, parade was usually deferred until five or six o'clock in the evening, and St. Simon's day falling this year on Sunday, and the Saturday before being given up to the soldiers, that

they might have time to clean their arms, the division was excused from parade. Notwithstanding this, as soon as the clock struck five, the soldiers of the British legion rushed out of their quarters with their arms, and placed themselves in order of battle, crying aloud that they would no longer be commanded by their colonel, and that they would prefer any other, even a Creole. The officers of the legion immediately repaired to the parade and endeavoured to pacify them. Among these was a lieutenant-colonel, against whom they had taken offence, and who, as soon as he approached them, received four or five bayonet thrusts, and was carried off mortally wounded. Colonel Bossett, hearing what was going on, appeared before the mutineers well armed, and determined to enforce order among them. As soon as he began to speak, the soldiers rushed upon him with their bayonets, but were prevented from doing him any serious injury by the efforts of the officers to appease them. General Paez being informed of the mutiny, ran from his quarters with his drawn sword in his hand, fell upon the mutineers, killed three of them instantly, and broke his sword upon the body of a fourth. He then seized some of the most rebellious, took them by the strength of his own arm out of their ranks and ordered them to prison. This spirited conduct so overawed the mutineers, that they separated, and retired hastily to their quarters. A young lieutenant, and three soldiers, all English, having been denounced as the most seditious, were arrested in the night. The lieutenant was innocent of what had passed the day before, but was denounced by his enemy, one of the officers of the legion. The next

day he and the three soldiers, without any further trial, were shot.

General Paez was an excellent partisan officer, and was very useful whilst he confined himself to the plains, where he was perfectly at home. But when out of these, he became dull, and appeared to be in a manner lost. That he was several times in this state, the history of the military operations in Venezuela will show. It must, however, be acknowledged, that of all the Colombian generals, he has uniformly displayed the greatest personal bravery; and that in all attacks he has been at the head of his Llaneros, over whom he has acquired unlimited power. He divides with them his last cent. They call him uncle and father. But, as he has had no education, and could form himself only by his own exertions, he has no actual knowledge of tactics, nor indeed of any branch of the military art, of which he has more than once been heard to speak with contempt. His staff officers are Llaneros, and form his regular society. He takes his hammocks in the midst of them, and smokes and drinks with them. He talks much, and, like most of the Caraguins, is vain, proud, and boastful.

In 1816, General Paez wished to take possession of Guanare; and on his march, found the Spanish lieutenant-colonel, Duran, at the head of a detachment of 200 infantry, with whom he was retiring towards the *hato* of La Guaz. General Paez had with him 1200 chosen cavalry, all Llaneros, with whom he was accustomed to march, and to whom he gave the name of invincibles. He instantly charged Duran's little party, crying, "destroy them, cut them in pieces." Duran

formed a square, and crossing his bayonets, made a successful defence against the wild attack of the Llaneros. He then in his turn made a full charge upon them, killed many, and routed the rest. Paez was obliged to fly, and escaped with bnt a small part of his invincibles.

His head-quarters, since 1813, have been in Valencia; but he has a beautiful country-seat not far from Caracas, which before the revolution belonged to the Marquis of San Leon. When time permits him, he passes some days at this place, where he fattens a great many cattle, performs operations upon his young horses and bulls, prepares medicines for any diseased animals, and trims and dresses his horses. He is best satisfied when busily engaged in these occupations. A considerable part of his time is employed in lying on his hammock, smoking, and talking with favourities of his past campaigns. He has a great predilection for hunting wild bulls, and particularly for the kind of hunting called *colear un toro*, which consists in taking a bull by the tail, and throwing him upon the ground, and is done, particularly by the Llaneros of Venezuela, in the following manner. The hunters are all on horseback, each carrying in his hand a piece of red cloth. At the sight of this colour, the bull becomes enraged, and runs at some one, who dexterously throws his cloth, and fastens it upon the horns of the bull in such a manner as to blindfold him. While he is roaring and plunging to clear himself of the cloth, the principal hunter, who is designated beforehand, seizes the animal's tail and fastens an end of a strong rope to it. He then makes the other end fast to a tree, so that the bull cannot escape. He now turns the tail with a strong

hand, and with such address, that the quick motion the animal naturally makes in turning his head towards his captor, is made to assist in throwing him flat upon his side. The moment he is got into this position, the principal hunter hamstrings him with his sabre, and the rest pierce him with their spears. The carcass is then dressed and prepared for cooking.

At the battle of Ortiz, in April 1818, where Bolivar commanded, Paez, with his cavalry, made several successful charges against the enemy, who, though inferior in number, were superior in discipline and skill to Bolivar. The general-in-chief had so entangled matters and confounded the line, that his infantry were beaten and nearly destroyed. On this occasion, Paez reproached him personally with great freedom and severity. At Bolivar's request, Paez covered the retreat, and made one or two charges, which saved the remnant of the infantry from destruction. Soon after the last charge, which he led himself, he retired on one side, and having dismounted, was seized with a fit, and lay upon the ground, foaming at the mouth. Colonel English, who related the circumstance to me, was present. He went up to Paez, but was warned by some of his people not to touch him. "He will soon be well," said they, "he is often so, and none of us dare touch him until he is perfectly recovered." Colonel English, however, approached, and having sprinkled some water in his face, and forced a little down his throat, he soon recovered; and coming to his recollection, he thanked him cordially, saying, that he was a little overcome by the fatigue of the day, having with his lance and his own arm killed thirty-nine of the

enemy. He said he felt his illness coming on as he was running the fortieth through the body. The bloody lance lay by his side, and he presented it to Colonel English, as a memorial of his friendship and affection. Paez soon recovered and joined his legion; and when Colonel English departed, he was presented by him with three very fine horses from his own stud.

After the refusal of General Morillo to give quarter, Paez was never known to spare the life of a prisoner. At the battle of Calabozo, having been successful in several charges, by which he forced the royalists to retreat, he was in the height of good humour, when an officer, who had been taken by his men, was brought to him: the officer was mounted. The general asked him a few questions, and then directed his *man of business* to do his duty. The Spaniard begged hard for his life. "Well," says Paez, "ride to yonder tree," pointing to one at some distance, "and when you get there, escape as fast as you can, and take care I do not come up with you." The officer obeyed, and when he arrived at the tree, casting one glance behind, commenced his race. Paez pursued and soon overtook him. He was just going to strike his lance through him, when the officer, with some presence of mind, said, "General Paez is too noble to take an advantage; my horse was tired; but if you, general, will give me your horse, and the same liberty, I think I could save my life." "Done!" answered Paez; and immediately the Spaniard was mounted upon his horse. The distance was again pointed out; the officer rode to the spot, and started afresh. Paez meanwhile mounted the jaded horse. He started

also, gained ground, and in about two miles actually overtook the Spaniard, and pierced him through with his spear. The case was witnessed by hundreds, and the air rang with the applauses of the sanguinary Paez!

Juan Bautista Arismendy, general of division, of the Order of Liberators, ex-governor of the Island of Margarita, &c. &c. was born in 1786, in the Island of Margarita, of parents in as good circumstances as this sterile spot, whose inhabitants subsist upon fishing and navigation, could make them. Arismendy is one of those men who are said to form themselves, and who become fit for the station they occupy in the world, by the force of genius and natural ability. He possesses a natural tact or disposition, which no education, though it may direct it, can ever give. From his youth he was devoted to hunting and fishing. The first formed *his coup d'œil*, and taught him stratagem: both hardened his body, by exercise and privation. His figure is broad, strong, and about five feet two inches high; his complexion is tawny and sun-burnt; his hair is yellow, his eyes are small and piercing, and he is probably the most active chieftain in Colombia. He has received no education, and can scarcely read or write. His penetrating genius, and his insinuating manners, advanced him in the army; and when Bolivar created himself dictator, he appointed Colonel Arismendy governor of the capital, Caracas. In this post he distinguished himself by his vexations and cruelties, and made himself many enemies.

In 1814, when Venezuela was in a declining condition, he left Caracas, and went, as brigadier-general and governor of the Island of Margarita, into his native

country. He re-established order in this province, fortified those places which afforded a good defence, and built a number of small forts, redoubts, and batteries. Here he made himself very popular by his good and just administration, and acquired a great ascendancy over his countrymen; so that, after the battle of La Puerta, which was lost by the dictator, in June, 1814, he was absolute master of Margarita, where he acted without control; insomuch, that when the two dictators, Bolivar and Marinno, in 1814, came to his island for shelter, he compelled them to depart, without admitting them even to common hospitality. He was jealous of his authority, and determined to hold the supreme command of Margarita; and he knew that Bolivar had a right to command him wherever they were together. Bolivar knew well the character of Arismendy, and did not dare to remain. From that time General Arismendy remained in quiet possession of his absolute command, and organized and disciplined his army; administered his affairs much better than Bolivar had ever done. By his kind reception of foreigners, he attracted many privateers to the island; their prizes were sold there; and commerce flourished under Arismendy's protecting care of the merchants and their interests. He contented himself with a moderate income, the product of regular duties, and taxes. Margarita was then the entrepot between the Venezuelan and Grenadan patriots, and the commercial world of the West Indies, and of the United States of America.

In March, 1815, General Morillo's mighty expedition arrived from Cadiz, at the Island of Margarita, on the

same day with that of General Morales, from Guiria. Arismendy and the inhabitants of Margarita saw the impossibility of resisting this united force, and therefore accepted the capitulation offered them by Morillo. It was clearly stated in the articles of capitulation, that none of the inhabitants should be molested for their political opinions. In direct violation of this stipulation, numbers of the most respectable inhabitants were secretly arrested in the night. Arismendy himself found means to escape, and conceal himself in the mountains. Morillo offered a great reward to have him taken and delivered up to him; and strict search was every where made for him, but in vain. As he was perfectly acquainted with all the foot-passes in the woods and mountains; and as the inhabitants were devotedly attached to him, he soon succeeded in uniting about fifty of the bravest of them, who determined to drive the Spaniards from the island, or die. He lived with them some time upon roots and wild fruits, and the produce of hunting. He animated their spirits by his conversation and examples, to such a degree, that they promised to follow wherever he chose to lead. His first object was to procure arms and ammunition, of which his party was entirly destitute. Knowing all the Spanish outposts, he began by surprising one of them, held by a corporal and four men. Arismendy and twelve of his men, armed with clubs and long knives, surprised this port in the night, killed the five men, and took their arms and cartridges. Arismendy proceeded in this manner killing the Spaniards in the night, and taking their arms and ammunition, for several months; and before any assistance could arrive, he

and his men were again in the mountains. He continued in this manner to weaken the Spanish force, until he obtained not only a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, but many recruits also. His successful enterprises reanimated the fallen spirit of the inhabitants. But, though already enabled to act upon a larger plan, and with effect, he was still in want of every thing, but principally of arms and ammunition. He had nothing to expect from the Main, because, after the flight of Bolivar from Cumana, the remaining patriot chieftains were reduced, like himself, to provide for their troops as they could. But the spirit of patriotism was now so strong in Margarita, that the women joined with their husbands, brothers, and friends, in their efforts to become again free. They voluntarily gave their jewelry, pearls, golden ear-rings, crosses, &c. for the support of the war, and made shirts and other necessary clothing for the troops. Arismendy was unanimously elected supreme chief. Some patriot clergymen offered golden and silver vases of the church, which they had taken the precaution to bury and secrete before the Spaniards landed. These valuables were secretly sent to St. Thomas's, to be exchanged for arms and warlike stores. Arismendy is very sanguinary, and now, particularly, was extremely exasperated against the Spaniards. Morillo, who had about 3000 men left, lost nearly all these by Arismendy's bravery. There remained not 600 in the city of Assumption and the forts of Pompatar, when I arrived with General Bolivar at the island in May, 1816. The Spanish commander had embarked and gone to the Main sometime before.

Arismendy constructed long perogues to carry from 150 to 200 men, who were to be armed with guns taken from the Spaniards. The inhabitants of Margarita, being sailors from their earliest youth, and very brave, soon filled these boats with their best men. Being so constructed that sails and rudders could be used, they took a great many Spanish vessels by boarding; the crews being armed with muskets, swords, (called manchitas,) and long knives. In this way they procured important means to carry on the war. They made prizes of great value, and took plenty of provisions. The Margaritans never attacked or took any other vessels than those with Spanish papers, and under Spanish colours. Arismendy established the strictest order in every thing, and acted with great probity and disinterestedness, living like the soldiers, and among them. The public stores were full and well preserved by the commissaries. Arismendy organized his little republic much better than any of his countrymen had done before; every one was satisfied and ready to assist him. In a short time he received new supplies of muskets and warlike stores; many privateers came to offer their service, and his seaports were soon filled with prizes.

Arismendy, now become powerful and well supported, carried on his attacks more openly. He intercepted a number of convoys, and surprised whole corps and destroyed them; he erected various forts, redoubts, and batteries, that he might have different points of attack and defence; old and young of both sexes worked day and night, exposed to the fire of the Spaniards, who, seeing the spirit of their opposers, lost

all courage and confidence. General Arismendy pointed out to me various women who fought like the best of his cannoniers, and who took up from the ground a great many balls and grape-shot that came from the enemy, loaded their own guns with them, and thus returned them to the Spaniards. When Arismendy, Bolivar, and myself, made the circuit of these forts, the former assured me that these women were of the greatest service, by animating their friends and relations to fight, and by carrying the sick and wounded on their shoulders; they would not suffer a man to leave his battery, but brought them food and spirits, handed cartridges, and, indeed, did the work of brave soldiers; whilst they performed these services, they were chanting patriot songs, and that amidst the heaviest fire of the enemy.

During my stay in Margarita, General Arismendy, among many instances of the heroism of their women, related to me the following:—The wife of General Arismendy had a rich uncle, who had been many years settled at Trinidad, and had often pressed her to come and visit his family. At the end of 1815, she suggested to her husband the plan of going herself to Trinidad, to pay the long-desired visit, and also for a more important purpose, which was to solicit from her uncle, by way of loan, a large sum of money for the purpose of aiding the war; her husband refused his consent to her going, and pointed out the dangers to which she would be exposed in that time of war and trouble, particularly from the numerous cruising vessels of the enemy, which then coveted the seas in almost every direction from Margarita. She persisted, however, in

her purpose, and at length obtained his consent, and a proper commission from him for obtaining the loan. She was young, handsome, and well educated; she embarked in a small schooner, without even a servant, and when she went on board, was unknown to any one in the vessel. After sailing some days with a fair wind, the schooner was chased and overtaken by a Spanish privateer, and though she sailed under Dutch colours, was sent into Porto Cabello.

As soon as she arrived in that city, she was recognised by a number of persons as the wife of General Arismendy, and was immediately arrested and put into a dark and damp dungeon in the citadel. Arismendy, who almost always put his prisoners to death, had spared three Spanish colonels and majors, whom he put into one of his forts that they might serve him as hostages in case of need. The governor of Porto Cabello knew their situation. They were beloved by their superior officers; and the governor sent one of his officers to Arismendy's wife, with his word of honour, that she should be immediately set at liberty if she would write a line to her husband and persuade him to release the three Spanish officers in exchange for her. She feared that her husband would be weak enough, as she expressed it, to consent to the proposal, and she positively refused to write. By the urgency of the governor, she understood the importance of these officers, and told him plainly that she would not write. After she had received a number of visits to the same purpose, the governor came himself and endeavoured to persuade her, but in vain. They then threatened her; but she replied, laughing, that it would be cowardly to

torment a defenceless woman, whose only crime was being the wife of a patriotic general. They next employed more rigorous treatment with regard to her living, but still treated her respectfully, and promised her immediate liberty if she would write to her husband to release the officers. At length she became vexed with their importunity, and told the officer who came to her, that if General Arismendy were informed of their cowardly treatment of her he would be as mad as a tiger, and would put to death thousands of Spaniards, men, women, and children,—all that might fall into his power: that, for her part, she was determined never to commit so weak and vile an act as they required of her, and that she would suffer a thousand deaths rather than attempt to persuade her husband to forget his duty.

During three months she was treated with great barbarity, but she remained firm, and constantly gave the same answers. The Spaniards, at last, finding that nothing could alter her determination, permitted her to go to the Island of Trinidad, fearing that if her husband should hear of her detention, he would do as she had predicted. Such was the wife of General Arismendy, at the age of twenty-three years.

General Arismendy now lives retired, at a beautiful country seat, not far from Ocumare.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Recapitulation of Facts—General Bolivar as he is, and not as he is commonly believed to be.

I HAVE shown how General Bolivar acted from 1810 to 1814. His campaigns in Peru do not come within my plan, but they are well known, as are also his political transactions in regard to the Bolivian constitution, which is his own work, and by which his principles are fully developed.

The memoir of the late Marquis De Torre Tagle, President of Peru, which will be found in No. 9 of the Appendix, is a remarkable document to show the character of General Bolivar. The marquis has been represented as a traitor, because he stated the truth during a time when Bolivar's power was at a low ebb. The truth, however, will be re-established, and history will transmit it to posterity.

In the Appendix, No. 10, will be found another document, a letter from Mr. Manuel Vidaurre, one of the most distinguished patriots of Peru, which places the character of Bolivar in a just light. I will endeavour to give his portrait.

General Bolivar, in his exterior, in his physiognomy, in his whole deportment, has nothing which would be noticed as characteristic or imposing. His manners, his conversation, his behaviour in society, have nothing

extraordinary in them, nothing which would attract the attention of any one who did not know him; on the contrary, his exterior is against him. He is five feet four inches in height, his visage is long, his cheeks hollow, his complexion a livid brown; his eyes are of middle size, and sunk deep in his head, which is covered thinly with hair; and his whole body is thin and meagre. He has the appearance of a man sixty-five years old. In walking, his arms are in perpetual motion. He cannot walk long, but soon becomes fatigued. Wherever he goes his stay is short, seldom more than half an hour, and as soon as he returns his hammock is fixed, in which he sits or lies, and swings upon it after the manner of his countrymen. Large mustachios and whiskers cover a part of his face, and he is very particular in ordering each of his officers to wear them, saying that they give a martial air. This gives him a dark and wild aspect, particularly when he is in a passion. His eyes then become animated, and he gesticulates and speaks like a madman, threatens to shoot those with whom he is angry, steps quickly across his chamber, or flings himself upon his hammock; then jumps out of it, orders people out of his presence, and frequently arrests them. When he wishes to persuade, or bring any one to his purpose, he employs the most seducing promises, taking a man by the arm, and walking and speaking with him as with his most intimate friend. As soon as his purpose is attained, he becomes cool, haughty, and often sarcastic; but he never ridicules a man of high character, or a brave man, except in his absence. This practise of abusing people in their absence, is characteristic of the Cara-

guins generally. The following is extracted from Colonel Hippisley's 'Narrative of the Expedition to the Rivers Orinoco and Apure, in South America.' London, 1819, p. 382.

"I had a full opportunity of surveying the general (Bolivar) while he was conversing with Captain Beire. From what I had heard of him, I was led to expect in appearance a very different man from the one I saw before me. General Bolivar is a mean looking person, seemingly, though but thirty-eight, about fifty years of age. He is about five feet six inches in height, thin sallow complexion, lengthened visage, marked with every symptom of anxiety, care, and I could almost add, despondency. He seemed also to have undergone great fatigue. His dark, and according to report, brilliant eyes, were now dull and heavy, although I could give them credit for possessing more fire and animation, when his frame was less harassed. Black hair, loosely tied behind with a piece of riband, large mustachios, black handkerchief round his neck, blue trowsers, boots and spurs, completed his costume. In my eyes he might have passed for any thing but what he was. Across the chamber was suspended one of the Spanish hammocks, on which he occasionally sat, lolled, and swung, whilst conversing, and seldom remained in the same posture for two minutes together," &c.

General Bolivar occupies himself very little in studying the military art. He understands no theory, and seldom asks a question, or holds any conversation relative to it. Nor does he speak of the civil administration, unless it happens to fall within the concerns of

the moment. I often endeavoured to bring him into serious conversation on these subjects, but he would always interrupt me; "yes, yes, *mon cher ami*, I know this, it is very good; but *apropos*"—and immediately turned the conversation upon some different subject.

His reading, which is very little, consists of light history and tales. He has no library, or collection of books, befitting his rank and the place he has occupied for the last fifteen years. He is passionately fond of the sex, and has always two or three ladies, of whom one is the favourite mistress, who follows him wherever he goes.

Dancing is an amusement of which he is also passionately fond. Whenever he stays two or three days in a place, he gives a ball or two, at which he dances in his boots and spurs, and makes love to those ladies who happen to please him for the moment. Next to this amusement he likes his hammock, where he sits or lolls, conversing or amusing himself with his favourite mistress, or other favourites, some of whom I have named in the course of this work. During this time, he is inaccessible to all others. The aide-de-camp on duty says to those who have important business to transact with him:—"His Excellency is deeply engaged at present, and can see no one." When he is out of humour, he swears like a common bully, and orders people out of his presence in the rudest and most vulgar manner. From his habits of life, or rather from his love of pleasure, it happens that many matters of business are heaped together, and left to his secretary; as his decree of 8th March, 1827, fixing the Custom-House duties of Venezuela, which is attributed

to Ravenga, and which has destroyed the commerce of the country. When he suddenly recollects some business, he calls his secretary, and directs him to write the letter or the decree. This brings more to mind, and it often happens that in one day he hurries off the work of fifteen or twenty. In this manner it often happens that decrees, made on the same day, are in direct opposition to each other.

General Bolivar has adopted the habits and customs of the European Spaniards. He takes his *siesta*, (noon nap) regularly, and eats his meals in the manner of the Spaniards. He goes to *tertulias*, (coteries) gives *refrescos*, and always dances the first minuet with the lady highest in rank in the company. This old Spanish custom is strictly observed throughout Colombia.

Inasmuch as General Bolivar is the sport of circumstances, it is difficult to trace his character. Bolivar, in success, differs, not circumstantially alone, from Bolivar in adversity; he is quite another man. When successful, he is vain, haughty, ill-natured, violent; at the same time the slightest circumstances will so excite his jealousy of his authority, that he arrests and sometimes condemns to capital punishment those whom he suspects. Yet he, in a great measure, conceals these faults, under the politeness of a man educated in the so called *beau monde*. They appear in his fits of passion; but not, however, unless he is sure of having the strength on his side; the bayonets at his command. When he finds himself in adversity and destitute of aid from without, as he often did from 1813 to 1818, he is perfectly free from passion and violence of temper. He then becomes mild, patient, docile, and even sub-

missive. Those who have seen him in the changes of his fortune will agree that I have not overcharged the picture.

The predominant traits in the character of General Bolivar, are ambition, vanity, thirst for absolute undivided power, and profound dissimulation. He is more cunning, and understands mankind better than the mass of his countrymen; he adroitly turns every circumstance to his own advantage, and spares nothing to gain those he thinks will be of present use to him. He is officious in rendering them little services; he flatters them, makes them brilliant promises; finds whatever they suggest very useful and important, and is ready to follow their advice. A third person suggests something to him, or he meets with some unexpected success—instantly he resumes his true character, and becomes vain, haughty, cross, and violent; forgets all services and all obligations, speaks with contempt of those he had just courted, and if they are powerless, abandons them, but always manifests a disposition to spare those whom he knows able to resist him.

At Aux Cayes, General Bolivar and I lived very much and very intimately together. Our conversation turned one day upon General Marinno, and he said, laughing to me, "Oh, I despise Marinno. He is a brute and not able to command four men." Marinno at that instant came in. Bolivar met him at the door and embraced him warmly, as a dear friend; and we remained together an hour or more.

Bolivar represented General Arismendy to me as a man without education, and yet as a very intriguing and dangerous man. He was evidently afraid of Aris-

mendy. He remembered that when he himself, and Marinno, came as fugitives to Juan Griego, in 1814, Arismendy had prevented his remaining there, and even threatened violence if he attempted to do so. Bolivar had not forgotten this when we came to Margarita after the sea-fight in May, 1816, and would probably then have been afraid to venture himself on shore, but that Brion, who, on account of his wound, had been put ashore had made such representations to Arismendy as had reconciled him to Bolivar, and induced him to come on board our vessel. As soon as Arismendy came on board, Bolivar immediately took him down into the cabin and conversed with him for a good while. He regained him by giving him a formal promise to convene a new congress, and lay aside his title of supreme chief, which was very offensive to the republican Arismendy. The latter, relying on his word, engaged again to recognise him as commander-in-chief. The day after Arismendy's formal recognition of Bolivar as commander-in-chief, he took again the title of *supreme chief*. And when I told him that Arismendy would be offended, he said, "Never mind, never mind, I care not much for Arismendy; I have gained him over, and he will do as I wish; and besides, he sees no further than the end of his nose." But when, in 1819, at Angostura, Arismendy had compelled Zea to leave the post of vice-president, and had taken it himself, Bolivar became so alarmed for his own supremacy, that he left his command to General Paez, marched about two hundred and fifty miles with his body-guard against Arismendy, and reinstated Zea, with whom he could

indeed do as he pleased. But he could and did only send him back to his former command, at Margarita.

Whilst General Bolivar stood in need of the military skill of General Piar, he flattered him highly; but when he came to fear his influence, he sacrificed him. He would not at that time have put Piar to death, if he had not been so advised and supported by others; not that he was unwilling to have Piar put out of the way, but that he would not have *dared* to condemn him.

In 1826, General Paez openly raised the standard of rebellion against the lawful authorities; and he was not only not punished, but suffered to remain in command as before. His impunity, like that of Arismendy, was owing to the strength of his party.

General Bolivar's disposition with regard to money is the reverse of miserly, and he is generally believed to be very generous. His disposition in this respect cannot be better described than by saying, that if he had a hundred thousand pounds to-day, he might very probably not have a cent to-morrow. He very seldom gives money to those that are in want, or to those who from delicacy refrain from asking for it, but he bestows profusely on his flatterers.

He has been compared to Napoleon Bonaparte. Bolivar in his proclamations imitates, or endeavours to imitate, the style of Napoleon. He began with a small body-guard, and afterwards greatly increased it, like Napoleon. He is ambitious, absolute, and jealous of his command, like the other. On public occasions he is simply dressed, while all around him is splendid,

like Napoleon, and he moves quickly from place to place like him. With respect to military and administrative talents, there is no resemblance between them.

Bolivar, when dictator of Venezuela, ordered the execution of 1253 Spaniards and Islennos, prisoners of war, and others, who were put to death in February, 1814. This was done in cool blood, and no entreaties could save them. I have mentioned an instance of his want of feeling, which I witnessed at the port of Juan Griego in May, 1814, and another in the naval combat just before.* This first was attended by an additional circumstance of cruelty; that the prisoners were compelled to dig their own graves! Admiral Brion was on shore, on account of his wound, but as soon as he heard of this execution, he sent positive orders, that no more prisoners should be taken on shore, even if Bolivar himself ordered it; and by this means about 120 lives were saved.

The following fact was related to me by a respectable eye-witness, whom I would name, but for the danger of exposing him to the vengeance of the dictator-liberator, The relator, at the time he stated the fact to me, I presume, had no thought of my writing the history of Bolivar.

During a small skirmish which General Bolivar had with a Spanish detachment, not far from Araure, in 1814, one of his officers came full speed and reported to him, that a detached company was attacked on a bushy hill, a mile from his head-quarters, and that they were in great want of cartridges. Twelve soldiers, who

* See Chapter VII.

heard the report, immediately offered themselves to carry the cartridges. Bolivar ordered the chief of his staff, Thomas Montilla, to send with each of these soldiers a box of cartridges. But, as there was no road at all, they were obliged to seek a passage through a very thick forest, full of briars and thorns, in order to ascend the hill. After having laboured to force their way until they found there was no probability of penetrating farther, they were compelled to return to head-quarters. They explained to the dictator the impossibility of going further, and showed him their clothes, torn in pieces, and their bodies covered with blood and wounds. Bolivar, in a furious passion, called them cowards, rascals, traitors, &c. and ordered the three first who arrived to be shot. His major-general, or chief of the staff, Thomas Montilla, who is a great favourite, his commandant of the artillery, Joseph Collot, and various other of the surrounding officers of the staff, entreated him to revoke his order. The men fell upon their knees, and with pathetic lamentations, entreated him to spare their lives, as they were innocent, and fathers of large families. All was in vain. As they came into his presence, two or three together, he renewed his order; and the whole twelve were bound and shot. On various occasions has Bolivar manifested the same disposition as I have shown.*

Colonel Hippisley, in his work already cited, says, p. 464, Bolivar would ape the great man. He aspires to be a second Bonaparte, in South America, without possessing a single talent for the duties of the field or

* See Chapter XII.

the cabinet. He would be King of New Grenada and Venezuela, without genius to command, consequence to secure, or abilities to support, the elevated station to which his ambition most assuredly aspires. In victory, in transient prosperity, he is a tyrant, and displays the feelings and littleness of an upstart. He gives way to sudden gusts of resentment, and becomes in a moment, a madman, and (pardon the expression) a blackguard; throws himself into his hammock, which is constantly slung for his use, and utters curses and imprecations upon all around him, of the most disgusting and diabolical nature. In defeat, in danger, in retreat, he is perplexed, harassed and contemptible, even to himself, weighed down by disasters, which he has neither skill or strength of mind to encounter, lighten, or remove. In this state he appeared to me at the retreat to and from San Fernando, when he looked the image of misery and despair.

"He has (p. 462) neither talents nor abilities for a general, and especially for a commander-in-chief. The numerous mistakes he has made throughout the whole of his campaigns, for the last eight years, have nearly desolated the provinces and annihilated the population. The repeated surprises he has experienced from the enemy, (already seven,) prove my assertion, and bear me out in declaring that any one of them would have disgraced a corporal's guard.

"Tactics, movements, and manœuvres, are as unknown to him as to the lowest of his troops. All idea of regularity, system, or the common routine of an army, or even a regiment, he is totally unacquainted

with: Hence arise all the disasters he meets, the defeats he suffers, and his constant obligations to retreat whenever opposed to the foe. The victory which he gains to-day, however dearly purchased, (of which his list of killed and missing, if he calls for or keeps such details, must evidently convince him) is lost to-morrow, by some failure or palpable neglect on his part."

Thus it is that Paez was heard to tell Bolivar, after the action at Villa de Cura, that he would move off his own troops, and act no more with him in command; adding, "I never lost a battle wherein I acted by myself, or in a separate command, and I have always been defeated when acting in concert with you, and under your orders." The native and black troops (freed slaves) can and do dash on, in their native country. Yet, under the name of courage, they will rush, without order, regularity, or discretion, upon the enemy, resolved at that moment to conquer or die; and if, in this onset, they are beaten or repulsed, and find themselves "able to go about" and to retreat, "the devil take the hindmost" appears to be the general cry; for they all continue to run until they reach a place of safety; and it is allowed by the royalist troops themselves, that the patriotic army, with Bolivar at their head, was never beaten in this respect." "The final slaughter of the prisoners, after the battle or during the retreat, is completely acquiesced in by Bolivar, who has himself condescended to witness this scene of butchery," &c.

These passages are sufficient to confirm what I have said in the course of these memoirs, of General Bolivar

and his troops. I could cite various other writers, to the same purpose.

It is true that his flatterers and courtiers have endeavoured to compare General Bolivar with Napoleon; but none of them have suggested to him the idea of aspiring to deserve being compared with Washington. All who have compared him with the latter were either strangers, or persons who have seen Bolivar perhaps a few hours, or not at all.

Bolivar's conduct as dictator, in Venezuela, in 1813-14, as supreme chief, in 1816-17-18; his project of a monarchical constitution, in which he proposed the creation of a senate for life, with the titles of dukes, marquises, counts, barons, &c., in 1819; the constitution of Bolivia, the secret history of his *protectorate* in Peru; his behaviour in Venezuela; his famous proclamation directed to the grand convention of Ocanna; and his self-nomination as supreme chief or dictator of Colombia, are proofs of his ambition, his hypocrisy, and his secret determination to become an absolute monarch.

A great man would have directed the efforts of the ambitious and ignorant chieftains of Colombia to one point, the driving their common enemies from the country, in the first place, and then establishing a free government. Bolivar's object has invariably been his own personal aggrandizement, to the exclusion of every good and noble purpose. He is certainly a rare example of great ambition, unaided by talent or virtue. Yet, such are the inhabitants of Colombia, that they are ruled by this man.

In his recently published organic decree, dated August 27th, 1828, in title 1, he says:

'Art. 1st. The attributes of the supreme chief embrace the maintenance of the peace in the interior, and the defence from without; the command of the forces by land and sea; the negotiations in war and peace, and treaties; and the nomination of all officers: the right to issue decrees and the necessary rules *(reglementos)*, of whatever nature they may be; to modify, to reform the established laws; the execution of the decrees and rules of those laws which shall remain in force; and the collection of taxes; the administration of justice, the execution of judgments; the approbation or the alteration of the sentences in the councils of war; the commutation of punishments, with the advice of the council of state, and upon the proposal of the courts, or on having previously heard them; the granting of amnesty or pardon for public or private offences, always with the advice of the council of state; the delivery of commissions or *lettres de marque*. The exercise of the natural power as chief of the general administration of the republic in all its branches, and in virtue of being entrusted with the supreme power of the state; finally, the presidency of the council of state, when he thinks proper.

"Art. 2d. The supreme council will be assisted in the exercise of the executive power with the advice of a council of ministers."

This famous decree explains so much, that I may safely appeal to it, in support of what I have said of its author. I have adverted to the difficulty of tracing the

character of this individual, arising from his being so much the creature of circumstances. He has not sufficient vigour of spirit, nor courage of heart, nor talent, to escape from a critical situation, or to rise from a fall, without help from abroad. His good fortune in receiving such help has been almost uninterrupted since 1813. But the great secret of his power lies in the character of the people over whom he rules.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Bolivar, whilst he was governor of the fortress of Porto Cabello, in June 1812, left the fortress and embarked clandestinely with some officers, in the night, without giving any previous notice to the garrison, without any order, without any capitulation, armistice, or previous treaty with the enemy. He embarked for fear of the prisoners of war, who had revolted, and taken possession of the citadel. An old soldier might admit the place to be no longer tenable. But here the garrison, finding that their commander had deserted, without leaving them any order or advice, actually retired in good order, and reached Valencia by land without losing a man; and without any attack from the prisoners in the citadel. It is an invariable rule that the commander of a place, in time of war and danger, should never leave those who have been committed to his care.

Secondly. Simon Bolivar, the dictator, liberator of the West of Venezuela, embarked in the greatest haste in the night of the 25th August, 1814, at Cumana, and fled with San Iago Marinno, from the field of war. He so completely lost his presence of mind, that, in spite of the warmest representations of his cousin Ribas and many others, he would hear nothing, and remained on

board Commodore Bianchi's vessel. He sent various messages to Marinno, urging him to embark, and as soon as Marinno arrived, he ordered the commander to cut his cables and sail. Ribas, and a thousand other brave men, remained and fought for their independence and freedom. We have seen how Arismendy and Bermudes forced them to leave the ports of Juan Griego and Ocumare, treating them as fugitives and cowards, and threatening to shoot them if they set foot on shore *.

Thirdly. General Bolivar came suddenly to the height of power, and was named captain-general of the armies of New Venezuela and New Grenada, because the congress of the latter country was in great need of some authority to subject the province of Cundinamarca, and to occupy Santa Martha; (1814, and beginning of 1815). He felt a second time his absolute inability, and, after his ill-fated siege of Carthagena, embarked for Jamaica, whilst General Palacio, with the remainder of the army, fought bravely, and gained advantages over the Spaniards †.

Fourthly. The occupation of Carthagena and Boca Chica by the patriots offered a new occasion to distinguish himself. He left Aux Cayes for Margarita, and in the naval combat (May 2d), chose his place in the long boat of Commodore Brion's vessel (the only vessel engaged, and which took the Spanish royal brig Intrepida), leaving to another the command of the officers and volunteers in his stead ‡. In consequence

* See Chapter VIII. † See Chapters IX. and X.
‡ See Chapter XIII.

of this action, General Arismendy, ignorant of the part Bolivar had taken in it, not only became reconciled to the latter, but placed himself again under his orders. If Arismendy had been made acquainted with Bolivar's conduct in this action, it would have been the destruction of the projected expedition against Venezuela *.

Fifthly, At the action of Ocumare (July 10th, 1806), the supreme chief left the field, and rode full speed (he is always careful to have the best runners) two leagues; jumped from his horse, and embarked on board the fast sailing privateer, Diana, Captain Debouille. As soon as he was on board, he ordered the captain to cut his cables; and arrived at the little Dutch island Bonair. General M'Gregor assembled the remainder of the troops left by Bolivar, and with them, joined General Piar at Barcelona †. When Admiral Brion arrived at Bonair from Curaçao, he was astonished to hear of the flight of the supreme chief, and reproached him severely. Bolivar received his reproaches with great docility, feeling at this time his entire dependence upon the admiral. Brion, who was quick tempered, becoming cooler, succeeded at last in persuading Bolivar that his honour absolutely required him to return to the Main and rejoin his troops; and he ordered Captain Debouille to put himself at the disposal of the supreme chief. Bolivar directed his course towards the coast of Cumana. On his landing, Marinno and Piar, who had left him at Carupano, reproached him with his cowardly flight from Ocumare,

* See Chapters XIII. and XIV. † See Chapter XIV.

and told him that if he did not embark immediately, they would arrest and try him before a court-martial. He embarked speedily, and arrived at Jaquemel, whence he passed to Port au Prince *. Brion now employed all his influence to procure Bolivar's recal to the Main. After long and great exertions, he succeeded, chiefly by giving his word that Bolivar would assemble a congress, and establish a republican government, to which the latter most readily consented. In consequence of this stipulation, he was recalled, and arrived at Barcelona in the latter part of 1816. As soon as he was again at the head of the troops he disregarded his promise, resumed his title of supreme chief, and proceeded as he had done before †.

Sixthly. The supreme chief, on the night of the 5th and 6th April, 1817, fled from the fortified place of Barcelona, abandoning his aide-de-camp, chamberlain, and more than 1000 men. The latter, perceiving that the Spaniards had gained the walls, killed his wife and himself. All the rest were murdered by the Spaniards. At this time, the supreme chief hid himself in the remotest part of the plains of Cumana, where he remained about seven weeks.

Seventhly. The supreme chief left the scene of war, in 1818, after his unsuccessful campaign in Venezuela. The details of this campaign are alone sufficient to give a correct idea of his military talents. He went for shelter to the strong place of Angostura, in Guayana.

These facts (and many more might be adduced)

* See Chapter XIV. † See Chapters XIV. and XVI.

sufficiently prove that Bolivar frequently lost his presence of mind, whilst the most propitious circumstances concurred to restore his fortune. I have said enough of his talents for administration, and his mode of proceeding in civil matters, in the course of these memoirs.

But how is it possible (the question naturally arises) that General Bolivar should have liberated his country, and preserved to himself the supreme power, without superior talent?

If, by "liberating his country," it be meant that he has given his country a free government, I answer, that he has not done so. If it be meant, that he has driven out the Spaniards, I answer, that he has done little towards this; far less, certainly, than the meanest of the subordinate chieftains. To the question, how he can have retained his power without superior talent? I answer, in the first place, that the *reputation* of superior talent goes a great way. But I shall not desire the reader to be satisfied with this answer. Before the revolution of Caracas, April 19th, 1810, and ever since that time, the Spaniards themselves have constantly and powerfully contributed to assist the patriots in all their enterprises; by forcing the inhabitants to withdraw themselves from an onerous and base submission; by leaving them no alternative but to resist oppression, cruelty, and death, by force of arms, or submit to them. Without any disposition to disparage the bravery, the constancy of the Colombian people, I say that the policy, and the whole behaviour of the Spanish chieftains, during the war on the Main, has operated powerfully towards the freedom and independence of the

people. It has been a stimulus applied with very little respite. Their obstinacy, their hypocrisy, their barbarous cruelties, their entire want of moderation, of even the semblance of liberal policy, of talents, and of courage, have contributed effectually to alienate from them the confidence and favourable opinion of the people. These naturally chose to be under the dominion of their native chieftains, rather than to perish under the cruelties and vexations of the Spaniards. If these latter had adopted a liberal system for administering the provinces of Venezuela and New Grenada, I venture to pronounce, that, as soon as the Americans perceived the precarious situation of the mother country, none of them would have thought of separating from Spain. This opinion is supported by the well-known fact, that not one of the patriotic juntas, in 1810, had dreamed of detaching itself from the adored King Ferdinand. The stupid management of the Spanish authorities has facilitated all the operations of the patriots. The grievous faults of Bolivar and some of his generals, have been exceeded by those of his adversaries. It is not strange, therefore, that Bolivar should have been able to do all he has done with very limited talents. It has been said, long since, that oppression cannot be exercised upon any people beyond a certain point; that passing this point certainly produces resistance, and at length revolution. The territory of Colombia has a vast extent of coast. It was impossible that it should be guarded by the Spanish troops that were sent out. Bolivar, when beaten and driven from one place, had only to go to another. The advantage in point of numbers was vastly against the Spaniards. Their

greatest number of troops never exceeded twenty thousand; whereas, on the part of the patriots, there was a great majority of the people of the country, who consisted of about two millions of souls. Quiroxa's revolution, in favour of the constitution of 1812, occupied Spain at home, and prevented her sending powerful aid to Morillo. The Spaniards generally, and Morillo among the rest, became tired and worn out; their troops deserted by hundreds. If Morillo, moreover, had sought to aid Bolivar, he could not have done it more effectually, than by appointing La Torre his successor; for the drooping and sickly state of the Spaniards at that time, La Torre was but a poor physician. A powerful moral cause stood also in aid of Bolivar; I mean public opinion; which, if not unanimously in his favour, was certainly so against the cruel deeds of the Spaniards; and the Colombians, in their choice between two evils, very naturally took that which appeared to be the least.

By examining the conduct of the Spanish chieftains, both in Venezuela and New Grenada, we shall find that they afforded great assistance to the limited talents of the supreme chief and liberator.

In Venezuela, the captain-general, Don Juan de Casas, as early as 1808, began to irritate the minds of the inhabitants of Caracas, by arresting, in a very arbitrary and impolitic manner, a great many inhabitants belonging to the first and most respectable families (mantuanos) in that province. There was no other motive for his arrest than ill-founded suspicion; and he was compelled to set them at liberty. But the im-

pression remained, and stirred up many enemies to his government.

Captain-General Don Vicente Emparan, his successor, was the victim of his own obstinacy. Without regard to the disposition, or feelings, or opinions of the inhabitants, he blindly followed the orders of the regency, at Cadiz, which continued to dictate and maintain laws, made in the time of Ferdinand the Catholic and Philip II. Emparan, by refusing to be advised, lost himself, and the Spanish cause. His great security, and the idea of his power, joined with his obstinacy, gave occasion to the revolution of the 19th April, 1810, in Caracas. The junta, which succeeded him, took the title of Provisional Junta of Venezuela, conservators of the rights of his catholic majesty, Ferdinand VII. which proved that this junta and its constituents had no idea of detaching themselves from Spain. Its detailed official report explained this very clearly, and concluded by offering the Spanish government money and support of every description, to maintain the war into which it was driven against Napoleon. The regency of Cadiz answered their kind offers by a vehement decree, dated August 3d, 1810, by which the province of Venezuela was declared to be in a state of blockade! thus treating its inhabitants like enemies of the nation. The regency ordered every means to be employed to turn out a junta, sincerely attached to their king; and to punish them as rebels.

The mission of Don Francisco Cortavaria, by the regency and cortes of Spain, to the island of Porto Rico, was the consequence of the decree of August 3d. He had

a commission to pacify the Main, and to force its inhabitants to receive a new captain-general from the hands of those who ruled in Spain. This mission increased the fire of civil war, instead of extinguishing it.

The weak and cowardly Captain-General Millares, who succeeded Emparan, was but an object of contempt and mockery to his subaltern, Don Domingo Monteverde, who treated him like an instrument that is laid aside, when it becomes useless to our purpose. The latter audaciously put himself in place of the other, and violated the treaty of Vittoria, made July 12, 1812, with Miranda.

Monteverde's government was the reign of Islennos, friars, monks, priests, and intriguers of various descriptions. Bovales, Morales, Suasola, Antonnanza, Puy, Rosette, and other Spanish chieftains of this sort, had the upper hand. His administration was a series of perfidies, cruelties, and persecutions; one of the most complete and horrid anarchy.

Simon Bolivar, with a respectable force, approached the limits of Venezuela, announced its deliverance, and promised the inhabitants relief and freedom. These wretched people, reduced to despair, flocked by thousands to his standard for refuge from misery and death. Desertion became general in the royal army; and these troops, united with many thousands of volunteers, augmented with Bolivar's legions, and reduced the forces of the enemy to so small and weak a number, that the former had nothing to do but to march forward, assured of success and victory. The confidence of the country in the Spanish troops, and the dread of them, declined in proportion as confidence in the patriot troops in-

creased. Thus he advanced into the interior of Venezuela, supported by a series of successes which cost him very little; and thus he entered the capital, Caracas, whence the enemy had fled. Men, money, arms, munitions of every description, were offered him from every corner, and, united with the zeal of about a million of people, desirous of assisting him to destroy the feeble remnant of the enemy, very ordinary talents only were necessary to direct this powerful mass of forces and means to the utter extermination of Spanish despotism and cruelty. But Bolivar was so elated with his unexpected success, that, at the height of his fortune, he lost all reflection, and imagined that every thing was accomplished. His gross faults were the only cause of his ruin. They brought on the subsequent misery of his countrymen, and the downfall of the cause of freedom in Venezuela.

The year 1813 saw him at the summit of human grandeur and glory. The next year saw him a fugitive, in danger of being shot for desertion like the meanest soldier, and forced to seek shelter in a sister republic, Carthagena, whom he afterwards treated as a foe; laying siege to her capital in 1815.

General Monteverde being wounded, left Porto Cabello for Curaçao, where he lived in high style, from the plunder and vexations carried on against the inhabitants of Venezuela. He left the command of the remaining royal troops to Colonel Salomon, whose conduct we have noticed.

After Bolivar's flight from Cumana, in August 1814, military despotism began again to direct the reins of the royal government. The captain-general, Cagigal, had

the nominal power, but Boves, Morales, Cevallos, and other Spanish chieftains, acted, throughout Venezuela, wherever they came, as masters and conquerors. The best proof of this is the massacre of the most respectable inhabitants of Valencia, which took place in presence of Cagigal, and went unpunished. Similar excesses were committed, unpunished, in all the other provinces of Venezuela; and, throughout its whole territory, persecutions and the most barbarous cruelties were multiplied. The only man who had character and firmness enough to preserve the city of Caracas itself from pillage was the Marquis of Leon. And this he did, as the reader will recollect, by overawing a mulatto lieutenant-colonel, (Muchado) who had been a slave of the Count De La Grange. But the marquis was not a military man; his authority was personal, limited, and momentary. He was probably the only man at that time on the Main qualified by character to re-establish the royal authority. But instead of giving him full powers for that purpose, the King of Spain sent ten thousand bayonets, with a chieftain more capricious, hypocritical, despotic, and sanguinary, than any of his predecessors. Such was Don Pablo Morillo, who imagined, that to overawe every one, he had only to present himself. He took the title of "Pacificator of the New World," and arrived on the Main with the philantropic principles which characterize him in many of his letters. He wrote to the King Ferdinand, that it was necessary to regenerate Spanish America, and to exterminate, by fire and sword, "the present population, and create a new one." He began by grossly oppressing the only man capable of rendering him

great service, the Marquis of San Leon. Him he arrested and took with him as a prisoner on his journey, because the marquis could not, or would not pay him, an extraordinary tax of twenty thousand dollars. Admiral Marquis De Euriles, the friend and counsellor of Morillo, greatly assisted Bolivar by the advice he gave Morillo, after he knew it was impossible for him ever to reconquer the Main.

General Morales, who succeeded La Torre, was better qualified to raise the royal party; but his barbarous cruelty, his ignorance of policy, and his despotic principles, alienated from him the good opinion of both parties. Such was the general state of affairs in Venezuela, from 1810 to 1824, when the last of the Spaniards were driven from the Main by the capitulation of Porto Cabello. Let us now look at New Grenada.

The viceroy, Don Antonio Amar, was an honest man, and desired the welfare of the country, but he was too old and too weak to hold the reins of government in a time of revolution and trouble. He hesitated, and then gave way. Don Antonio Sorio succeeded him, and did worse. From that time there was no viceroy worthy of notice. Every province had its junta, and its governor or president; and these had no union, no understanding among themselves. They died away, one after another.

The reader may perhaps be acquainted with the atrocious deeds of the Bishop of Cuenca and his army of death, filled with friars and priests. He was another Peter the Hermit, with his fanatical brethren the Crusaders.

In Carthagena, Santa Martha, Porto Bello, &c. the Spanish chieftains, after having pillaged the places, left them to their subalterns and fled.

In the eight provinces of Venezuela and the twenty-two of New Grenada, the viceroys, captain-generals, governors, and Spanish leaders, have made every effort to alienate the affections of the Americans by their tyranny, cruelty, duplicity, and their general conduct, as impolitic as it was barbarous. The king, the regency, the cortes, and the juntas of Spain, have, in reality, powerfully seconded the patriots. Ever since 1810, the Spaniards have involuntarily done all they could do in favour of the patriots. Besides, the conduct of the Spanish chieftains has undoubtedly favoured the enterprises of General Bolivar, and assisted his feeble efforts. His generals and subalterns, and all the inhabitants of Colombia have powerfully supported him. Many of his generals have done far more than he has to free the country from the Spaniards. Amongst them Louis Brion was distinguished; as were also the Generals Ribas, Villapol, Paez, Zarasa, Piar, Palacios, Arismendy, Gomez, Sanander, Padilla, and others. None of these generals have ever abandoned their posts, or in any respect behaved so meanly as Bolivar has done. To these brave men Colombia, and Bolivar himself, owe the expulsion of the Spaniards and the salvation of the country; if their present expulsion may be called so. Of these men, Brion, Ribas, Villapol, Piar, and Palacio, no longer are living.

The brightest deeds of all these generals were performed in the absence of Bolivar. Abroad, they were attributed to his military skill and heroism, while in

fact he was a fugitive, a thousand miles from the scenes of their bravery, and never dreaming of their successes. What has he done in Peru? He has destroyed freedom and independence there, as in Colombia.* His protectorate there answers exactly to his dictatorship in Colombia; a despotic military anarchy, which has driven the best inhabitants from both countries, or rendered them slaves, and which, for many years to come, will be felt as the pernicious effect of his incapacity and despotism.

General Bolivar, moreover, has never in person commanded a regiment; he has never made a charge of cavalry, nor with a bayonet; on the contrary, he has ever been careful to keep himself out of danger. He has always taken the precaution to provide himself with excellent horses and good guides, and whenever the fire approached him, has made use of both. The plain narration of facts composing these memoirs proves this assertion.

General Bolivar's expedition, in 1813, against Monteverde, and its complete success, has made him famous abroad. I have shown how easy, in his situation, success was, and that he had only to go forward. The merit, such as it may be, of consenting to go forward with a handful of men after the defection of Colonel Castillo, is General Bolivar's. The expedition was conceived and planned not so much by Bolivar as by his cousin Ribas, who was the soul and the friend of

* The two battles fought in Peru were gained in his absence: in the one he was a hundred miles from the field of action; in the second, at Ayachuco, where he was ill. General Sucre gained both, and Bolivar had the honour and the name.

Bolivar. He and Colonel Brizenno persuaded Bolivar to persevere and go forward, when, as respectable eye-witnesses have assured me, Bolivar himself wished, upon the defection of Castillo, to return to Carthagena.

The entry into Venezuela was the most brilliant epoch in the military career of General Bolivar. I have shown how easily it was made. Very little talent, surely, was requisite to drive a handful of Spaniards out of the country, and by so doing, to give liberty to the Venezuelans. He did neither, but fled for shelter to New Grenada; but the memory of his grandeur remained, and having been the tyrant of his country, he was regarded as her *Liberator*. His fame procured him a good reception at Tunja, in November, 1814; and the congress of New Grenada named him captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, the highest military charge in the Spanish American armies. But this was trifling when compared with his dictatorship in Venezuela.

Congress, and all true friends of liberty, now entertained sanguine hopes that Bolivar had acquired wisdom by experiencing adversity, and that he felt an ardent desire to retrieve his faults and deserve their confidence. These hopes were founded upon his verbal promises made to his friends in Tunja, and upon his numerous proclamations, and solemn promises, to give freedom, liberty, and welfare, to the Grenadans. But he had acquired the habit of acting as master, and of following the impulses of his vain and haughty disposition. He entirely disregarded the confidence placed in him, and the obligation he was under to the congress of New Grenada, which placed him at the head of a strong

army, that he might be enabled to fulfil the important and double commission given him. He took, with perfect ease, the open and undefended capital of Bogota, but suffered his troops to plunder it during forty-eight hours. The most important task assigned him was the conquest of Santa Martha, which, at the time, could have been easily completed; but he preferred the gratification of his own revenge, in besieging Carthagena, which had received him within her walls with distinguished hospitality whilst he was a fugitive, and proscribed by Arismendy and Bermudes. His principal aim in besieging, and endeavouring to take Carthagena, was to avenge himself upon Castillo, who commanded in the place. The dreadful consequences of this siege have been detailed already.

In the assembly of patriots, held in the beginning of 1816, in the city of Aux Cayes, (Hayti,) its members named General Bolivar as their commander-in-chief, because Commodore Brion, upon whom the expedition depended, had formally and openly declared, that if Bolivar should not be appointed the commander-in-chief of the projected expedition, he would not advance a single dollar. Brion was, at that time, the principal supporter of the patriots; Commodore Aury was the next; but the former had more money, and a more extensive credit than the latter, and was animated by the great promises of Bolivar to act in his favour. The president of Hayti, Alexander Petion, was also in favour of General Bolivar, and assisted him powerfully in the projected expedition. Besides all this, Bolivar had sacrificed his fortune in favour of the cause, and had been the most elevated chieftain, in rank, since 1813.

Commodore Aury was the only member of this assembly who opposed, not the nomination of Bolivar, but his assuming the civil and military power alone. He proposed a council of government of three or five members, over which Bolivar should preside. The latter rose and spoke vehemently against a division of power, and concluded by saying, that he would rather resign than consent to Aury's proposal. Bolivar was well aware that Brion and Petion would do little or nothing if any other chieftains were elected, and therefore ventured to speak of resignation. Not a voice was heard in support of Aury; and Bolivar proposed a loud and individual vote, which was given for his being commander-in-chief of the projected expedition. The proceedings were reduced to writing beforehand, and were signed by every member except Aury, upon whom Bolivar avenged himself as we have seen.

From the time when Aury expressed himself so strongly against the absolute and undivided power of Bolivar, the latter began to fear that others might follow that example. Since 1813, Bolivar had been accustomed to have all around him acknowledge and submit to his authority, and obey implicitly all his orders, however arbitrary or despotic. When the dictator ordered the execution of the 1200 Spaniards, in February, 1814, more than a thousand inhabitants of Caracas and Laguaira murmured deeply against this cruel and sanguinary deed; but no one dared to oppose, or even to speak openly against it.

When Bolivar heard from me that General San Iago Marinno had given a secret commission to Captain Bouille, a man of colour, to recruit three hundred

choice soldiers from Hayti, he became very uneasy, and said to me that Piar had certainly advised Marinno to do so. He added, that Piar, being a man of colour, was a very dangerous one, and that he had the greatest influence over Marinno, and that Piar's object was to enable Marinno again to become his rival, as he had been in 1813 and 14. He then requested me to find some means of defeating Marinno's object, without having it known that he, Bolivar, cared about it. This was done as I have already related.

As soon as the supreme chief arrived at Carupano from the Island of Margarita, his body-guard was organized. Twenty-five men, with an officer, were daily placed before his head-quarters, and relieved every twenty-four hours.

In December, 1817, when Bolivar arrived at Barcelona, he again organized a body-guard. This was repeated at Angostura; and since that time this corps has been augmented so much, that he appointed the general of division, Raphael Urdaneta, the commander-in-chief of it. He had various generals of brigade under his orders; but principally General Anzoatigui, who was always blindly devoted to him. Since that time this body-guard has accompanied him everywhere.

There can be no doubt that the institution of this body-guard has been the ruin of liberty in Colombia; because the bayonets have supplied the place of both military and administrative skill ever since the Spaniards were driven from the territory. These alone have kept the weight of argument and opinion on his side. In imitation of the famous motto, "*Ultima Ratio Regum,*" engraved upon the cannon of Frederick II. of Prussia,

Bolivar should engrave upon the muskets of his body-guard, "*Ultima Ratio Dictatorum.*" Their bayonets, supported by the money supplied by English stock-jobbers, have given him a supremacy over the congress, who, in the latter times of his presidency, have been the slaves of his will. I may ask, has any one of the distinguished patriots ever opposed the least hint to his known will? These patriots, having nothing to oppose to the bayonets of Bolivar, have always the majority of members against them.

Bolivar has several times offered his resignation, but never unless he knew beforehand that no one would dare to appear in favour of accepting it. He has a great many enemies, but the bayonets are all on his side.

In order to preserve his usurped power, he is careful to treat all his guards well, and to attach their officers to him by paying great attention to them, and making them large presents. He took his Colombian body-guard to Peru, and when he left Peru, in 1826, he brought back as a body-guard along with his Colombian troops, 1500 Peruvians, under the plausible pretext of having troops sufficient to march against the rebels at Valencia.

His simply being in power attaches many to him. A great source of his influence is his having the disposal of all the offices of Colombia, in the civil and military departments; and those who flatter and please him best, get the best offices, without the least regard to their qualifications. He is a great dissembler, and possesses such ease of manners, that he charms those whom he wishes to gain to his purpose, seldom refusing their

requests, and never meeting them with rebuke. The most common actions of men in power, under whatever name they may rule, are generally regarded as generous and extraordinary deeds, while far nobler deeds of private men pass unnoticed. This is the case with Bolivar. He spends 20 or 100,000 dollars without hesitation, when he can immediately have what sum he pleases. He knows well that so long as he reigns he shall not want money.

The great mass of the Colombian people are ignorant, bigoted, and rude, to a degree not easily conceived by one educated in almost any protestant country, particularly in the North American states. Hence it is, that Bolivar's speeches, proclamations, promises, conversations, are thought of so highly. These people, once getting a notion into their heads, keep it fast. They think Bolivar a great man, and believe that his monstrous faults are in fact the faults of others, because he tells them so. Besides, he generally shows only the fair side of any event whatever.*

Whenever he is about to appear, on solemn occasions, before the public, he is careful to prepare his friends and creatures, by informing them what he intends to do, and how they are to act. He then goes, surrounded by a numerous body of officers, all devoted to him, and a large number of troops, who remain without, under arms. Surrounded by this force, he is always sure of the strongest party. This military show

* See his justificatory memoir, published at Carthagena, in Sept. 1814; his proclamation before he embarked for Jamaica, in May, 1815; that published after the execution of General Piar, in 1817, &c.

imposes upon all, and so overawes his boldest and most decided enemies, that they are forced to be silent, knowing his vain, vindictive, and treacherous character, and being sure that if they opposed him they should, sooner or later, become the victims of his vengeance. A more striking proof of his vindictive spirit, need not surely be required than his siege of Carthagena, carried on for the purpose of taking vengeance on Castillo for an insult received two years before, and to avenge Pineres' defeat (and his own) in his effort to be elected president of the government of that province.* What senator or representative could be rash enough to oppose him? He could not be opposed, with any chance of success, but by some military chieftain, who should have at command a force equal, at least, to his own. All the present chieftains are in favour of Bolivar, and all hold offices of a high grade under him. The power and the wealth of the country are in the hands of those who are interested deeply in supporting his power.

It is by means of all these advantages united, that General Bolivar has preserved his power since 1813. His security is now so great that he feels himself above dissembling any longer. He has thrown off the mask, and acts the part and speaks the language of an independent and powerful sovereign. He will preserve his power, as long as those who surround him remain attached to him, probably as long as he lives. His removal, whether it should happen by his death or otherwise, would produce a civil war.

All well informed men, who are acquainted with the

* See Chapter VIII.

different manners and habits of thinking, and with the heterogeneous character of the provinces, and of the chieftains now composing this colossal mass called a republic, will agree with me that it is impossible so to unite these parts that the body may enjoy that liberty which is necessary to the existence of a republic. If, therefore, Bolivar should be suddenly removed, these ambitious chieftains, each of whom has his partisans and admirers, would place themselves at the head of armed men and march one against another. The hatred of which I have spoken in my introduction as existing in a very high degree between the Caraguin and Grenadan government, and the jealousy existing among all the chieftains, would soon overturn the state. Colombia would be the theatre of a desperate and bloody war. The strongest would reign just so long as he continued to be so.

I speak freely of the characters of the principal chieftains in Colombia; and I have a right to do so, for I know them well. My acquaintance with them has been sufficient to give me a knowledge of the degree to which their minds have been cultivated and enlightened, as well as of their distinctive characters, and their actual worth. It is absurd to suppose that a people kept in ignorance, slavery, bigotry, and superstition, for three centuries, can be raised at once to the degree of enlightenment, knowledge, and virtue, possessed (for example) by the people of the United States, who perhaps are the only people ripe for the blessings of true liberty, grounded upon wise laws, and supported by a liberal and virtuous population. Time alone, and that well improved, by giving the Colombians good institutions,

and affording them good examples, and a frequent intercourse with enlightened strangers, can, by degrees, introduce among them the elements of knowledge, and raise them to that high state of mind which is capable of appreciating freedom.

Who, in Colombia, is able to prescribe wise laws? Who is able to make the people see their use; or to persuade or compel them to obey them? Who can be found there to support such laws in opposition to his own individual interest? Bolivar's example, had he been capable, would have gone a great way toward producing the happiest results. But, unfortunately for Colombia, and indeed for all the other Spanish republics, Bolivar has neither virtue, firmness, nor talent sufficient to raise himself above his own sphere of mediocrity, passion, ambition, and vanity. He is far from being competent to lay a foundation for good laws, schools, useful institutions, and a flourishing commerce. Had he been fit for these things, he would long since have invited and protected strangers, and encouraged agriculture, in a country where soil and climate combine to lighten the labour of man, and to multiply the comforts of life. He would have encouraged commerce, instead of depressing it. He would have made it the interest of the clergy to inspire the people, who are devoted to them, with the principles of morality, union, and patriotism. He would have insisted upon the freedom of religious opinion, and protected the people in the use of all the means necessary for the enjoyment of it. He would have consulted men of experience and virtue; and surrounded himself with men of talents and probity.

But what has this man done during the last four years, that is, since 1824, when Colombia was cleared of the last Spanish troops? Instead of remaining in his native country and employing all the means in his power to establish a solid government, we see him, even as early as 1822, seeking a new field for his ambition, a new scene of what he deems glory. He goes to the South, overruns a new country, destroys the congress in Peru, and places himself there, at the head of a despotic military government, renewing the dictatorial excesses of 1813 and 14 in Venezuela. By force of arms he detaches a portion of Peru, calls it the republic of Bolivia, and gives it a monarchical constitution, of which he is the president and protector. When he saw that his protectorship was going the wrong way, he thought of no remedy but a timely retreat, the expedient he had always been accustomed to resort to. He retired to Guayaquil, whence, as I have been well informed, he secretly sent out emissaries to Valencia, Caracas, Porto Cabello, and Carthagena. Paez having openly raised the standard of revolt against the existing constitutional form of government, Bolivar adroitly seized this pretext to name himself dictator, annulled all congressional forms, assumed all the powers to himself; and passing over to Valencia, held secret conferences with Paez, and his old and intimate friend, Dr. Miguel Penna, and not only left Paez unpunished, but confirmed him in his post.

Bolivar is suddenly struck with conviction of the necessity of a reform and a change in the constitution of Colombia! The national convention assembles at

cana. During their session, Bolivar, some leagues off, surveys their operations with an anxious and jealous eye. The result is too well known. The convention expires, and Bolivar, become its substitute, is compensated for all his restless nights and his sorrow; and sits upon his throne, with the title of "Supreme Chief, President Liberator!"*

Such is the political life of the cunning Simon Bolivar. His favourite rule is, to do every thing by himself; and he has acted upon it,—overturning or transforming every thing. At the head of the twelve departments, he placed, under the name of intendants, military chieftains, the greatest part of whom were totally unacquainted with any kind of administration whatever. He made Soublette intendant of Caracas; Marinno, of Maturin, and so on. He has destroyed the little commerce of the country by heavy imposts, by his famous decree on patents, by his not admitting of the Colombian *vales* in the public treasury, by imposing arbitrary taxes upon merchants, and incarcerating foreigners, (which he did at Laguaira and Caracas in the beginning of 1816,) and refusing to hear their just representations. Agriculture and national industry have been destroyed by his campaigns in Peru, and by the numerous levies recently made, by way of preparation against a new attack of the Spanish, expected from Cuba, against Colombia.

The finances are so ruined that Bolivar knows not how, any longer, to pay the interest of the English loan, and keep the national credit even up to its present

* See Appendix, documents Nos. 11 and 12.

sunken state. Thus has he destroyed the welfare of Colombia, and ruined Peru; and should he appear elsewhere, his appearance would produce the same result.

But the worst of Bolivar's acts is the last, where he has thrown off his flimsy mask, and declared that "bayonets are the best, the only rulers of nations." This pernicious example, it is to be feared, will be followed by other chieftains in the new Spanish republics.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Fundamental Law of the Republic of Colombia.

THE sovereign Congress of Venezuela, whose authority has been voluntarily recognised by the people of New Grenada, liberated by the arms of the republic, considering,

1. That the provinces of Venezuela and New Grenada, united in a single republic, possess all the requisites for attaining the highest degree of power and prosperity:

2. That, if formed into distinct republics, though united by the closest ties, far from profiting by their great advantages, they could, with difficulty, give stability to, and command respect for, their authority:

3. That these truths, being deeply impressed upon the minds of all men of superior talent and sound patriotism, have determined the governments of the two republics to agree upon their union, hitherto obstructed by the vicissitudes of war.

Wherefore, actuated by necessity and mutual interest, and conforming to the report of a special committee of deputies from New Grenada and Venezuela,

In the name, and under the protection of the Almighty, they have decreed, and do hereby decree, the following *Fundamental Law* of the Republic of Colombia:—

Article 1. The Republics of Venezuela and New Grenada are henceforth united in one, under the glorious title of the Republic of Colombia.

2. Its territory shall comprehend the former captain-generalship of Venezuela, and the viceroyalty of New Grenada, comprising an extent of a hundred and fifteen thousand square leagues, the precise limits whereof shall be fixed hereafter.

3. The debts contracted separately by the two republics are hereby consolidated as a *national debt of Colombia*, for the payment of which all the property of the state is pledged, and the most productive branches of the public revenue shall be appropriated.

4. The executive power of the republic shall be vested in a president; and, in the case of vacancy, in the vice-president, both to be provisionally appointed by the present congress.

5. The Republic of Colombia shall be *(pro tempore)* divided into the three great departments of Venezuela, Quito, and Cundinamarca; comprising the provinces of New Grenada, which denomination is henceforth abolished; and their capitals shall be the cities of Caracas, Quito, and Bogotá, (the adjunct, Santa Fé, being annulled.)

6. Each department shall have a superior administration, with a chief, to be appointed for the present by the congress, and entitled a Vice-President.

7. A new city, to be called Bolivar, in honour of the assertor of the public liberty, shall be the capital of the Republic of Colombia—the place and situation to be fixed on by the first general congress, upon the principle of adapting it to the exigencies of the departments, and to the future grandeur to which nature has destined this opulent country.

8. The general congress of Colombia shall assemble on the first day of January, 1821, in the town of Rosario de Cucuta, which, from various circumstances, is considered the most eligible situation. It shall be convened by the president of the republic on the first day of January, 1821, who shall communicate such regulations concerning elections, as may be adopted by a special committee, and approved by the present congress.

9. The constitution of the Republic of Colombia shall be formed by the general congress, to which shall be admitted, in the form of a plan, the constitution decreed by the present congress, which, together with the laws enacted by that body, shall be provisionally carried into execution.

10. The arms and flag of Colombia shall be determined on by the general congress, and in the mean time those of Venezuela being most known, shall continue to be used.

11. The present congress shall adjourn on the 15th January, 1820, after which the new elections to the general congress of Colombia shall be made.

12. A committee of six members and a president shall replace the congress, whose particular power and duties shall be regulated by a decree.

13. The Republic of Colombia shall be solemnly proclaimed throughout the towns and armies, accompanied by public festivals and rejoicings; and this ceremony shall take place in the capital, on the 25th of the present month, in commemoration of the birth of the Saviour of the world, through whose especial favour this wished-for union, regenerating the state, has been obtained.

14. The anniversary of this political regeneration shall be perpetually celebrated with the solemnities of a national festival. The present fundamental law of the Republic of Colombia shall be solemnly promulgated throughout the towns and armies; inscribed on all the public records, and deposited in all the archives of societies, municipalities, and corporations, both clerical and secular.

Given at the Palace of the Sovereign Congress of Venezuela, in

the city of St. Thomas de Angostura, on the 17th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1819, and ninth of independence.

Francisco Antonio Zea, *President of the Congress*; Juan German Roscio, Antonio M. Briceno, Ignacio Munas Manuel Sedenno, Euscbio Afanador, Onofre Bazal, Juan Martinez, Francisco Conde, Domingo Arzura, Jose Espana, Diego Bautista Urbaneja, Jose Thomas Machado, Luis Thomas Poraza, Juan Vincente Cardosa, Ramon Garcia Gadiz. *Diego de Vallenilla*, Deputy and Secretary.

No. II.

Fundamental Law of the Union of the People of Colombia.

We, the Representatives of the people of New Grenada and Venezuela, in General Congress assembled,

Having carefully considered the fundamental law of the Republic of Colombia, passed by the Congress of Venezuela at the city of St. Thomas de Angostura, on the 17th day of December, A. D. 1819, are of opinion,

1. That united in one republic, the provinces of Venezuela and New Grenada, possess all the means and faculties necessary to place them in the most elevated state of power and prosperity.

2. That constituted into separate republics, however closely bound by the ties of union, they would find it difficult to give stability to their sovereignty, or inspire respect for it.

3. That deeply penetrated by these advantages, all men of superior intelligence, and distinguished patriotism, have declared that the governments of the two republics should form an union, which the vicissitudes of war have hitherto prevented.

4. Finally, that the same considerations of reciprocal intercourse, and a necessity most manifest, had made it obligatory on the Congress of Venezuela, to anticipate this measure, which has been approved in the most authoritative manner by the unanimous votes of the people of both countries

In the name and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, they have decreed, and do boldly decree, the solemn ratification of the *Fundamental Law of the Republic of Colombia*, which has been before mentioned, in the following manner:—

Art. 1. The people of New Grenada and Venezuela to be united in one national body, founded on a compact, which determines that the government is now, and ever shall be, *popular and representative*.

2. This new nation shall be known and denominated by the title of the *Republic of Colombia*.

3. The Colombian nation is, and shall for ever be, irrevocably free and independent of the Spanish monarchy, and of every other foreign power or domination; nor shall it ever be the patrimony of any family or person.

4. The supreme national power shall always be separately exercised, and divided into legislative, executive, and juridical.

5. The territory of the Republic of Colombia shall comprehend all that was within the ancient captain-generalship of Venezuela, and the viceroyalty of New Grenada; but reserving for a more suitable time their precise demarcation.

6. For the more advantageous administration of the republic, its territory shall, for the present, be divided into six or more departments, each bearing a particular name, with a subordinate administration, dependent on the national government.

7. The present Congress of Colombia shall form the constitution of the republic, in conformity with the sentiments here expressed, upon those liberal principles which have been consecrated by the wise practice of other free nations.

8. They recognise *in consolidum* as the national debt of *Colombia*, all the debts which the two people have separately contracted, and for which they make responsible all the property of the republic.

9. The congress shall, in the mode that may be found convenient, appropriate the most productive branches of the public revenue, the taxes, and a special sinking fund created for the purpose, for the redemption of the principal, and for paying the interest of the public debt.

10. In more favourable circumstances there shall be erected a new city, with the name of the Liberator, *Bolivar*, which shall be the capital of the Republic of Colombia. The plan and site shall be determined by congress, on the principle of accommodation to the convenience of the different parts of this vast territory, and the grandeur to which this territory is destined by nature.

11. Meanwhile, until congress shall establish the distinctive insignia, and the flag of Colombia, the actual flags of New Grenada and Venezuela shall be continued in use.

12. The ratification of the establishment of the Colombian republic, and the publication of the constitution shall be celebrated in the towns and in the armies, with festivity and public rejoicings, making known in all places, the solemnity of the day on which the constitution is promulgated.

13. There shall be, perpetually, a national festival, for three days in each year, upon which shall be celebrated the *Anniversary*:

1. Of the *emancipation and independence* of the people of Colombia:

2. The *union* in one republic, and the *establishment* of the constitution:

3. The great *triumphs* and splendid *victories* by which we have *conquered* our enemies, and *secured* these blessings.

Art. 14. The national festival shall be celebrated every year on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of December, consecrating each day to the special remembrance of one of those three glorious causes, and in particular, to that of the *virtues*, the *intelligence*, and the *services* rendered to the country.

The present fundamental law of the union of the people of Colombia, shall be solemnly promulgated in the towns, and in the armies; inscribed on the public registers and deposited in all the archives of the cabildos and corporations, civil and ecclesiastical; and shall be communicated to the supreme executive power by a special deputation.

Done in the place of the general Congress of Colombia, in the town of Rosario de Cucuta, the 12th of July, A. D. 1821, twelfth year of independence.

JOSE IGNACIO MARQUES, *President.*
ANTONIO M. BRICENO, *Vice-President.*

Felix Restrepo, Manuel M. Guijano, Pedro F. Carbajal, Jose Cornelius Vallaria, Casimiro Calvo, Miguel Ibanez, Francisco de Orbegogo, Carlos Alvarez, Diego F. Gomez, Lorenzo St. Ander, Juan B. Esteves, Jose Antonio Yanes, Andreas Rojas, Bernardino Tovar, Jose Antonio Paredes, Gabriel Briceno, Louis Ignacio Mendoza, Toaquin Plata, Jose Prudencia Lanz, Jose Manuel Restropo, Francisco Jose Olero, Miguel Tobar, Jose J. Borrero, Salvador Camacho, Jose A. Mendoza, Vincente Azuero, Nic. Ballen De Guzman, Sinforoso Mutis, Domingo B. Briceno, Jose Felix Blanco, Ildefonso Mendez, Vincente Borrero, Mariano Escobar, Diego B. Urbaneja, Francisco Coado, Jose M. Hinestrosa, Arbellon Urbina, Jose Ignacio Balbuena, Jose Gabriel de Alcala, Francisco Gomez, Miguel Pena, Fernando Penalver, Ramon Ignacio Mendez, Toaquin F. Soto, Pacifico Taime, Juan Ronderos, Manuel Reuiles, Policarpo Uricoichea, Alexandro Osorio, Pedro Gual Miguel de Zarraga.

Deputy and Secretary, Miguel Santamaria,
Deputy and Secretary, Francisco Soto.

This instrument was further signed by the ministers of the interior, and the Vice-President, H. Ander, and so promulgated —the constitution being formed in conformity thereto.

No. III.

The territory of the republic of Colombia is divided by the last law of Bogota, June 23, 1824, into twelve departments, forty-nine provinces, two hundred and eighteen cantons, which division is maintained up to the present day, namely:

Department.	*Capital or Residence of the Intendant.*	*Province.*	*Residence of the Governor.*
1° Orinoco	Cumana	Cumana	Cumana
		Barcelona	Barcelona
		Margarita	Asuncion
		Guayana	Angostura
2° Venezuela	Caracas	Caracas	Caracas
		Carabobo	Valencia

Department.	Capital, or Residence of the Intendant.	Province.	Residence of the Governor.	No. of Cant.
3 Apure	Barinas	Barinas Obispos Mijagual Guanarita Nutrias San Jaime Guanare Ospinos Araure Pedraza	Barinas	
4 Zulia	Maracaybo	Maracaybo Coro Merida Trujillo	Maracaybo Coro Merida Trujillo	
5 Boyaca	Tunja	Tunja Pamplona Socorro Casanare	Tunja Pamplona Socorro Pore	
6 Cundinamarca	Bogota	Bogota Antioquia Mariquita Neyva	Bogota Antioquia Mariquita Neyva	25
7 Magdalena	Carthagena	Carthagena Santa Martha Rio Hacha	Carthagena Santa Martha Rio Hacha	23
8 Cauca	Popayan	Popayan Choco Pasto Buenaventura	Popayan Quibdo Pasto Iscuande	21
9 Isthmus	Panama	Panama Veragua	Panama Veragua	10
10 Equator	Quito	Pinchinca Imbabura Chimborazo	Quito Ibarra Riobamba	18
11 Assuay	Cuenca	Cuenca Loja Bracamoros y Mainas	Cuenca Loja Jaen	11
21 Guayaquil	Guayaquil	Guayaquil Manabi	Guayaquil Puerto Viejo	9

No. IV.

Decree to unite, in the departments and provinces, the military command with the civil authority, &c. in one and the same person.

SIMON BOLIVAR, &c.

As it is highly requisite, for the solidity and the honour of the republic, to avoid expences in the present state wherein the public revenues suffice not to cover the public expenses of the administration, and, as it is wished to put a stop to disputes which embarrass the public service, and the good administration in the

departments; and both aims being attainable, by assigning the military command to the individual entrusted with the civil authority in the departments and provinces, and in virtue of the extraordinary power granted to the executive of the republic by the decree of the 23d inst.; I have decreed the following:

Art. 1. The military command shall be united with the civil authority in all the departments and provinces in which the government judges it to be convenient.

Art. 2 If the government should not have named the person who should have the civil authority in the departments and provinces, in which case the laws name the receivers of the departments, and the political chiefs *(gefes politicos)* in the capitals as authorised to take the military command; in default of these, then the civil authorities shall be conferred on the judges, or, in their absence, on the political chiefs of the capital, &c.

No. V.

Decree by which Simon Bolivar assumed the dictatorial power.

Simon Bolivar, Libertador, Presidente de Colombia, &c. Teniendo in consideracion:

1. El estado de agitacion en que actualmente se encuentra la republica, despues de los sucesos de Venezuela, dividida en opiniones sobre el regimen politico y alarmada con el temor de una guerra civil, y de una invasion exterior de parte de los enemigos comunes;

2. Que positivamente hay datos fundados para temer que el gobierno Espanol intente renovar las hostilidades con las fuerzas que reune en la isla de Cuba.

3. Que la mayor parte de los departamentos ha manifestado su opinion, de que el Presidente de la Republica se revista de cuantas facultades extraordinarias sean indispensables para restablecer la integridad nacional y salvar a Colombia de la guerra civil, y de la guerra exterior!

4. Que ya el poder executivo ha declarado en el caso del articulo 128 de la constitucion, y, en consecuencia ha convocado oportunamente el Congreso; y deseando por una parte corresponder a la confianza de los pueblos, y por otra conservar la constitucion actual, hasta tanto que la nacion por los medios legitimos y competentes provea a su reforma, oido el consejo de gobierno; venido en decretar y decreta;

Art. 1. Desde en adelante, estoy como presidente de la republica, en el caso del articulo 28 de la constitucion y en el ejercicio de todas las facultades extraordinarias que de el emanan; tanto para restablecer la tranquilidad interior como para asegurar la republica contra la anarquia y la guerra exterior.

Art. 2. En mi ausencia de esta capital, el vice-presidente de la republica, como que queda encargado del poder ejecutivo, ejercera

dichas facultades extraordinarias en todo el territorio en que yo no las pudiere ejercer immediatamente.

Art. 3. Fuera de los objetos, y casos que se determinaran para el ejercicio de las expresadas facultades extraordinarias, la constitucion y las leyes tendran su debido cumplimiento.

Art. 4. Se dara cuenta al Congreso proximo de todo lo que se ejecutare en virtud del presente decreto, segun lo dispone el mencionado articulo 128 de la constitucion.

El secretario de Estado del despacho del interior queda encargado de comunicarlo y de velar en su ejecucion.

Dado y firmado de mi mano y refrendado por el secretario de estado del despacho del interior, en Bogotá a 23 de Noviembre de 1826. *Simon Bolivar.*

El secretario de estado del despacho del interior, *Jose M. Restrepo.*

No. VI.

Simon Bolivar, &c.

No bastando las rentas de propios de los diferentes cantones de la republica para los gastos ordinarios, *y no conviniendo por ahora gravar a los pueblos* con nuevas imposiciones municipales que *excitan quejas por todas partes*, en uso de las facultades extraordinarias que residen en el Gobierno, he venido en decretar lo que sigue:

—Art. 1. Queda suspenso el establecimiento de jueces letrados de primera instancia en todos los cantones de la Republica, y los nombrados por el Poder Ejecutivo cesaran en sus funciones.

2. Los Alcaldes municipales continuaran con arreglo a la ley administrando la justicia civil y criminal en primera instancia, lo mismo que lo hacian antes de que hubiera jueces letrados, y conforme a lo prevenido en la ley de 11 de Mayo de 1825, para el caso de que no los haga.

3. Los Alcaldes municipales pondran el mayor cuidado en administrar pronta y cumplidamente la justicia tanto civil como criminal y en perseguir los reos para que se les imponga el condigno castigo, sobre lo cual velara muy cuidadosamente el Poder Ejecutivo para que se les castigue a los omisos, o negligentes.

4. El presente decreto se cumplira, sin embargo de cuales quiera disposiciones que sean contrarias.

El secretario de estado del despacho del interior queda encargado de la ejecucion de este decreto. Dado en Bogotá a 24 de Noviembre de 1826. Simon Bolivar.—El secretario de estado del despacho del interior, Jose M. Restrepo.

No. VII.

Decree urging the Execution of the Law of 22d May, 1827, in favour of the Public Credit.

SIMON BOLIVAR, &c.

Siendo un deber sagrado en que esta constituida la Republica de asegurar el pago de los intereses de su deuda, para restablecer su credito y contribuir a su prosperidad y engrandecimiento, y teniendo en consideracion que nada puede contribuir tanto a la consecucion de estos fines saludables como el llenar a efecto la ley sancionada en 22 de Mayo de este ano, que ha mandado hacer una anticipacion a los fondos del credito nacional;—he venido en decretar y decreto lo que sigue:

1. La ley de 22 de Mayo de este ano sera exacta y rigidamente ejecutada en todos los departamentos de la Republica, de modo que las sumas mandadas anticipar esten entegramente colectadas en todo el mes de Diciembre proximo, a mas tardar.

2. Los intendentes y gobernadores cuidaran de evitar en sus respectivos distritos, toda fraude contra la ley, y toda parcialidad en las asignaciones.

3. Los encargados de su ejecucion en todas sus partes, sufriran, en el caso de no llenar sus respectivas obligaciones, las penas contenidas en decreto de esta fecha.

El secretario de estado del despacho de Hacienda queda encargado de la ejecucion de este decreto. Dado en Bogotá, capital de la Republica, a 23 de Noviembre de 1826. Simon Bolivar.—El secretario de estado del despacho de hacienda, Jose M. del Castillo.

No. VIII.

Decree to suppress the Frauds committed against the Public Treasury.

SIMON BOLIVAR, &c.

Siendo como son tan comunes y escandolosos los fraudes que se cometen contra las rentas nacionales; y conviniendo refrenar una propension que tanto relaja la moral publica y disminuye tan considerablemente los ingresos del tesoro; he venido en decretar y decreto lo que sigue.

Art. 1. Todo defraudador de las rentas del Estado queda sujeto a la pena de perdimiento de las mercadorias, generos efectos en que haga o pretenda hacer la defraudacion, y en la de presidio de seis hasta diez anos con las costas del proceso.

Art. 2. Son defraudadores en el sentido del articulo anterior:

1st. Los que importaren, exportaren o internaren mercaderias, frutos y efectos extrangeros, eludiendo su presentacion en las aduanas para no pagar los derechos establecidos.

2d. Los que introdujeren por los puertos de la Republica mercaderias, frutos, o efectos de prohibida introducion.

3d. Los que, contra la prohibicion de las leyes, pretendan exportar furtivamente los metales prohibidos.

4th. Los cultivadores, vendedores y conductores do tabacos contra las instrucciones del ramo, o sia los requisitos que ellas prescriben.

5th. Los destiladores clandestinos, y sendedores por menor de aguardientes, sin las licencias que determina la ley.

Art. 3. En la pena de perdimiento, se comprende el buque, carruage o caballerias, y la de los utensilios, vasijas y apara. Los en que se cometa el fraude. Los encubridores, fautores o receptadores del fraude estan sujetos a las mismas penas.

Art. 4. Los aprehensores de cualquiera clase, sean o nó empleados, hacen suyo quanto aprehendan, deduciendose unicamente las costas procesales, y los derechos de aduanas. Si fuere tabaco lo aprehendido, lo tomara la renta al precio a que cueste en cada administracion, el cual sera pagado fiel e inmediatamente al aprehensor.

Art. 5. Los juicios por la imposicion de estas penas, seran sumarios: e instruira los procesos el administrador, o colector del ramo, o el comandante, o uno de los ayudantes del resguardo; y se reducira al acto de aprehension debidamente calificado con un numero plural de testigos, deben ser examinados en un solo acto.

Art. 6. En virtud de estas deliquencias que se pasaran immediatamente al juez de hacienda, pronunciara este la sentencia que sera ejecutada, y llevada a efecto.

Art. 7. Todo descuido o connivencia de parte de los empleados o del juez, sera viremisiblemente castigado con las penas que perscribe el decreto de esta fecha.

El secretario de estado del despacho de hacienda queda encargado de la ejecucion de este decreto. Dado en Bogotá, capital de la Republica, a 23 de Noviembre, de 1826. *Simon Bolivar.*

El secretario de estado del despacho de hacienda, *Jose M. Del Castillo.*

No. IX.

*Memoir of the Marquis of Torre Tagle, late President of Peru.**

The public man is not master of his actions: he is obliged to answer for his proceedings, and give an account of his conduct. The country in which he has served is deserving of his consideration, and of his best wishes. Mine will always be directed towards the felicity of Peru.

* This remarkable document will prove by facts, how General Bolivar has acted in Peru. The author of it is generally known as an honest, upright, and respectable man, whom Bolivar and his adherents have tried to pass as a traitor, and an agent of the holy alliance.

At the time when I received the supreme command of Peru, (called independent), many remarkable circumstances took place, for the explanation of which it is painful to my feelings of delicacy to find it indispensable to publish some confidential communications of General Bolivar, which never would have been divulged, had not the attempt been made through them to sully my honour. In such a case I am not constrained to maintain a reserve and delicacy which would dishonour myself, and which has not been observed towards me. I shall not pause to show the strong interest I have felt in endeavouring to prevent the misfortunes of Peru. I received the supreme military command in Callao, in July, 1823, and this was the greatest proof of my devotion to the felicity of the country. I considered it absolutely a sacrifice, from the time General Bolivar ordered forces to occupy it, before they had been required by Don Jose de La Riva Aguero; since, on the arrival of General Portacarrero at Guayaquil, transports were ready with troops to be disembarked at Callao, without consulting the wish of the Peruvians. From that time the extermination of the country was decreed; and it was my duty to omit no means to free her from slavery. I accepted the command on this account, provisionally, although there were scarcely any resources in the capital to maintain the troops, or sustain the civil list, notwithstanding I attended to every thing in the best manner possible. I was exceedingly desirous that the congress, selecting a worthy citizen, would relieve me from the administration, from which it had exonerated Don Jose de La Riva Aguero. But this body having been violently dissolved in Truxillo, I conceived it my duty to continue at my post, in order to re-establish, at all hazards, the legislative assembly. But how could this be effected without Peruvian forces, and only with auxiliaries who would take no part in internal dissensions? I was persuaded that it should be done, and immediately effected it, without any other protection than that of my own courage and that of my friends. I re-established the congress, I saved several of the deputies, and secretly gloried in actions which I conceived to be good, and, at that time, most useful to the country.

Bolivar arrives at Callao the 1st September, and the torch of civil discord is immediately lighted; every thing appears to him wrong, and he does not hesitate to declare to the committee of the congress, who wished to congratulate him, that "*general and radical reform was necessary;*" that is to say, that he considered himself capable of dictating the law to the congress. He did not deceive *himself;* terror was disseminated; and this body only thought of discovering the will of Bolivar, in order to comply with it. He is invested with the supreme, military, civil, and dictatorial command, degrading the authority which the same congress had conferred upon me, and scattering the seeds of division between the executive power and a foreign and absolute authority. Large contributions are decreed beyond the capacity and fortune of the inhabitants; extensive loans are received, which

are al employed in procuring excellent clothing for the auxiliary troops, and supplying punctually their wants and their pay, these troops being constantly attended to in preference to the Peruvians.

It would be difficult to conceive how much I had to suffer and dissemble, from the imperious and overbearing manner of Bolivar, in carrying into effect all his ideas, without regard to the means; and how much I was compelled to tolerate, not only from him, but Colonels Heres and Perez, the two springs he constantly moved to molest, at every moment, the government, which was studious to observe towards him the greatest obsequiousness.

Notwithstanding this, I conceived myself obliged to make these sacrifices for Peru, in order to preserve a semblance of her proper authority, which might hereafter be opposed to the dreadful measures which were commencing against the natives of the country, and which every day would increase.

Before Bolivar went to the northern coast to pacify those provinces, he verbally charged me to be most rigorous towards all the party of Rivas Aguero, and to spare none of their lives; he ordered that all this party should instantly disappear, to avoid the evils resulting from delay.

Don Jose de la R—— A——, being taken with some others, in Truxillo, by Colonel La Fuente, he imparted the event to the government, who transmitted it to the congress, without asking any punishment. The congress, by their reply and former decrees, placed me under the necessity of giving an order for the execution of R—— A——, and some of his principal followers; but I consoled myself with the idea that they would have left Truxillo before the order would reach there.

I communicated my sentiments to Bolivar on this subject, in a letter which I wrote him the 5th of December, and which is amongst the justificatory documents, (No. 1.)

The resolutions on the fate of De La R—— A——, and the other prisoners, emanated from the congress and not from myself. I gave them sufficient opportunity to reverse the decree which the legislative body had passed on the 8th of August, and I did not oppose the idea of La Fuente, that they should be banished to Chili. The congress resolved to enforce the punishment of a crime which had been classified by the law, and it was not in my power to prevent it.

On this occasion I shall merely state, that the imputation cast upon the government of having sent an individual to Truxillo, for the purpose of poisoning R—— A—— is false; whatever this individual said, or was compelled to say, is false, and no member of the government had any share in it. The said individual was only known by his activity in introducing communications, as he had done in Lima, when Callao was besieged by the Spanish army. He was afterwards sent for to convey four letters to Truxillo, for the purpose of exciting an insurrection in that city, for which he received only fifty dollars, drawn from the public treasury. Who could believe that for so small a sum he could be induced to un-

dertake such an enterprise as this? Who could believe that the government would, for a moment, suppose that an individual unknown to R—— A—— could obtain an easy introduction into his domestic service." This very contemptible calumny did, notwithstanding, at the time, obtain general currency.

General Bolivar having been informed of the immediate execution he had commanded of the orders of congress against R—— A——, and the other principal persons taken with him, replied to the minister of war, who, at that time, also filled the department of state, in the liberal terms which appear in paper No. 2, dated Caxamarca, 14th of December, 1823.

From this letter we will make the following observations: First, that General Bolivar wished not only all the partisans of R—— A——, but all the Spaniards who should be found in the capital, to be immediately put to death.*

Secondly, that he ordered the battalion of Vargas to march out immediately to the mountains, and to be replaced in Callao by that of the Rio de la Plata. That body was in the mountains where the negotiations commenced with the Spaniards. General Bolivar suggested the idea, but did not wish to appear publicly in it, perhaps in order to induce the belief that the government was selling the country, and he saved it by triumphing over the Spaniards, without fulfilling any promises towards them; but the government sustained its character of justice, honour, and interest for Peru, as might be expected.

Under date of the 18th of January, General Bolivar wrote me the letter, (No. 3,) by which he recommends to my notice most strenuously a very important affair which he had communicated, under the same date, to Colonel Heres. It was this that was contained in the letter of his then secretary, Espinar, (No. 4,) the original of which was confided to me by the said colonel, in confidence, and which was returned to him after being copied.

As soon as I was informed of all, the minister of war, Colonel Heres, and myself, endeavoured to carry into effect the project of General Bolivar, as he did not wish to appear publicly in it; I wrote, with their common consent, to the president of the congress, the note No. 5, which was replied to by a note of approbation, under the supposition that the government was acquainted with the wish of Bolivar in this particular. The letter which I wrote to Bolivar on the 16th of January, refers to this circumstance, and is marked No. 6; and that of Colonel Heres of the 15th of the same month, (No. 7,) is a farther corroboration of all that has been said, and shows my wish to agree with him in this business even in the most minute points.

Under such circumstances, and charged with accelerating the

* This corroborates perfectly what I have stated in Chap. VII. of these Memoirs, of cold-blooded butchery of more than 1200 Spaniards, and Isleno in Laguaira and Caracas, executed by Bolivar's order.---AUTHOR.

said negociation, Colonel Perez arrived at Lima from Pativilca; the secretary of General Bolivar, who had a conference with myself and the secretary of war, on the 17th of January, according to the document No. 8. He then observed, if the Spaniards should not wish to treat on the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, the said general proposed a particular one with Peru; and thus it was confidently resolved upon. In consequence of all this, the respective persons were delegated under this date, the official letter (No 9) written to General La Serna, and instructions given to the minister plenipotentiary, as appears from the papers Nos. 10 and 11.

The minister set off to Xauja at that time, and entered that town on the 26th of January. He learnt there, from Field-Marshall Don Juan Antonio Monet, that, on the following day, General Soriga, chief of the staff, would come from Ituancayo, on the part of the commander-in chief, to have an interview with the said minister, and to receive the despatches, two of which were in fact delivered to him, for the viceroy La Serna, (Nos. 9 and 12,) accompanied by the official despatch and letter for his Excellency General Canserac, Nos. 13 and 14, the replies to which are Nos. 15 and 16.

The conference with General Soriga was altogether of a private nature, as he declared from the beginning that La Serna alone could give a definitive answer. In this conference, as in all the others, the minister proceeded to establish negociations exclusively on the basis of independence, and he there solicited, as had been proposed by General Bolivar, in case of being refused an assent to the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, a particular treaty of union and friendship might be concluded with Peru, on the basis of independence.

Having punctually given to General Bolivar an account of all that had been doing, he wrote me a letter of approbation, (No. 17.) By this letter it appears, that all that I did on this subject was with his knowledge and concurrence; and all that the minister proposed had been previously arranged without his deviating in the slightest respect from his instructions.

There was only one difference—General Bolivar was not desirous that a convention should be formed with the Spaniards, even upon the basis of independence; he wished to propose a thing that was not to be fulfilled, whilst I was always resolved to proceed with good faith, to comply exactly with my duty, and to restore peace to Peru by the sincere union of Spaniards and Peruvians.

Who would not esteem this conduct the most honourable and beneficial to the country? If the end of this war was to gain independence, and if this could be obtained without the effusion of blood, and without aggerating the sacrifices of a devastated territory, why did General Bolivar wish to risk the object by the uncertain result of a battle? Why was the greatest part of the Peruvian army to perish, which should serve as the defence of this

soil? Why in case the forces of Colombia should triumph, should this country remain at the mercy of Bolivar, for him exclusively to decide on its fate and destiny? What honourable man, in my case, would have performed so rash and desperate a part?

My desire was to terminate the war. The congress wished the same thing, as manifested sufficiently in the order of the 14th of last January, (No. 8.)

I am certain that my conduct in this particular could only appear bad to General Bolivar, and to his ambitious satellites, but to no other people or inhabitants of the world. Before God and man, my conscience tells me I have proceeded with rectitude. I owed much to the people for having reposed their confidence in me. I fulfilled my obligations on this account, by exerting myself for their good and prosperity, at the expense of a thousand risks and sacrifices. At some future period, my actions will be properly estimated, and an impartial posterity, not agitated by the passions of deluded, ungrateful, and intriguing men, will do me justice.

I was anxiously expecting a reply from his excellency the viceroy, on the negociations above-mentioned, when the troops which garrisoned the castles of Callao, refused obedience to the independent authorities. This happened three days after the minister of war had returned from Xauja to Lima; and the enemies of order, well satisfied that the government had no part in this revolution, endeavoured to throw the suspicions on him. As I had no previous intimation of this charge, I confidently believed, and many others believed, that it was a political and military stratagem General Bolivar made use of, with the double object of overthrowing the government, which he could not decorously attack, and beating the Spanish forces which might advance to the assistance of the castles.

Many circumstances concurred to give plausibility to this presumption. General Bolivar not only charged me expressly from Caxamarca, under date of the 12th of last December, that the battalion of Vargas should leave Callao to be replaced by that of Buenos Ayres, but in his letter of the 7th of January of the same year, (No. 19,) in which he mentions his having been informed of the insurrection of the grenadiers of that body in Lima, he orders the battalion of Vargas to be ready to march, as was afterwards done, and that Callao should be defended by the troops of Peru and the Rio de la Plata.

Colonel Heres, on the 9th of the same month, in his letter, (No. 20,) recommends to me very particularly, from Bolivar, his orders contained in his official letter of the 11th of December, from Caxamarca, that is to say, the same order with regard to the charge of battalions; and advises that all the royalists, all factious individuals, and the followers of Riva Aguera, should be shot—not only were the troops distributed according to the directions of General Bolivar, but, some days previous to the insurrection at Callao, General Alvrado was named by him governor of that place. Colonel Valdivieso, who was really the governor, was removed,

without cause or just motive. The same thing had happened a few days previously, at the request of the general-in-chief of the army of the centre, Don Henriquez Martinez, to the commander of one of the forts, Don Francisco Cabero and Sifuentis.

This extraordinary combination of simultaneous changes, offered presumptive evidence to my suspicion; and other things occurred to confirm it. Not being able to conceive that there was any neglect in the service of the castles, or in the administration of the corps, I was, moreover, astonished at not having received any information of it from the governor of the place; and that no commander or officer had made any discovery on this subject; and, finally, that the generals of the Andes were constantly encouraging expectations of recovering the castles. All this induced the belief that the twofold object of the revolution was to depose the government, and to defeat the Spaniards; more especially when the Colombian officer, Ugarte, the aide-de-camp to Colonel Heres, in passing over to the Spaniards, was found with either a true or forged passport from his colonel. Such a casualty induced a suspicion that Ugarte was carrying over an insidious and detailed information, and that the Spanish forces were speedily coming to Callao. Ultimately it has become notorious that the authors of the movements in Callao were only Colonel Moyano, and Lieutenant-Colonel Oliva, who had formed their plan without depending on any external assistance to realize the undertaking. After the loss of Callao, General Bolivar, trampling upon my authority, commissioned General Martinez to execute the premature measures which are contained in the copy No. 21, directed to the ministers at war, with the note, No. 22. As, according to received orders, Martinez was to cause the infantry to march instantly, the capital remaining unprotected and without the power of being garrisoned in a proper manner, I summoned a junta of generals; and, after having read the said instructions, I was of opinion the troops should not march, which was agreed upon by the junta. I thus saved the capital from the dreadful catastrophe which it would have suffered from the revolutions of General Bolivar—a service which is, perhaps, not properly appreciated, from its not being generally known.

In the meantime, Bolivar, separating himself entirely from the conduct of the government which still subsisted, and without any regard to the congress, directed, under the date of the 10th of February, to General Martinez, the scandalous note, (No. 23,) which he sent to the government with the official note, (No. 24.) The congress being consulted in all that had occurred, resolved upon what is contained in the order, (No. 25.)

The fulfilment of the determination of Bolivar was still suspended, when General Gamarra appears, commissioned to carry into effect the orders given to Martinez. The legislative body was informed of this circumstance, (the only superior authority whom I would acknowledge,) and they issued an order of suspension, which appears in the paper, (No. 26.) There was no

remedy; the President of Colombia required his mandates should be obeyed in Peru; and it was to be done. Invested now with a dictatorial character, without paying the least attention to the sanction of the representative authority, he names General Necochea civil and military chief of the capital, commanding him to fulfil his orders; in virtue of which appointment, with the consent of the congress, I delivered up the command to Necochea on the 17th of February, after having received the note, (No. 27.)

I thus terminated my career in the supreme government of Peru, called independent, which I had maintained with so much repugnance, and with the object alone of freeing the country from an obstructive authority. It was on this account I received the command at Callao from General Sucre, and that I did not renounce it on the arrival of Bolivar, although I was strongly urged to it by the deputy, Carrion.

When the congress, in naming Bolivar dictator, sent to know my wish by Don Arce, I replied that, as a public man, I would fulfil immediately whatever the Peruvian congress should resolve upon, in order that they should not think me ambitious of the command. In fact, I preserved the command whilst I thought it indispensable to preserve the country from being sacrificed. Lastly, when the government of the capital was offered me by the Spanish authorities I refused it, since there is at present no danger whatsoever, nor any absolute necessity for my services.

On my separation from the government, Bolivar determined to crown his work by ordering me to be arrested and shot, as well as many illustrious and respectable Peruvians, who, according to his opinion, might oppose his design. The Supreme Being has saved us and placed us under the protection of the national army. We will continually exert ourselves for the felicity of our country, to contribute to its increased prosperity, and to check the progress of the tyrant. His immeasurable ambition shall find no aliment in Peru, nor shall he ever domineer over its illustrious citizens.

It is as true that Bolivar has endeavoured to persecute, without cause, every Peruvian of talent, or who could make a figure, as that, when General La Fuente caused the last change in Truxillo, and was called the Pacificator of the North, Bolivar immediately determined to destroy him. La Fuente caused the Peruvian cuirassiers to sustain themselves against the hussars of the guard of Bolivar, who wished to trample upon them. From that time he determined to deprive him of the presidency of Truxillo, to separate him from the army, and to send him to Chili, under the miserable pretext which appears in his letter, No. 28. In this letter he also disapproves of the conduct observed towards Riva Aguero; yet it had his entire approbation, and he even wished it more rigorous, as appears from his official letter of the 14th of December, (No. 2.) As to General Santa Cruz, the said letter evinces sufficiently the ancient hatred that the President of Colombia felt for him, which he has subsequently expressed and manifested, by the repeated entreaties that General Sucre has

made to me, to cause himself and Santa Cruz to be tried by a council of war, on account of the late events of the south. The object of this was the destruction of Santa Cruz; and on this account I refused acceding to the proposal. I cherish the flattering idea that, during my government, in the most turbulent times, and in the midst of a civil war, Providence has not permitted a drop of human blood to be shed. Some rigid measures were indispensably taken to prevent our being devoured by anarchy; but every Peruvian was set at liberty, and restored to his home, before I gave up the command. I maintained my office without receiving a *real* of salary as supreme chief, in order that the most necessitous might be relieved—assisting many with my own fortune, and burthening myself to sustain the lustre of the rank which I had obtained. I believe my administration has been marked by mildness, justice, and disinterestedness; and if my government was not the best, my intentions were perfectly correct and pure. United now to the national army, our fates will always be the same. I shall never be dazzled by the false glare of chimerical ideas, which, bewildering the deluded people, only lead to their destruction, and to make the fortunes of a horde of adventurers. On every side we see nothing but ruin and misery. In the course of the war, who but those who called themselves defenders of the country, had ruined our fortunes, devastated our fields, relaxed our morals, oppressed and distressed the people? What has been the fruit of this revolution? What is the positive good that has resulted to the country? The total insecurity of property and individuals. I detest a system which has not for its object the general good, and which does not conciliate the interests of all the citizens.

Oh Peru! peaceable country, in which I first beheld the day; delightful country! that appears destined for the residence of the gods! Do not permit temples to tyranny to be raised within your limits, under the false pretext of liberty. Do not believe that your happiness is intended by a show of a false equality. From the instant you shall succumb, a colossal power will oppress you with the weight of a most cruel despotism. Already the people governed by Bolivar, groan under that weight; and if fate is favourable to him, all the other states of America will follow their unhappy example.

From the cordial and sincere union of Spaniards, every good may be expected; from Bolivar, desolation and death.

THE MARQUIS OF TORRE TAGLE.

Lima, March 16, 1824.

JUSTIFICATORY DOCUMENTS.

No. 1.]—Extract of a letter, of the 5th December, 1823, written by Don Jose Bernardo de Tagle, to General Simon Bolivar.

"I laid the communication of La Fuente before the congress, without giving any opinion respecting Riva Aguero, but only requesting their resolve in order to communicate it. The congress does not approve that Riva Aguero should go to Chili, and says that you and myself should determine on this subject. 'The law is clear, and the crimes of this unfortunate man determine his punishment.' I complied with what is due to justice; but I assure you that, after having been for many years a public character, and experienced the pain of being obliged to decide upon the fate of men, a day of greater unhappiness than was occasioned by deciding upon that of Riva Aguero, I have never in my life experienced. I believed that he must have set off for Chili, for certainly he would not have thought it prudent to wait there (at Truxillo) the determination of the congress. Anxiously do I wish to know the fate of that man."

No. 2.]—Head-quarters of the Libertador, Caxamarca, December 14, 1823. *To the Minister of War.* As I arrived yesterday without my secretary, he having been taken ill on the road, I addressed myself directly to your Excellency. I last night received the communications of his Excellency, to the 30th of last month, by which I have learnt the dislodgement of the expedition of Arica, and the suspicion that was entertained against the Vice-Admiral of Peru.*

As the brig Boyaca, with Captain Core, has arrived on the west of Huanchaco, with the object of sending assistance to the party of Riva Aguero, there is not the least doubt that hopes are entertained of keeping that party alive, though it appears almost extinct. Consequently, I have dictated measures for securing the vessels of Peru and Colombia, which might be attacked by the partisans of Riva Aguero, or by the Spanish squadron, consisting of four sail, of which I have been informed by the captain of the port of Callao, and by an original letter from his excellency, the president of the republic. The communications of yesterday have not failed to produce a very disagreeable impression upon me; they show me that obstacles are multiplying on every side to the liberty

* The government of Peru always entertained the best opinion of the vice-admiral. He was not accused of any thing in the communication to General Bolivar. It was only stated to him that a sergeant-major, who had come from the Chili expedition at Arica to Lima, had reported that the vice-admiral had burnt the provisions at that place, and was on his way to Huanchaco, with General Santa Cruz.

of Peru. The expedition of Chili is dispersed, and even returned to its country. Santa Cruz and his partisans entertain very sinister ideas; Guise the same. The factions of Lima are making great progress in Canta and Huarochiri. The expedition of Herrera sufficiently manifests the royalist party that predominates in Lima, in the most extraordinary manner.

Finally, the combination of yesterday's news is terrible, and scarcely leaves me any hopes of a favourable result to be wrested from misfortune, even by force; every thing threatens ruin in this country. Whilst I advance towards the north, the south falls into confusion; and when I return to the south, I am certain this part of the north will inevitably be thrown into the utmost disorder. Whatever direction I take, I meet with opposition. Who would have conceived that the party of Riva Aguero should be able to recruit accomplices by the attraction of an infamous piece of treason? Yet such is the situation of things. *It is my opinion, that if the government does not establish terrible measures against the royalists, and against factious individuals, Peru will be the victim of its own clemency.* The orders of the government as to Riva Aguero and his accomplices are very just, and very much to the point, and ought to be rigorously complied with; besides, *I am of opinion that the same orders should be extended to the other accomplices of Lima, and others of Riva Aguero's party, or that of the Spaniards. The government should demand from the congress terrible laws against conspirators, of whatever party they may be; and the government should cause these laws to be executed with inexorable rigour.* Peru is undermined by her enemies, and only a countermine can save her. I do not venture to dictate measures which I judge salutary, because I am not a Peruvian? and every thing I do is attributed to Colombia and sinister views. Let the relation of Herrera speak for itself, which declares that the contributions create enemies to Colombia; as if the contributions were for the use of Colombia alone, and did not belong to the expenses of Peru and its authorities. Before now I have repeated that I wished the government of Peru would incur the odium which will fall on me for these strong measures, and that I would do the rest. In proof of which, I have taken charge of this civil war, which certainly has been attended with its share of odium and calumny; but it was my duty to take charge of it, in order to save this country. Thanks to God! it has had a speedy result; but there will certainly be a reaction, if strong caustics are not applied to the gangrene that this domestic war has left. *To destroy the hostile and factious guerillas, the battalion Vargas should immediately march from Callao, towards Canta, to be replaced by the battalion of Rio de la Plata, or Chili, or by both, for the better preservation of the castles.* Let Colonel Cordero take the command of the guerillas of Sierra, against Xauja and Pasco, and let every assistance be given him for the subsistence and movement of his troops, or ample orders for supply wherever he may be.

"In this way the parties of Mancebo, Rinavilca, Carreno, and Vidal, will be destroyed, and the opponents of Villar will be silenced, who, on account of the hatred which is borne to him in the country, have been found by Rinavilca the opponents of legitimate government. I always thought Mancebo and Villar were bad men, and prejudicial to the country. If Colonel Cordero does not find subsistence for his battalion, let him scour the country to Caxatamba, and leave the force necessary to maintain order. From Huarochiri some troops of the line from Chili should proceed with the same object, which would also prevent the destruction of the Chilians in the climate of the coast. It is incredible how necessary it is to throw all our army amongst the mountains, to accustom them to marching, and to the climate of the country which is to be the scene of war. On the same account I ardently desire that all troops of Chili which may arrive on the coast of Peru, should move towards the mountains in any way and in any direction. Afterwards, they can be re-united and organized in the most convenient and best way possible. By this operation, the salvation of the Chilian troops will be obtained, and an expense saved the government which it is not able to sustain on account of its present state of penury. As to Messrs. Santa Cruz and Guise, the government will take such measures as will be dictated by their wisdom.—For my part, I shall soon be in Truxillo, from which place I can communicate to the government whatever occurs to me upon these and other subjects of much importance. Before terminating this official letter, I must add, that the corps commanded by Raboa, who were the most obstinate, have now acknowledged the legitimate government; they are in this city, in a most lamentable state, on account of their small force and miserable condition: but I shall attempt to improve it as far as lies in my power. Within six days I shall be in Truxillo, and there I shall dictate measures to regulate every thing according to the views of the congress and the government. The promotion of General La Fuente has appeared to me just and proper, on account of his good conduct in such critical circumstances. May God preserve your excellency. (Signed) BOLIVAR.

No. 3.]—PATIVILCA, January 11th, 1824. My dear President—At last I am convalescent from my indisposition, which appears terminated, and has only left me a little debilitated. I cannot exactly mention the day when I shall set off for the capital, but it will be as soon as I am a little stronger. Colonel Heres will speak to you about a very important affair, which I communicate to him under this date. I think it is of the greatest importance, and recommend it to you most earnestly. I charge you with secrecy and promptitude in the execution of it. I am your affectionate friend and servant, BOLIVAR.

To His Excellency Don Jose Bernardo Tagle.

No. 4.]—PATIVILCA, January 11th, 1824. *'To Colonel Heres.'* My estimable Colonel—On account of the arrival at Lima of Mr. Alzaga, and the pressing requests which have been made to the government to commence negotiations on the convention celebrated between the commissioners of his Catholic Majesty and the government of Buenos Ayres, His Excellency the Liberator thinks that an armistice can take place between General La Serna and the government of Peru, which, lasting six months or more, shall protect us from being invaded by the Spanish army, which, at present, has a great numerical preponderance over that of Colombia. In effect, His Excellency desires that the convention of Buenos Ayres should be ratified with the Spaniards of Cuzco before it is ratified by our side, because it will be the means of obtaining more favourable terms; whereas, on the contrary, if we ratify it before La Serna, he, being sure of our assent, would increase his pretensions excessively, and all the disadvantages would fall upon us. The Libertador is of opinion, that the government, in accordance with the congress, should send a flag of truce to Cuzco, or wherever La Serna may be, inviting this general to enter upon a conference, the basis of which shall be the said armistice. This being agreed to by La Serna, he will send commissioners to Xauja, fully authorised to treat with us upon the armistice, a rule of demarcation, and other particulars, which his excellency proposes. His excellency desires that the language which the government makes use of may be in these, or other similar terms, indicating frankness of principle, liberality of ideas, and absolute confidence in the liberating armies and its chiefs. La Serna must be addressed with a noble pride, and without discovering, in any manner, our present state of debility. The Libertador is so satisfied with the result of this negotiation, that his excellency is responsible for the liberty of Peru, after an armistice of six months. All the difficulty rests in the affair being well managed, in order that its motive may never transpire.

His excellency the Liberator does not wish to give his countenance to the commencement of this negotiation, because it would indicate a state of debility in the army, and a want of confidence in our own force, that would cause the illusion of opinion to vanish, which the Spanish now entertain of his excellency. La Serna, and the other chiefs, would not consent to any thing to accelerate their march towards us, and the result of a battle would be uncertain. As soon as the auxiliaries arrive, which his excellency has asked from Colombia, and which he expects within six months, the fears which at present surround us will be dissipated. The greatest address is necessary in the management of this affair, and the most inviolable secrecy. The proposal which the government will make, always in its own name, *(and by no means in that of the Liberator,)* may be divulged to a few persons, but the causes from which they originate must remain absolutely a secret, even to those who assist in the negotiation. On this account, his excellency has not permitted me to reply, officially, to the government, respecting the arrival of Mr. Alzaga, his presentation to the con-

vention, &c. &c., and you will mention to his excellency, the president, in the name of the Libertador. The president must write, with a certain frankness to the chief of the vanguard, or to the viceroy, La Serna, in these or similar terms: "that he has been informed, that La Serna, animated by the most noble sentiments of philanthropy, was desirous of terminating the war of America by a pacific negotiation; that there has been sufficient blood shed; that the enlightened world is scandalized at this fratricidal contest; that the cannon has thundered long enough; that American blood has flowed too long by the hands of brothers; that, being all sons of liberty, and defending the rights of humanity, it appears that this sanguinary war is more monstrous from its inconsistency than from the disasters which it causes; that we are men, and should employ reason before force; that, let us once come to an understanding, and the good of America and that of Spain will concentrate in the same point; that the peninsular government, the Cortes, and the king, have acknowledged the independence of all America; that Buenos Ayres has already concluded her treaties, Mexico the same, and Colombia has already set on foot, at Bogota, a negotiation with the Spanish agents, on the preliminaries of an armistice and peace. It thus appears, that Peru alone is unfortunate in not enjoying repose, as the contending parties have not come to an understanding; that the government of Spain could derive many advantages from the actual position of Peru; and that human prudence would dictate that Spain should make use of the last hope which remains to her, of treating advantageously with us." La Serna must farther be told, "that, on account of the mission of Mr. Alzaga from the government of Buenos Ayres, and that a convention having been proposed, which has been concluded between the commissioners of his Catholic Majesty and Buenos Ayres, his excellency, the president, invites General La Serna to declare, explicitly, his intentions, his will, his assent to or his rejection of these treaties." The government should make it appear, in directing this communication, that the Libertador has no concern in it; that he has not merely withheld his assent, but that he has not even the least knowledge of the beneficent intentions of the government. In fine, not a word must be spoken, in the said communication, of his excellency, the Libertador. Adieu, my dear friend! this letter, although private in its form, has, virtually, all the character of an official letter. Let it be considered so in case of necessity. I am entirely yours,

JOSE DE ESPINAR, RABRICADO.

No. 6.—LIMA, January 13th, 1824. Most excellent Sir—I believe most firmly that every step towards a convention with the Spaniards will be useless, until we shall know from them whether they are disposed to negotiate. To this effect, I think it of immense importance that all responsibility resting upon me, as chief of Peru, whom I shall name, possessing distinguished civil and military knowledge, shall proceed to General Canterac, or to

General La Serna, in case the former shall not possess sufficient power. This previous step I think very important to the salvation of Peru; it will mark out the path we are to pursue in our ulterior arrangements; and I am resolved upon it. I only wait for the approbation of the sovereign congress, which is to be obtained by your excellency, to whom I reiterate the assurances of my high consideration and esteem.

(Signed) JOSE BERNARDO DE TAGLE.

To the President of the Congress.

No. 6.]—LIMA, January 16th, 1824. *To the most excellent Simon Bolivar.* My dear Libertador and friend—In consequence of what you informed me in your esteemed letter of the 11th of the present month, and by the letter under the same date directed to Colonel Heres, by your secretary, I proceeded to lay before congress the communication, a copy of which I transmit to you, marked No. 1, with the reply, which is marked No. 2. I have, in accordance with Colonel Heres, determined to direct a communication, in which, besides the general points which are contained in the letter of your secretary, are comprehended those which have been suggested and almost dictated by the said colonel, which are copied, and marked No. 3. The plenipotentiary of Buenos Ayres, to whom it was suggested by the minister of war, that General Guido should convoy this communication, on account of its importance, and in order better to explore the political attitude of the chiefs of the Spanish army, as appeared most proper to Heres,—refused his consent to the nomination, thinking it would be better to send some Peruvian of character, designating, at the same time, the said minister of war. Colonel Heres told me, that, in case of necessity, he should approve of this nomination; and I am now seeking a person to whom I can entrust this important commission; under the determination that, should I not meet with any other Peruvian than the minister of war who could fulfil this commission, I shall send him, notwithstanding the great loss he will be to me. Colonel Heres tells me that the express must immediately set off, so that I have no time to write more fully. Your most affectionate friend and obedient servant,

JOSE BERNARDO DE TAGLE.

No. 7.]—*To the most excellent Don Bernardo Tagle.* My general and friend—After I left your house, I reflected, at my leisure, on the letter which you should write to La Serna. The minister of war is right in his opinion. It is better to say nothing of the transmission of the papers. It appears to me, all those should be sent which are received from Europe, merely saying that they are enclosed; but as you have more judgment than myself, you may resolve upon what you may think most proper. I am your affectionate friend, (Signed) J. DE HERES.

No. 8.]—Four o'clock, P.M. of the 17th of January. My esteemed general—Have the goodness to defer our interview with Mr. Berindoaga to this night, at 7 o'clock, in your palace, as I am at present occupied with Mr. Alzaga. I am, general, your obedient servant, J. G. PEREZ.

No. 9.]—LIMA, January 17th, 1824. Most excellent Sir—General Heres, named by the government of Buenos Ayres to convey to your excellency, in behalf of the deputies of Spain on this continent, the preliminary convention, must have reached you about the same time that Don Felix Alzaga, the minister plenipotentiary, arrived here, soliciting the government of Peru to accede to this convention.

This government has been informed of the favourable desire of your excellency to terminate a sanguinary war, more monstrous by its inconsistency than by the disasters which it occasions. The enlightened world is scandalized at this fratricidal contest, in which the sons of liberty, in both hemispheres, fight against each other, without the Spaniards, on their side, being able to determine the object. Cannon have resounded too long ere the imperious voice of justice and humanity has been heard, through the means of a formal negotiation. The Cortes and the king, far from revolting at the independence of America, have authorised their commissioners to the northern and southern continents, to treat with them on this basis. Buenos Ayres and Mexico have already concluded their treaties. A negotiation in Bogota is already set on foot by the Spanish agents, on an armistice and preliminaries of peace, with respect to Colombia. Why, then, shall Peru alone be the scene of the most dreadful war, when the Spanish troops in her territory are directed by your excellency, whose sentiments of philanthropy, as well as the liberal principles which animate the chiefs of your army, are so well known? Let the effusion of blood, then, cease; let reason regain her rights; and let us preserve those forces which should give subsistence and life to the country. The government of Peru invites your excellency to declare explicitly your intentions and will respecting the preliminary convention, celebrated between the commissioners of his Catholic Majesty and Buenos Ayres. To this effect your excellency might appoint deputies to proceed to Xauja, the same thing taking place on the part of this government. In order to commence a conference, and to establish some points which may contribute to give formality to this negotiation, the brigadier-general, Don Juan de Berindoaga, minister of state, of war, and marine, and also charged with the department of foreign relations, is now despatched to your excellency. Peru may hope that the day will soon dawn which is to behold the Spaniards and Peruvians again linked together by the indissoluble ties produced by good faith, perpetual friendship, and the advantage formed by reciprocal

rights. I have the honour to offer to your excellency the sentiments, &c.

From the most excellent Jose Bernardo Tagle to the most excellent Don Jose de La Serna.

(This is a copy, Tagle.) HIPOLITO UNANUE.

No. 10.]—Instruction which the president of the Republic of Peru gives to Don Juan de Berindoaga, brigadier-general, minister of state, of war, and marine, and charged with the department of foreign relations, for the fulfilment of his commission, to the most excellent Don Jose de La Serna, or to his excellency Don Jose de Cantarac, in the case pointed out in these instructions.

1st. General Don Juan de Berindoaga must proceed to the most excellent Don Jose de La Serna, or to his excellency General Don Jose Cantarac, should he possess all the necessary powers, with the object of declaring the favourable disposition of the government of Peru to terminate the present scandalous war in which we find ourselves engaged.

2d. The commissioned general can make the necessary explanations on this matter, and regulate every thing according to the manner he may deem most proper, in order that deputies may be named by the chiefs of the Spanish troops, to treat on the armistice that is mentioned in the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres; keeping always in mind, that in this, as in every other negotiation with the Spaniards, the independence of America must be the basis.

3d. The deputies being nominated, the said General Berindoaga can return to Lima, or communicate from Xauja, there awaiting the orders which may be forwarded to him.

4th. The contents of the note under this date, which is directed to his Excellency Don Jose de La Serna, and the copy of which accompanies these instructions, will be the guide of his proceedings.

5th. In all that may occur, not comprehended in these instructions, he will proceed conformably to the peculiar circumstances which may present themselves, and according to the previous knowledge that he has of the government of Peru; always consulting its greatest advantage. JOSE BERNARDO DE TAGLE.

Lima, January 17th, 1824. *(Hipolito Unanue.)*

No. 11.]—An additional (and very confidential) article to the instructions given under this date, to the minister plenipotentiary, Don Juan de Berindoaga.

In case the Spaniards should be averse to treating on the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, the minister can propose to them a particular treaty with Peru, on the basis of independence.

JOSE BERNARDO DE TAGLE.

Lima, January 17th, 1824.

No. 12.]—Xauja, January 27th, 1824. Most excellent Sir—Having yesterday arrived at this town, with the credentials of minister plenipotentiary of independent Peru, to your excellency, or his excellency Don Jose de Cantarac, should he possess powers to commence a negotiation, this general yesterday sent to the said town, Field-Marshal Don Juan Loriga, general-in-chief of the staff, with instructions to have an interview with me, and to receive the letters directed to your excellency, and that I should wait a reply in Lima, or some intermediate point without your jurisdiction; since in your excellency alone the powers of fulfilling my commission reside. These things having taken place in pursuance of the philanthropic ideas of my government, and I being obliged to proceed to Lima, as I am not permitted to speak to your excellency, it is my duty to propose a suspension of hostilities for the necessary time to treat on the expediency of the preliminary convention of Buenos Ayres, and other reciprocal interests. Your excellency will please to command, if you should think proper, two deputies to proceed to Xauja, or any other point, whither the same number will immediately be sent by Peru. I hope that your excellency, penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the war, which is opposed to the views of this enlightened age, and to all liberal principles, will be pleased to accede to these measures proposed by my government, anxious to enjoy peace, as the greatest good that any triumph could obtain. I have the honour, &c.

From the most excellent Juan de Berindoaga, to the most excellent Don Juan de La Serna.

No 13.]—Xauja, 27th January, 1824. Most excellent Sir—To field-marshal Don Juan Loriga, general-in-chief of the staff, sent by your excellency to have an interview with me, and to receive the letters I had to deliver to him, I have shown my credentials as minister plenipotentiary to your excellency, or to his excellency Don Jose de La Serna. Not having the pleasure of speaking to your excellency, as I am obliged to return to Lima, or wait for a reply in some intermediate point without the territory occupied by the Spanish arms, I enclose to your excellency two parcels for the most excellent La Serna, one from his excellency the president of the Republic of Peru, the other to myself, opened, relative to the objects of my commission; will your excellency order that they be sent to their direction, and accept the particular consideration, &c. From the most excellent Juan de Berindoaga to the most excellent Don Jose de Cantarac.

No. 14.]—Xauja, 27th January, 1824. *To the most excellent Don Jose Cantarac.* Most excellent Sir—Much have I regretted not having spoken with you in Huancayo, as I expected, I think my mission would have had a more speedy and satisfactory result to our reciprocal interests Notwithstanding, I flatter myself that your excellency will contribute as much as is in your power to the

conclusion of all the differences that subsist between Spain and Peru. Until this happy day shall arrive, it is with pleasure I assure your excellency of the consideration, &c From the most excellent Juan de Berindoaga.

No. 15.]—I have received the letter, under date of yesterday which your excellency directed to me from Xuaja, enclosing two parcels for the viceroy of Peru, Don Jose de La Serna; one from Don Bernardo Tagle, and another, open, from your excellency, which will be forwarded to-day, by express, to their destination. As I am not authorised to commence any negotiation, your arrival at this place would have been useless. I will esteem it as a favour if your excellency will cause the parcel to be delivered which I send to you for Colonel Alduanti. May God preserve your excellency many years. (Signed) JOSE CANTARAC.

Head-quarters at Huancayo, January 27th, 1824.

No. 16.]—HUANCAYO, January 28th, 1824. *To Don Juan de Berindoaga.* Esteemed Sir—I reply to your excellency's letter of yesterday, by assuring you that my desires are, and always will be for the termination of the disagreement, now existing between some parts of Peru, and the mother country; and I shall take a particular pleasure in co-operating to this end. As I have already officially informed your excellency, not being empowered to commence any negotiation, your desire would be of no avail in personally proceeding to my head-quarters.

Yours, &c. JOSE CANTARAC.

No. 17.]—PATIVILCA, February 7th, 1824. My dear President—I have seen, with the greatest satisfaction, the result of the mission of General Berindoaga, as it was perfectly well managed by the negociator. By this step we have been able to sound the feelings and state of the enemy. General Berindoaga has done very well in giving the enemy the idea of a new treaty, which might be favourable to them; thus they may be led to expect something from the negotiation. On the whole, every thing has appeared to me perfectly right. I understand that you have desired to have a document from me, showing my approbation of the measure of entering into the negotiation with the enemy. This document is justly desired, and I am ready to give it in the most solemn manner; but I will observe to you, with frankness, that a doubt of my probity has never yet occurred but to my enemies, and I have never considered you as one of them. The proposal of Carrion, for a minister, was a piece of forgetfulness on my part, I not recollecting, at the time, that there was a minister appointed, and in the exercise of his functions. I knew that Mr. Valdiviero was in the territory of Riva Aguero, and that before he had been minister, and nothing more. I have for Mr. Valdiviero the esteem and consideration which he deserves. Have the goodness to make this public. To General Berindoaga, to whom I am going to

write very fully, have the goodness to present, in the mean time, the expressions of my satisfaction for his excellent conduct in the mission he has just fulfilled. Accept for yourself, the expression of, &c. BOLIVAR.

No. 18.]—Secretary-General's office of the Constitutional Congress of Peru, Lima, January 14th, 1824.

To the acting Secretary of His Excellency the Libertador. Mr. Secretary—We have the honour of directing to your excellency, for the information of his excellency the Libertador, the annexed notes, originals, and copies, forwarded on account of the arrival of Don Felix Alzaga, the minister plenipotentiary from the state of Buenos Ayres to this government, with the principal object of soliciting the accession of this government to the preliminary convention, held between Buenos Ayres and the commissioners of his Catholic Majesty, on which important affair the sovereign congress has determined to suspend their resolution, until they learn the opinion of his excellency the Libertador. Touching this matter, the congress have vacillated between conflicting reasons; for, if on one side, they are urged by the primary object of securing the independence and liberty of the republic against the intrigues of bad faith, and the spirit of domination profoundly rooted in the breasts of all Spaniards, who are always ready to violate the most sacred stipulations;—on the other side, they are urged by the desire of terminating a contest, which, infallibly, must be very bloody, on account of their prosperity and repeated success during the two preceding years, and the improper conduct which many of our countrymen have pursued in the towns they have occupied, and in the incursions they have made; which conduct, according to report, has alienated the minds of the people to the prejudice of themselves, as well as of the great American cause. To which may be added, the state of annihilation of the public treasury, wholly unable, at present, to give assistance and activity to a numerous army, which is required in order that the result may not be doubtful; and this deficiency of the treasury can only be supplied by violent extortions, which would probably be frustated by the poverty of individual fortunes. Under these circumstances, and because the congress have intrusted to the Libertador the salvation of the country, and reposed unlimited confidence in his military skill, prudence, and knowledge of the human heart, they hope to hear his thoughts on this delicate subject before proceeding to any resolution. May God preserve your excellency.—

(Signed) MANUEL TERREYROS.

To Joaquin Arrese, Deputy Secretary.

No. 19.]—Copy of the articles 2d and 9th, of the letter of the 7th of January, 1824, from General Bolivar to Don Jose Bernardo de Tagle.

2d. Much do I regret the affair of the grenadiers of the Rio de la Plata, since it indicates a continued state of anarchy. Have

the goodness to tell General Martinez, from me, that I should be much pleased, if, for the honour of the arms of his country, an exemplary punishment were made among the accomplices in this affair; and that, if they belonged to Colombia, I would shew him how they ought to be punished, as I did, when a military tumult took place in Truxillo, between the cuirassiers of General La Fuente and the hussars of my escort, a few hours before I left that place. This all happened on account of the hatred borne us by all those of the party of Riva Aguero, who always look upon us as the usurpers in Peru, having previously calumniated their government to us as guilty of corruption.

9th. I am desirous of having a great army near Huanúco, to prevent the enemy from getting to Lima. On this account, I desire that the battalion Vargas should be ready to march to the mountains, in order that our troops may be augmented on that side. The troops of Peru and the *Rio* de la Plata, are more than sufficient to defend Callao. Let new recruits be made in Lima, and the coast of its department, to augment the battalion of Pardo Zelo, which should be stationed in Callao to secure the recruits. This battalion should not be less than a thousand strong; and he is, decidedly the best chief, that is, as I have been informed by every one. Let all the recruits be from the coast, or else they will die. You can send recruiting parties to this department, or that of Lima, to raise troops to augment the defence of Callao. I should observe to you, that all Peruvian troops not employed in a fortress, will infallibly desert; and thus all the expense and trouble will be lost. You cannot imagine the difficulty I have had to retain in the ranks the troops of the north: Every day the battalions are renewed, and are always composed of recruits. Whenever they sleep in the open air, or perform long marches, they all desert. Such troops are not worth a groat. Their own chiefs proposed to me to send *them* to Callao, but, as they were *all* mountaineers, I knew that they would die. I prefer sending them to Caxamarca, where their subsistence will cost nothing, and they will be in a good climate. Their muskets are good for nothing. Finally, I frankly tell you, that I only depend upon the troops of Colombia, and, on this account, I am obliged to draw the last which remain in Callao, and Lima, to enable me to do something of importance.

[No. 20.]—Extract of a letter from Colonel Thomas Heres, to Don Jose Bernardo Tagle, of the 9th of January, 1824: "The Libertador enjoins me very particularly to write to you about having carried into effect the measures which he communicated to you in his official letter of the 14th December, from Caxamarca. In the state of this diseased body, amputations only can save it.

No. 21.] General Secretary's office, Head-quarters, Pativilca, February 8th, 1824.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of the North. General!—The army of the enemy may approach the capital; and your ex-

cellency, on account of the inferiority of the forces under your command, may find yourself unable to make any resistance. Under this impression, his excellency, the Libertador, commands me to communicate to you what follows, which is to contribute to the liberty of Peru.

1st. Your excellency will cause all the corps of infantry, without any exception, to commence their march to this place, by the route which you shall esteem most expedient; perhaps through Chancay, by old Frapiche to Rotes, thence to Huawza and thence to Pativilca.

2d. The corps of cavalry ought to form the vanguard, and the guerilla parties ought to be nearest the enemy, as corps of observation.

3d. Your excellency will dispatch, at any expence, some confidential and daring men to Callao, to go on board all the armed vessels there, but most particularly the armed vessels Guagas, Venganza, and Balcarser, and others of this description, with orders to bore holes in them, either to sink them completely, or render them useless.

4th. His excellency commands that all horses and mules shall be taken from the capital and its vicinity, as well as all articles of war, which are there to be found, all merchandise which may be employed to clothe the army, and, finally, all that may be useful to us and would assist the enemy.

5th. The transportation from the capital of these articles of war, clothing, and the rest, must be effected in any way that your excellency may judge most convenient.

6th. On no pretext whatever, should any thing be left in Lima which could be of any use to the Spaniards.

7th. To this effect his excellency, the Libertador, empowers you (keeping only in view the safety of the country and the army, and the necessity of removing resources from the reach of the enemy) to proceed to demand from the government, and from individuals, all articles of war, every thing useful in magazines, all moveable objects, and all merchandise which may be applied to clothing the army.

8th. His excellency authorises you, in case of refusal, or any resistance to giving up the articles asked for, to take them by force, and thus prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

9th. Finally, his excellency, the Libertador, desires that your excellency should be impressed with the importance of this commission, and that it should be fulfilled by your excellency, with all the zeal, activity, and all sufficient energy and skill necessary in the unfortunate event of an invasion of the capital by the enemy's force, which is to be feared.

10th. In order that the third article of these instructions may take effect, your excellency will offer to those employed, a great sum of money, which must be paid.

11th. For this, and other exposnes, which are absolutely indispensable under these circumstances, and to fulfil many other ob-

jects, his excellency impowers you to lay a contribution on persons of property, and see that it is immediately complied with.

12th. Your excellency will publish a proclamation in the capital, and in all places through which the army will pass under your command, in order that every man, and every slave, who may wish to follow the army, may present themselves, and become incorporated into it, without any fear of being returned to their masters.

Your excellency has nothing to expect from the inhabitants voluntarily; you must demand and take every thing by force. This method, in truth, is hard, but in the present state, it is indispensable. May God preserve, &c.

(*It is a copy, Espinar.*) (Signed) Jose de Espiner.

No. 22.] General Secretary's office, Head-quarters, Pativilca, 8th February, 1824.

To the Minister of War. Sir—I send you a copy of the note under this date, which I directed to Don Henriques Martinez, by order of his excellency the Libertador. May God preserve, &c.

To the Minister of War, from Jose de Espiner.

No. 23.] General Secretary's office, Head-quarters, Pativilca, 10th February, 1824.

To the General of the army of the centre, Don Henriques Martinez. General—I send you a duplicate, by order of his excellency, the Libertador, of my communication of the 8th of the present month, charging you again with its fulfilment. Callao is lost; and do not doubt but this is a work of the Spaniards. The capital will share the same fate, and you are exposed to be involved in its ruins. Your excellency is authorised to save yourself, and to save the remains of the army, the marine of war, and of commerce, for all which his excellency not only delegates to you the ample and extraordinary power of which he is possessed, but, at the same time, makes you responsible for any omission in the fulfilment of his instructions, which no human power can resist.* Your excellency will not only have the measures executed which I communicated to you in my note of the 8th, but, also, you will order a communication to be had with Vice-admiral Guise, in these, or similar terms; that Vice-Admiral Guise must enter Callao with his squadron, seize upon and take out all vessels, without exception, and those which he cannot remove he must sink or set on fire; and all those vessels which he shall succeed in removing, shall be considered as enemies' property, and condemned as lawful prizes, agreeably to the laws on that subject; and that he shall proceed afterwards with his squadron to the North, to receive the orders of his excellency the Libertador. You will endeavour, general, to save every thing that is possible;

*What respect and obedience to the congress! What consideration for the executive power! When this was said on the part of General Bolivar did he think himself omnipotent? What delirium!---what sacrilege. Note of Tolar Tagle.

and to remove from the capital every thing which may be of use to the army. Your excellency will proceed as a delegate of the Liberator, who invests you with his powers to do every thing which his excellency would do, were he present. Your excellency must imagine that the country being lost, all the ties of society broken, *there is no authority, nothing to be regarded;* and that you must deprive the enemy of the immense resources of which he is about to take possession. For all which his excellency has received sufficient authority from the congress, which he transfers to you. May God preserve, &c. To the general, from

(*It is a copy, Herrero.*) JOSE DE ESPINEN.

No. 24.]—LIMA, February 12, 1824. Sir—I have just received the official letter of his excellency, the Libertador, a copy of which I transmit to your excellency, in the order that, placing the contents of it before his excellency, the President, he may be pleased immediately to send me a reply, that I may, in consequence, guide myself by what the said most excellent gentleman shall determine.

HENRIQUES MARTINEZ.

To the Minister of War.

No. 25.] General Secretary's office of the Constitutional Congress of Peru, Lima, February 12th, 1824.

Sir—The sovereign congress being acquainted with the notes of the 8th and 9th of the present month, directed by the Libertador to General Martinez, have resolved—that a committee should be named from this body, who, with due instructions, shall proceed to his excellency, the Libertador, to make some necessary representations to him, in order that proper measures may be adopted for the salvation of the country; and that the effect of the said notes shall be suspended, as far as regards the security of the capital, till a reply shall be received from the Libertador, the government still continuing to remove the munitions of war, and, in case the enemy should advance upon the capital, every thing which would assist them to the prejudice of the cause, and of the army of the country.

By orders of the congress, we communicate this to your excellency, in order that, having the goodness to lay it before the President of the Republic, he may cause the same to be fulfilled.

May God preserve, &c.

From Joaquin and Araese, deputy-secretary; Jose Bartolome Serate, deputy-secretary, and minister of state in the department of the government.

Lima, February 12th, 1824. Let the previous order of the sovereign congress be observed and fulfilled; let a certified copy be made of it, and let it be transmitted to the minister of war for its fulfilment in the part which appertains to him. TAGLE.

(*It is a copy, Unanua.*)

No. 26.] Department of War and Marine,
Lima, February 15, 1824.

H. S. Minister—At the request of his excellency, the President of the Republic, I had the honour of transmitting, for your information and consequent proceeding, the order, which under this date, the deputy-secretaries of the congress have directed to me. The sovereign congress being informed of the note of the secretary of his excellency, dated the 11th of the present month, and directed to General Don Agustin Gamana, in which he confers upon him the powers which he had before given to General Don Henriques Martinez (should the latter not have fulfilled them), which note was presented by the minister of war; have resolved, that carrying into due effect what was before sanctioned, in consequence of the commission conferred upon General Martinez, the result of the committee dispatched from that body to the Libertador shall be received before any innovation is admitted.

By order of the same, we communicate this to your excellency, that, by your transmitting it to the President of the Republic, it may have its due effect. May God preserve, &c.

JOAQUIN DE ARRESE, Deputy-Secretary.
JOSE BARTOLOME SARATE, Deputy-Secretary.

I offer to your excellency the sentiments, &c.
(It is a copy, Unanue.)

No. 27.] General Secretary's office of the Congress,
Lima, February 17th, 1824.

The congress having been duly summoned, and only twenty-seven delegates having been assembled, which number is not sufficient, according to law, to constitute a quorum, the said gentlemen formed themselves into a private junta, when the reply of his excellency the Libertador was laid before them, and the request of General Necochea; and in consequence of the urgent necessity which connects the state of the castles of Callao, with the protests of responsibility again repeated, they have agreed—that the charge thereof being accepted by his excellency, the Libertador, the government should be told, that the moment has arrived in which the decree of the 10th of the present month must be published; and if, by that authority, any chief should appear, with sufficient credentials, demanding the civil and military command, in virtue of which it shall be given him, the said chief must be informed, that the congress, to prevent the abandonment of this city, has sent a committee to his excellency, the Libertador; and it is hoped that he will prudently await the reply before carrying into effect this measure. All which you will have the goodness to communicate to the President of the Republic, for his information and consequent orders.

May God preserve, &c.

JOAQUIADE ARRESE, Deputy-Secretary.
JOSE BARTOLOME SARATE, Deputy-Secretary.

No 28.]—*To the Minister of State in the department of the government.* LIMA, February 17th, 1824. Observe it and fulfil it, and, in consequence, let the decree of the 10th of the present month, of the sovereign congress, be proclaimed; and afterwards, let the civil and military command of the capital be delivered up to Don Mariano Necochea, on whom it has been conferred by his excellency, the Libertador, after having accepted the supreme dictatorship, given by the sovereign congress.

(Signed) TAGLE.

(It is a copy, Unanue.)

No. 29.]—PATIVILCA, January 29th, 1824. My dear President—This morning I received the note from the government, enclosing me the proposals, or rather the orders, of General La Fuente, that dispatches should be sent to his companions in arms. The tone of La Fuente with the government has shocked me, though previously I had reasons to be surprised at nothing. He, says, very plainly, that the dispatches must be sent—that is to say, he orders it. This general, my dear President, is more absolute than the congress, yourself, or I. Will you believe, that whilst he commanded at Truxillo, he retained those persons in the service whom the government had ordered to be shot? Colonel Devalos, who commanded on the night of my arrival at Truxillo, sent to me for orders. He has, furthermore, set Silva Novoa and Manrebo at liberty, who had robbed the state of more than a hundred thousand dollars; and this same La Fuente knows it by the declaration of Riva Aguero. I gave orders for these men to be arrested; and I added, in conversation, that I would set them at liberty, in order that they might leave the country, whenever the money should appear. Silva offered to make important disclosures, but nothing was done, all through the management of La Fuente. He, besides, excites jealousies among the troops, by his unjust preferences. His pride is such, that he sent me the countersign by his aide, I being, with my staff, at Truxillo; as if he were the chief, and not myself. At the dinner table he placed himself on my right. He came no farther than the door of the drawing-room to receive us * He never came to my house to consult me about any thing, as you have done so often, as well as the minister of state, and others. I know this was owing to your excessive goodness, but I also know the distance between yourself and him is immense. I will add, that these things made no impression upon me till this moment; but the insubordination of La Fuente is so great, that we cannot depend upon his obeying any thing that is ordered. You

* These ridiculous and whimsical observations of General Bolivar show not alone his vanity, but his mediocrity of mind. A man of superior talent, even General George Washington, would have never made these remarks, and much less in an official letter.—*Note of the Author.*

NOTE.—The originals of the papers which have been printed in this manifesto will remain in the secretary's office of the city council, till the 18th of the present month, in order that all who doubt their authenticity may be convinced by ocular demonstration. TORRE TAGLE.

must understand, that I reproved him very much for his disobedience to the government, respecting the execution of the criminals who were ordered to be shot, and I exhorted him to submit to the laws and the authorities. He replied, that he was commanded to commit an assassination, since the order was for the secret execution of the men, without trial and without witnesses. I replied to him, that I did not doubt that this all originated from Berindoago; and that you were too good, and too much of a gentleman, and that, occasionally, Berindoaga's advice was not the best, as in this case; for a secret execution, without trial of *persons of consequence,* was a shocking thing, and had always been disapproved of. Permit me, my dear president, to avail myself of this opportunity to give you my opinion, frankly, on this affair. Finally, I have many reasons for believing that General La Mar will experience much disgust from General La Fuente; he told me so himself before leaving that place, and expressed his regret that there was not another *Prefect* to this department. If General La Mar should be appointed Prefect of this department, with the power of nominating a *Sub-Prefect*, to take charge of the prefecture, he only retaining the authority and title, I think the service would proceed rapidly, and the embarrassments would be diminished. If this idea appear good to you, you can propose it to the congress from me. Let Mr. La Fuente go to Chili, to relieve Mr. Salazar, and every thing will be right. General La Fuente is really opposed to Riva Aguero and Herrera, but entirely devoted to the other accomplices of this conspiracy. He esteems General Santa Cruz passionately; so much so, that he wished me meanly to stoop to him. The purport of all this is, that the altar has remained entire, and that the idol alone is wanting, which was thrown down to make room for the successor, who is expected. This successor may be Santa Cruz, La Fuente, or any other ambitious person. The altar must be destroyed. Adieu, my dear President, I am cordially yours, BOLIVAR.

No. X.

Extract of a communication from Senor Manuel Vidaure, published in the Massachusetts Journal of August 19th, 1828:

"Bolivar called a convention, because he thought he should have a majority in it. He dissolved it by the scandalous method of causing some of the representatives to separate themselves, so that a quorum should attend the sittings. Brisenno Mendes was the commander of this disorganizing faction: Brisenno Mendes, the political offspring of Bolivar—his creature, his confidant; he who, with very little reserve, discovered in the congress of Panama the depth of the ambitious ideas of the American Napoleon. Let the impartial judge. Is not the case of Colombia entirely similar to that of Peru? There he convoked the congress, hoping that he should be able to dispose of the deputies at his pleasure. His success was not commensurate with his intentions. There were

infamous traitors, but the majority were sound. He impeded the installation of the congress, making the ignominy of the transaction fall on those pusillanimous persons who signed a pathetic petition, alleging reasons of agitation and disturbance. He protracted the dictatorship, and he did so in order to give a code repugnant to the will of the people—a code which deserves to be called the energetic expression of *absolutism*. Is not this precisely equivalent to the resolution of the householders of Carthagena, of the Canton of Ubate, and to the documents from the executive departments?

"Enlightened nations know that the powers of those who command are not enlarged except by intrigue, seduction, or force. It is impossible that change of this sort should proceed from a will that is free and regulated by reason. Who would be a slave, if he could be free? Who is not satisfied that he will be a slave, if he concedes extraordinary powers to a soldier? I ask whether Bolivar would have dispersed the convention, if a majority had been favourable to him? Would he have thrown obstacles in the way of the Peruvian congress, if a great number of faithful men had not manifested their sentiments in the preliminary meetings. Brisenno Mendes feigned himself oppressed in Colombia; some unprincipled Peruvian alleged the same in my country. Oppressed! they who have on their side the armed force! Oppressors I called them, and grievous oppressors! enemies of order, aspiring criminals against God and human nature. Can men read with moderation and sufferance, the following sentiments in the 'Redactor?"

"Carthagena rests the entire exercise of the sovereignty in the person of the Libertador.

"Ubate authorises, so far as may depend on her, the Libertador to be president, in order that he may take upon himself the absolute command.

"He unites the three powers, and proceeds to establish absolution in the world of Columbus! and are these acts and these maxims detailed, without fire flashing in the eyes, and the blood leaping to the cheeks? Be Bolivar absolute, but let him remember that all the thrones where despots have seated themselves have been stained with their own blood. There was a poinard for Henry IV. of France, the least wicked of kings, a dagger ——."

No. XII.

Organic Decree of General Bolivar (in virtue of which he has assumed the supreme power in Colombia), dated Bogota, 27th August, 1828.

TITLE 10TH;—OF THE SUPREME POWER.

Art. 1. The attributes of the supreme chief are to maintain peace in the interior, and defence against foreign invasions; to have the command of the land and sea forces; to negociate with foreign

powers; to make peace and declare war; to make treaties; to name all the civil and military officers.

The supreme chief has the right to render the decrees and ordinances necessary (of whatever description they be) to modify or reform the established laws, and to alter them entirely; and to look upon the execution of the decrees and ordinances, as upon laws to be maintained.

To manage the taxes; the administration of justice; the execution of judgments; the approbation or the reform of the sentences of court-martials; the commutation of punishment with the advice of the council of state, and upon the proposal of the courts, or after having heard them previously; the right of amnesty; or the granting of pardon for public or private faults, always with the advice of the council of state.

To give commissions to privateers.

To exercise the natural right of chief of the general administration of the republic in all its branches, and as being entrusted with supreme power of the state; finally, to preside in the council of state when he pleases.

Art. 2. The supreme chief will be assisted in the exercise of the executive by the council of ministers.

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